USEC Signs Multi-Year Contract with Russia’s TENEX for Low Enriched Uranium Supply
-Contract
Builds Upon an Existing Supply Arrangement with TENEX-; -Ensures
Diverse Mix of Supply Sources While USEC Continues to Deploy Its
American Centrifuge Project-
Wed, 03/23/2011
BETHESDA,
Md. – USEC Inc. (NYSE: USU) has signed a multi-year contract with
Russia’s Techsnabexport (TENEX) for the 10-year supply of low enriched
uranium (LEU) beginning in 2013 that will build on USEC’s long-term
relationship with TENEX. USEC and TENEX began working together in 1993
under the Megatons to Megawatts™ program. The new contract will provide
USEC with continued access to Russian enriched uranium, which currently
constitutes about one-half of USEC’s supply source.
USEC and TENEX signed the contract today in Washington, D.C. Under
the terms of the contract, the supply of LEU to USEC will begin in 2013
and ramp up until it reaches a level in 2015 that is approximately
one-half the level currently supplied by TENEX to USEC under the
Megatons to Megawatts program with the mutual option to increase the
quantities up to the same level as that program. Unlike the Megatons to
Megawatts program, the quantities supplied under the new contract will
come from Russia’s commercial enrichment activities rather than from
downblending of excess Russian weapons material.
“After safety, one of USEC’s top priorities is to meet our customers’
long-term needs for enriched uranium, and our decision to enter into
this contract with TENEX is further evidence of our commitment and
ability to meet those needs,” said John K. Welch, president and CEO of
USEC.
“We believe this new contract will further strengthen our important
relationship with TENEX. Over the past two decades this relationship has
supported our efforts to provide long-term reliable supplies of
enriched uranium to our customers while maintaining a strong domestic
production capacity based on U.S. technology,” Welch said.
“USEC remains fully committed to deploying our American Centrifuge
technology in our new plant in Ohio and extending the operations of our
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Kentucky. This contract complements
those ongoing activities as we maintain our market position during this
important transition period.”
USEC will deliver the enriched uranium supplied under this contract
to USEC’s customers under its portfolio of contracts. Under the
quantitative limitations on imports of Russian enriched uranium in the
United States through 2020, USEC will deliver a portion of the enriched
uranium to U.S. utilities with most of the enriched uranium to be
delivered to USEC’s customers outside of the United States in both
existing and emerging markets.
The new contract assures USEC continued access to an important part
of its existing supply mix, which complements USEC’s ongoing efforts to
deploy the American Centrifuge Plant in Piketon, Ohio, using advanced
U.S. centrifuge technology. With this contract in place, USEC will
continue to be one of the world’s leading suppliers of enriched uranium,
while transitioning to new domestic production from the American
Centrifuge Plant.
This new contract does not affect USEC’s domestic production of
enriched uranium or its highest priority objective to deploy the
American Centrifuge technology. USEC’s plant in Paducah, Ky., remains
USEC’s key supply source today. USEC continues to make progress in
obtaining a $2 billion loan guarantee from the U.S. Department of Energy
and additional financing to support the deployment of the American
Centrifuge Plant. However, by supplementing its domestic capacity with
continued access to Russian LEU, USEC can assure customers that its
supply mix will remain sufficiently robust to meet their needs
throughout the transition to the American Centrifuge Plant.
Deliveries under the contract are expected to continue through 2022.
USEC will purchase the separative work units (SWU) contained in the LEU
and deliver natural uranium to TENEX for the LEU’s uranium component.
The pricing terms for SWU under the contract are proprietary but are
based on a mix of market-related price points and other factors.
The effectiveness of the new contract between TENEX and USEC is
subject to approval of the Russian State Corporation for Atomic Energy
(ROSATOM) and completion of administrative arrangements between the U.S.
and Russian governments under the agreement for cooperation in nuclear
energy between the United States and the Russian Federation (the Russia
123 Agreement) which, among other things, provides the framework for the
return to Russia of natural uranium delivered by USEC to TENEX. USEC
anticipates that these implementing arrangements will be completed in
2011.
Following approval of the new supply contract by ROSATOM, USEC and
TENEX expect to conduct a feasibility study to explore the possible
deployment of an enrichment plant in the United States employing Russian
centrifuge technology. As part of the feasibility study, ROSATOM, USEC
and TENEX will review international agreements, government approvals,
licensing, financing, market demand and commercial arrangements. Any
decision to proceed with such a project would depend on the results of
the feasibility study and would be subject to further agreement between
the parties and their respective governments. In any event, such a
project would not be deployed until after completion of the American
Centrifuge project. This initiative is part of USEC’s strategic approach
in serving its customers in the uranium enrichment market.
USEC Inc., a global energy company, is a leading supplier of enriched uranium fuel for commercial nuclear power plants.
The Megatons to Megawatts Program is a unique, commercially financed
government-industry partnership in which bomb-grade uranium from
dismantled Russian nuclear warheads is being recycled into LEU used to
produce fuel for American nuclear power plants. USEC, as executive agent
for the U.S. government, and TENEX, acting for the Russian government,
implement this 20-year, $8 billion program at no cost to taxpayers. This
program is on track to complete the downblending of the equivalent of
20,000 nuclear warheads into commercial nuclear fuel by the program’s
conclusion at the end of 2013.
Forward-Looking Statements
This news release contains “forward-looking statements” within the
meaning of Section 21E of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 – that is,
statements related to future events. In this context, forward-looking
statements may address our expected future business and financial
performance, and often contain words such as “expects,” “anticipates,”
“intends,” “plans,” “believes,” “will” and other words of similar
meaning. Forward-looking statements by their nature address matters that
are, to different degrees, uncertain. For USEC, particular risks and
uncertainties that could cause our actual future results to differ
materially from those expressed in our forward-looking statements
include, but are not limited to: risks related to the effectiveness of
USEC’s new supply contract with TENEX, including the receipt of approval
of ROSATOM and completion of administrative agreements between the U.S.
and Russian governments under the cooperation agreement that are
required for the new contract to take effect; uncertainty regarding the
results of any feasibility study conducted regarding the possible
deployment of an enrichment plant in the United States employing Russian
centrifuge technology; risks related to the deployment of the American
Centrifuge technology, including risks related to performance, cost,
schedule and financing; our success in obtaining a loan guarantee from
the U.S. Department of Energy (“DOE”) for the American Centrifuge Plant,
including our ability to address the technical and financial concerns
raised by DOE and the timing of any loan guarantee; our ability to reach
agreement with DOE on acceptable terms of a conditional commitment,
including credit subsidy cost, and our ability to meet any required
conditions to funding; our ability to obtain additional financing beyond
the $2 billion of DOE loan guarantee funding for which we have applied,
including our success in obtaining Japanese export credit agency
financing of up to $1 billion; the impact of the demobilization of the
American Centrifuge project and uncertainty regarding our ability to
remobilize the project and the potential for termination of the project;
our ability to meet the November 2011 financing milestone and other
milestones under the June 2002 DOE-USEC Agreement; restrictions in our
credit facility that may impact our operating and financial flexibility
and spending on the American Centrifuge project; risks related to the
completion of the remaining two phases of the three-phased strategic
investment by Toshiba Corporation and Babcock & Wilcox Investment
Company, including our ability to satisfy the significant closing
conditions in the securities purchase agreement governing the
transactions and the impact of a failure to consummate the transactions
on our business and prospects; uncertainty regarding the cost of
electric power used at our gaseous diffusion plant; the economics of
extended Paducah plant operations, including our ability to negotiate an
acceptable power arrangement and our ability to obtain a contract to
enrich DOE’s depleted uranium; our dependence on deliveries of LEU from
Russia under the Russian Contract and on a single production facility;
pricing trends and demand in the uranium and enrichment markets and
their impact on our profitability; changes in U.S. government priorities
and the availability of government funding, including loan guarantees;
the impact of government regulation by DOE and the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission; the competitive environment for our products and
services; changes in the nuclear energy industry; the impact of the
recent natural disaster in Japan on the nuclear industry and our
revenues and results of operations and prospects; and other risks and
uncertainties discussed in our filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, including our annual report on Form 10-K and quarterly
reports on Form 10-Q, which are available on our website at www.usec.com. We do not undertake to update our forward-looking statements except as required by law.
http://www.usec.com/news/usec-signs-multi-year-contract-russia%E2%80%99s-tenex-low-enriched-uranium-supply
Contact:
Media: Paul Jacobson (301) 564-3399
Investors: Steve Wingfield (301) 564-3354
Investors: Steve Wingfield (301) 564-3354
RUSSIAN-U.S.
HEU AGREEMENT
[Russian-U.S.
agreement concerning the disposition of highly enriched uranium
extracted from nuclear weapons]
The
Governments of United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereafter referred
to as the Parties,
Desiring
to arrange the safe and prompt disposition for peaceful purposes of highly enriched
uranium resulting from the dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia, bearing in
mind existing agreements in the area of arms control and disarmament, the reduction
of nuclear weapons in accordance with existing agreements in the area of arms
control and disarmament,
Reaffirming
their commitment to ensure that the development and use of nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes are carried out under arrangements that will further the
objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1,
1968, Affirming their commitment to ensure that nuclear material transferred
for peaceful purposes pursuant to this Agreement will comply with all applicable
non-proliferation, material accounting and control, physical protection, and
environmental requirements.
Have
agreed as follows:
ARTICLE
I: PURPOSE
The
Parties shall cooperate in order to achieve the following objectives:
1.
The conversion as soon as practicable of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
resulting from dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia extracted from
nuclear weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to
arms control agreements and other commitments of the parties which is
currently estimated at approximately
500
metric tons in the Russian
Federation, having an average assay of 90
percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 into low enriched
uranium (LEU) for use as fuel in commercial nuclear reactors. For purposes
of this Agreement, LEU shall mean uranium enriched to less than 20 percent in
the isotope 235; and
2.
The technology developed in the Russian Federation for conversion of HEU resulting
from the reduction of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation may be used for
conversion of United States HEU in the United States of America; and
3.
The establishment of appropriate measures to fulfill the
non-proliferation, physical security protection, nuclear material
accounting and control, and environmental requirements of the Parties
with respect to HEU and LEU subject to this Agreement.
ARTICLE
II: IMPLEMENTING CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS
1.
The Parties, through their Executive Agents, shall within twelve six months
from entry into force of this Agreement seek to enter into an initial
implementing contract to accomplish the objectives set forth in Article I of
this Agreement.
The
Parties may conclude additional implementing contracts or agreements pursuant
to his Agreement, as required. For any purchase, the Executive Agents
shall negotiate terms (including price), which shall be subject to
approval by the Parties.
2.
It is the intent of the Parties that the initial implementing contract shall
provide for, inter alias:
i.
The purchase by the United States Executive Agent of HEU, conversion of such
HEU to LEU. LEU converted from HEU at facilities in the Russian Federation and sale
of
the
LEU for commercial purposes. and/ or the purchase by the United States Executive
Agent of LEU converted from HEU at facilities in Russia and sale of such
LEU for commercial purposes; The United States will provide information
to the Russian Federation on all commercial disposition of such LEU;
ii.
Initial delivery of HEU or LEU converted from HEU resulting from the dismantlement
of nuclear weapons in Russia by October 1993, Initial delivery of LEU
converted from HEU extracted from nuclear weapons resulting from the
reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to arms control agreements and other
commitments of the parties by October 1993, if possible;
iii.
Conversion of no less than 10 metric tons of HEU having an average assay of 90
percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235 in each of the first five years,
and, in each year thereafter, conversion of no less than 30 metric tons of HEU
having an average assay of 90 percent or greater of the uranium isotope 235;
however, specific amounts will be stipulated in the first and subsequent
implementing contracts;
iv.
The participation of the U.S.
private sector and of Russian enterprises;
v.
The allocation among the United States of America,
private sector firms of the United States of
America, the Russian Federation, and Russian
enterprises of any proceeds or costs arising out of activities undertaken
pursuant to any implementing contract;
vi.
The use by the Russian Federation side of a portion of the proceeds from the sale
of HEU or LEU converted from HEU for the conversion of defense enterprises, enhancing
the safety of nuclear power plants, environmental clean-up of polluted areas
and the construction and operation of facilities in the Russian Federation for the
conversion of HEU to LEU,
vii.
By agreement of the Parties an equivalent amount of HEU can substitute for the
corresponding amount of LEU planned for purchase by the United States Executive
Agent.
ARTICLE
III: EXECUTIVE AGENTS
Each
Party shall designate an executive agent to implement this Agreement. For
the United States side
of America
the executive agent shall be the Department of Energy hereinafter referred to
as DOE. For the Russian side Federation the Executive Agent shall be the
Ministry of the Russian Federation of Atomic Energy.
After
consultation with the other Party, either Party has the right to change
its executive agent upon 30 days written notice to the other Party.
If
a governmental corporation is established under United
States law to manage the uranium enrichment
enterprise of the Department of Energy, it is the intention of the United
States Government to designate that corporation as the Executive Agent for the United States side.
ARTICLE
IV:
PRIORITY
OF AGREEMENT.
In
case of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any implementing contracts
or agreements, the provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.
ARTICLE
V:
ADDITIONAL
MEASURES
1.The
Executive Agent of the Russian
Federation shall ensure that the quality of
HEU LEU derived from HEU subject to this Agreement is such that it is
convertible to LEU usable in commercial reactors. Specifications shall be
agreed upon in the Process of negotiating the initial and subsequent
implementing contracts.
2.
The conversion of HEU subject to this Agreement shall commence as soon as possible
after the entry into force of the initial implementing contract.
3.
The Parties shall, to the extent practicable, seek to arrange for more rapid
conversion of HEU to LEU than that provided for in Article II (2) (iii).
4.
The United States of America
shall use HEU and LEU acquired pursuant to this Agreement and its implementing contracts and
agreements, when subject to United
States
jurisdiction and control, for peaceful purposes only.
5.
HEU and LEU acquired by the United States of America pursuant to this
Agreement, and implementing contracts and agreements related to it, shall be
subject to safeguards in accordance with the November 18, 1977 Agreement
between the United States of America and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) for the Application of Safeguards in connection with the
Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968.
6.
The Parties shall maintain physical protection of HEU and LEU subject to this Agreement.
Such protection shall, at a minimum, provide protection comparable to the
recommendation set forth in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/REV.2 concerning
the physical protection of nuclear material.
7.
If the Parties enter into an agreement for cooperation concerning the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, nuclear material acquired by the United States of America pursuant to this
Agreement and its implementing contracts and agreements, when subject to U.S.
jurisdiction or control, shall be subject to the terms and conditions of
that Agreement for cooperation.
8.
The activities of the United States Government of America under this
Agreement, or any implementing contract or agreement shall be subject to
the availability of United States Government funds.
9.
In the event the United States Government does not have funds available for
implementation of this Agreement, the Executive Agent of the Russian Federation reserves the option to
obtain funding for implementation of this Agreement from any private U.S.
company.
10.
Prior to the conclusion of any implementing contract, the Parties shall
establish transparency measures to ensure that the objectives of this Agreement
are met, including provisions for nuclear material accounting and control and
access, from the time that HEU is made available for conversion until it
is converted into LEU. Specific transparency measures shall be established
in the same time frame as the negotiation of the initial implementing
contract, and shall be executed by a separate agreement.
11.
Prior to the conclusion of any implementing contract, the Parties shall agree
on appropriate governing provisions for entry and exit, liability, and
status of personnel, exemptions for taxes and other duties, and applicable law
.
12.
The Executive Agent of the United
States shall use the LEU converted from HEU
in
such
a manner so as to minimize disruptions in the market and maximize the overall economic
benefit for both Parties.
This
Agreement shall have no effect on contracts between the Russian
Federation Russian enterprises and United States companies for the
delivery of uranium products which are currently in force and consistent
with United States and Russian law.
13.This
Agreement places no limitations on the right of the Russian
Federation to dispose of LEU derived from HEU resulting
from dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia extracted from nuclear
weapons resulting from the reduction of nuclear weapons pursuant to arms
control agreements and other commitments of the Parties beyond the
specific commitments set forth herein.
ARTICLE
VI:
ENTRY
INTO FORCE, DURATION AND AMENDMENTS
1.
This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force
for twenty years until the full amount of HEU provided for in paragraph 1
of Article 1 is converted into LEU, delivered, and supplied to commercial
customers.
The
duration of this Agreement may be extended by the written agreement of
the Parties.
2.
Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement.
Agreed
amendments shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force
so long as this Agreement remains in force.
Each
Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement upon 12 months written
notification to the other Party .
Done
at Washington
this 18th day of February 1993, in duplicate in the English and Russian
languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For
the United States of America:
William Burns
For the Russian Federation:
Viktor Mikhailov Printer
Friendly Version
Uranium Diet: US Nuclear Power Industry
Could Face Fuel Shortage
By Ivan Fursov
http://www.countercurrents.org/fursov250913.htm
25 September, 2013
An aerial view of the Limerick Generating Station, a nuclear power plant
in Pottstown, Pennsylvania (AFP Photo / Stan Honda)
Russia has
been supplying US nuclear power plants with fuel for a dumping price
since 1995. But with the HEU-LEU agreement coming to an end, America’s
nuclear power generation industry is likely to face a sharp fuel price
surge and shortage.
The HEU-LEU agreement
(Megatons to Megawatts Program) signed in 1993 supposed downblending of
500 tons of Soviet-made military grade highly enriched uranium (HEU)
(equivalent to 20,000 nuclear warheads) into low-enriched uranium (LEU)
to produce fuel for American nuclear power plants out of it.
The program supplied up to 40 percent of
nuclear fuel for America’s 104 nuclear reactors (America’s 65 nuclear
power plants generate over 19 percent of electric power in the country)
and appeared to be extremely profitable. For example in 1993-2009,
Russia raised a mere $8.8 billion by selling hundreds of tons of
highly-enriched uranium (HEU), allegedly at a fixed price lower than
enriched uranium production costs at the time.
Still, Russian state nuclear corporation
Rosatom has put the money ($12 billion for the HEU-LEU agreement in
total) to good use, investing in fundamental research and
infrastructure, in particular into innovative uranium enrichment
technology and fuel assembly fabrication.
Today Rosatom possesses cutting edge
gaseous centrifuge enrichment industry concentrated at four facilities
in Siberia and the Urals, making up to 40 percent of the world
enrichment capacities.
The HEU-LEU agreement is due to end in
November 2013 with the final contracted tons of nuclear fuel delivered
to the American customer, United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
The US has the highest number of commercial nuclear power plants and is the biggest consumer of nuclear fuel in the world.
To meet the high internal consumption
the US government has not only been buying uranium fuel from Russia, but
also has been converting its own nuclear warheads into power plant
fuel. In 1996, the US government declared 174.3 tons of military HEU as
surplus and recycled it into LEU fuel.
The US stopped producing HEU back in
1964, when it reached the maximum of 30,000 nuclear warheads in its
possession, while Russia ceased to produce it in 1988, when the USSR
already possessed 44,000 nuclear warheads. For some time the USEC
continued producing HEU for submarine nuclear reactors, but ceased this
kind of production in 1992. Production of military-grade plutonium has
also been stopped in both the US (in 1988) and Russia (in 1994).
Both France and the UK stopped HEU
production in 1990s, with reportedly only two countries in the world,
India and Pakistan, still producing it for internal military needs.
With an estimated 2,000 tons of
highly-enriched uranium produced by all members of the ‘nuclear club’
ever, at least a third of the metal has already been recycled into fuel.
Since no nuclear-capable country is willing to disarm altogether, the
process of downblending is finite.
While Rosatom has been successfully
developing in every direction over recent years, the USEC continues to
rely on outdated and extremely costly gas-diffusion enrichment
technology despite multibillion-dollar investments into infrastructure.
The corporation’s gaseous centrifuge enrichment project at American
Centrifuge Plant at Piketon, West Virginia, worth $3 billion, is
suffering constant technical problems and is far from up-and-running at
full capacity.
In 2012, the Russian Foreign Ministry
announced that Moscow is not going to extend the so-called Nunn–Lugar
program (Cooperative Threat Reduction [CTR] Program), within the
framework of which the Megatons to Megawatts Program has been operating
for national security reasons.
To keep up with the changes in 2011 USEC signed a contract
with Russia’s TENEX for 10-year supply of low-enriched uranium starting
in 2013. By 2015, the level of LEU supply to USEC is expected to reach
half the original level of TENEX’s supplies. However, the quantities
supplied under the new contract will come from Russia’s commercial
enrichment activities, meaning the enriched uranium will be sold to the
US for a considerably higher international market price. Of course, this
could have an impact on internal US electric power generation and
consumption.
Fast reactors and closed nuclear fuel cycle
Meanwhile, Russia is the only country
that has developed industrial scale fast-neutron nuclear reactors, the
so-called breeder reactor technology that enables to use a wider range
of radioactive elements as nuclear fuel and - besides producing electric
energy - generating more fissile material that can be used as nuclear
fuel than it consumes. This brings us to the closed nuclear fuel cycle, a
long-lasting dream of the nuclear energy industry that one day might
come true.
With the BN-600 breeder reactor (600
megawatt) at Russia’s Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant running since
1980, the assembly of the next generation BN-800 breeder reactor (880
megawatts) at the same site is set to be finished by the end of 2013 and
operational in September 2014.
Russian physicists have already
elaborated a next step for the revolutionary technology, a BN-1200
breeder reactor that is set to be assembled at Beloyarskaya nuclear
power plant by 2020.
Overall eight BN-1200 breeder reactors
are expected to be constructed by 2030, marking the dawn of a new era of
nuclear energy power generation – a truly ‘green’ and ecologically
secure closed nuclear fuel cycle.
Plutonium hunger
Space exploration and plutonium-238 are two things inexorably associated with each other.
Actually, all the information that
humankind so far obtained from its lasting many years unmanned missions
to Solar System’s planets is thanks to plutonium, as no other element
can help maintain energy self-sustainability of a space vehicle better.
All spacecraft from Voyager 1 - which
has become the first manmade object to reach interstellar space - right
to the Curiosity rover currently exploring Mars, are fuelled by
plutonium. Because solar panels are too big and energetically
inefficient, a nuclear reactor is too heavy and complicated, chemical
electric batteries that could last for years do not exist, so only
radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTG) using plutonium-238 as fuel
are proven and reliable source of power in space.
But there is a peculiarity: Voyager 1 is
still sending data using electricity generated from US-produced
plutonium, while the Curiosity rover operates on watts generated from
plutonium ‘made in Russia’.
Over the last years NASA has been
ringing alarm bells over not having enough plutonium-238 to power up its
deep space exploration mission space crafts, because the US stopped
plutonium production decades ago and cannot restore the technology
anytime soon.
Unlike plutonium-239 that is used to
make nuclear bombs and of which the US possesses hundreds of tons, its
close isotope plutonium-238 is a much rarer element.
With nuclear disarmament gaining
momentum after the end of the Cold War, the US stopped producing
military grade plutonium in 1992, with Russia shutting down its last
military reactor producing plutonium-239 in 2010. But only Russia
maintained industrial production of various isotopes of plutonium.
NASA’s plutonium poverty is a
long-lasting problem. The US space agency used to buy the necessary
radioactive element from the sole planetary plutonium producer Russia
for years, but starting from 2009, when Moscow demanded revision of the
old contract and hiked the price, the US stopped buying plutonium from
Russia.
The US agency currently has just about
16kg of Pu-238, which isn’t much. The Curiosity rover’s ‘atomic heart’
consists of an RTG with over 4kg of the precious radioactive element,
reports The Wired. But for example launched in 2006 New Horizons probe
bound to Pluto right now travels through space with 11kg of the nuclear
material on board.
NASA admits it has plutonium enough only
till the end of this decade, but a number of missions have already been
shelved entirely due to the lack of Pu-238.
Besides that, many military satellites
also run on plutonium. As recently as August 28 this year, a Delta IV
heavy rocket launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California
delivered to orbit huge KH-11 intelligence satellite for the US National
Reconnaissance Office. Even if this satellite has solar panels, as any
military installation it must have a reserve power supply, most probably
an RTG.
On the off chance the Pentagon has some
secret plutonium stash, it wouldn’t last long, simply because the US
stopped its own plutonium production in 1988.
On top of all plutonium-238 half life is
only about 87.7 years (for other plutonium isotopes it could be
thousands or millions of years), so the metal produced a quarter of a
century ago has partly lost its energy potential already.
The US Atomic Energy Act forbids NASA
from manufacturing plutonium-238 on its own, so starting from 2001 the
space agency has been pressing the US authorities to restore Pu-238
production. The program estimated between $85 and $125 million is
developing with a slow pace with financing of only $10 million in 2013.
The program would imply using two
reactors, the High Flux Isotope Reactor at Oak Ridge National Laboratory
in Tennessee and the Advanced Test Reactor west of Idaho Falls, and is
supposed to deliver 1.5-2kg of plutonium annually starting from 2017.
But even that supply is not likely to
satisfy NASA’s needs as production of plutonium for a mission like the
New Horizons would take years, while there are more missions that cannot
wait.
© Autonomous Nonprofit Organization “TV-Novosti”, 2005–2013.
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