Senin, 17 November 2014

       Ini Jawaban Mitos Banyak Korban         Tenggelam di Pantai Selatan Jawa
http://owunik.blogspot.com/2014/11/ini-jawaban-mitos-banyak-korban.html#.VGikOSZtv9M.facebook


Mengenakan pakaian renang warna tertentu kabarnya bahaya kalau berenang di pantai selatan Jawa, bisa-bisa diambil anak buah Penguasa gaib Laut Selatan. Mitos ini telah berkembang sejak dulu, sehingga berakar kuat dalam kepercayaan masyarakat.

Memang seringkali laporan muncul banyak orang tenggelam atau terbawa arus yang tiba-tiba seperti menarik ke lautan lepas. Pantai-pantai wisata seperti Pelabuhan Ratu dan Parangtritis begitu akrab dengan kisah misterius semacam itu.
ripcurrent2
Sebenarnya ada jawaban secara ilmiah yang bisa menjawab mengapa hal itu bisa terjadi. Para praktisi ilmu kebumian mengamati pantai Parangtritis selama bertahun-tahun, dan akhirnya inilah kemungkinan yang jadi penyebab utama hilangnya sejumlah wisatawan di Pantai Parangtritis.

Rip current, yakni arus  balik yang merupakan aliran air gelombang datang yang membentur pantai dan kembali lagi ke laut. Arus itu bisa menjadi amat kuat karena biasanya merupakan akumulasi dari pertemuan dua atau lebih gelombang datang. Dengan kecepatan mencapai 80 kilometer per jam, arus balik itu tidak hanya kuat, tetapi juga mematikan.

Kepala Laboratorium Geospasial Parangtritis I Nyoman Sukmantalya mengatakan, sampai sekarang informasi mengenai rip current amat minim. Akibatnya, masyarakat masih sering mengaitkan peristiwa hilangnya korban di pantai selatan DI Yogyakarta dengan hal-hal yang berbau mistis.

“Bisa dibayangkan kekuatan seret arus balik beberapa kali lebih kuat dari terpaan ombak datang. Wisatawan yang tidak waspada dapat dengan mudah hanyut,” demikian papar Nyoman.
rip-current-1
Celakanya, arus balik terjadi begitu cepat, bahkan dalam hitungan detik. Arus itu juga bukan hanya berlangsung di satu tempat, melainkan berganti-ganti lokasi sesuai dengan arah datangnya gelombang yang juga menyesuaikan dengan arah embusan angin dari laut menuju darat.

Nyoman melanjutkan, korban mudah terseret arus balik karena berada terlalu jauh dari bibir pantai. Ketika korban diterjang arus balik, posisinya akan mudah labil karena kakinya tidak memijak pantai dengan kuat. “Karena terseret tiba-tiba dan tidak bisa berpegangan pada apa pun, korban menjadi mudah panik, dan tenggelam karena kelelahan,” lanjutnya.

Sementara staf Ahli Pusat Studi Bencana Universitas Gadjah Mada, Djati Mardianto, melanjutkan, apabila korban tetap tenang saat terseret arus, besar kemungkinan baginya untuk kembali ke permukaan. “Karena arus berputar di dasar laut sehingga materi di bawah bisa naik lagi,” ujar Djati.

Setelah mengapung, korban bisa berenang ke tepi laut, atau membiarkan diri terempas ke pantai oleh gelombang datang lain. Setidak-tidaknya, korban memiliki kesempatan untuk melambaikan tangan atau berteriak minta tolong.

nyi-roro-kidul



Sumber : Owunik . blogspot . com - yang unik, emang asyik :)

17 interesting facts about Iran’s nuclear program



Photo: 17 interesting facts about Iran’s nuclear program / Nuclear Program

                                                         Baku, Azerbaijan, Nov. 19

By Umid Niayesh - Trend:

Today over 30 countries around the world use nuclear energy with about 440 operating nuclear power plants. The Islamic Republic of Iran is one of them, and that country specifically has been in the media spotlight for the last 10 years.

Why? Is it controversial? Is it dangerous? Should it be contained? As of yet, Pakistan is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapon. Iran, according to some world powers, is trying to become the second one.

There are at least ten articles being published on Iran's nuclear program all over the internet. The US and its west allies suspects Iran of developing a nuclear weapon - something that Iran denies. The Islamic Republic has on numerous occasions stated that it does not seek to develop nuclear weapons, using nuclear technology for electricity generation and medical purposes instead.

So, what is Iran's nuclear program that everyone talks about? Below is a list of interesting facts about what Iran claims is its "Inalienable right".

1. The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s during the Shah regime with the help of the United States as part of the “Atoms for Peace" program. Under the agreement, the United States agreed to provide Tehran with a nuclear research reactor and several power plants.

2. Why did Iran need the nuclear program in the first place? According to the Shah, at the time, the goal of the program was to save "valuable petroleum for high-value products, not just simple electricity generation."

3. First nuclear reactors in Iran were built under the program by American Machine and Foundry (AMF) - one of the largest recreational equipment companies in the United States.

4. The US and other European governments participated in development of Iran's nuclear program until the 1979 - the year, when Iran lived through a revolution, which had Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi overthrown.

5. Iran's nuclear program wasn't painless, so to speak. Former Iranian foreign minister Abbas Ali Khalatbari became the first to pay the price. Following the 1979 Revolution, he was arrested and sentenced to death on charges of corruption and treason. He was reportedly charged of wasting country’s assets signing the contract to build the Iran’s first nuclear power plant.

6. After the revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became the Supreme Leader of Iran. At the time, during the first several years after the revolution, the country's officials were against the nuclear program. New Iranian government canceled the US contract to build two nuclear power plants in the city of Bushehr on the Gulf coast. An article in one of Iran's official newspapers at the time said: "Nuclear Power Plants: An Obvious Treason to Our Nation."

7. Iran did have some period of time, when the government was pursuing nuclear weapons, in particular during the eight-year war with Iraq, however both the founder of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei opposed nuclear weapons. Khamenei even declared a fatwa (religious decree), which called pursuit and possession of nuclear weapons as "grave sin".

8. In 1986 Iran bought its centrifuge from Pakistan then transported it in a private jet to Tehran, without Pakistani officials knowing anything about the deal. Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan provided Iran's secret nuclear program with centrifuges for the first time.

9. Iran's nuclear program became public in 2002, when an opposition group revealed secret activity including construction of a uranium enrichment plant and a heavy-water reactor in the country. Enriched uranium can be used to make nuclear weapons, and spent fuel from a heavy-water reactor contains plutonium suitable for a bomb.

10. Once Iran's nuclear program started to gain attention, the country wasn't able to prove its peacefulness. This led to the U.S. and its European allies press Iran into halting enrichment of uranium, which can be used both for civilian purposes and for building nuclear bombs.

11. In 2003 Iran made a deal with UK, France and Germany regarding its nuclear program, and agreed to suspend its uranium enrichment, and allow for international inspection to take place on its soil. However, two years later, Iran stopped implementing the agreement, as the EU presented the country with "inadequate" proposals.

12. Iran's nuclear program, throughout the years, was considered fairly safe, yet between 2010-2012, at least four nuclear scientists were killed in terror attacks, which, according to experts, were set to disrupt Iran's nuclear program.

13. The first round of UN sanctions against Iran was approved in December of 2006.

14. The latest reports indicate that Iran has at least 18 known nuclear facilities, including uranium enrichment plants (Natanz, Fordow), nuclear power plants (Bushehr, Darkovin (under construction), research facilities (Esfahan, Tehran), Uranium Conversion Facility (Esfahan), Yellowcake Production Plants (Ardakan), uranium ore mines (Saghand, Gchine), and nuclear waste storage sites(Anarak, Karaj).

15. A 2013 Gallup survey indicated that 56 percent of Iran's adult population (total population - 77 million people), support the nuclear program, while 41 percent disapprove the idea.

16. Centrifuges are used for enrichment of uranium, which can be used for creating a nuclear weapon. Iran, as of current, has 19,000 centrifuges, of which 9,000 are fully engaged in enrichment activities.

17. Under the pressure of international sanctions, many spheres in Iran suffered a decline. In decline were: car manufacturing sector, medicine imports, aviation, oil and petrochemical sector, money transfers (banking), the country's national currency, tourism sector, decline in investments, etc.

Umid Niayesh is Trend Agency's staff writer, you can follow him on Twitter @UmidNiayesh
Follow us on Twitter @TRENDNewsAgency

Four NATO ships due in Black Sea ahead of maritime exercise

Photo: Four NATO ships due in Black Sea ahead of maritime exercise / Other News
Four NATO warships are due in the Black Sea in the next several days ahead of an international maritime exercise to include Ukraine, according to press reports and information from the U.S. Navy, USNI News reported.
Guided missile destroyer USS Ross (DDG-71) was scheduled to transit the Bosphorus Strait today - U.S. 6th Fleet annouced - as well as the French frigate Commandant Birot (F796).
"Ross' presence in the Black Sea serves to demonstrate the United States' commitment to strengthening the collective security of NATO allies and partners in the region," according to a release from U.S. 6th Fleet.
"The ship is scheduled to work alongside NATO allies and partners in the region during its time in the Black Sea, enhancing interoperability and improving regional security."
The Canadian Navy's Halifax-class frigate HMCS Toronto (FFH-333) and the Spanish guided missile frigate Almirante Juan de Borbón (F-102) are due in the Black Sea in by Sept. 7, according to a Wednesday report by the Russian news agency Itar-Tass.
Guided missile cruiser USS Vella Gulf (CG-72) departed the Black Sea on Aug. 26.
The ships are scheduled to support the latest iteration of exercise Sea Breeze, which will kick off on Sept. 8 and run until Sept. 10, Pentagon spokesman Col. Steve Warren told reporters on Wednesday.
The exercise will focus on basic naval skills including maritime interdiction operations, force protection, navigation and humanitarian and disaster relief (HADR) missions, a defense official told USNI News.
A separate land-based exercise - Rapid Trident - has been scheduled in the next weeks in Ukraine at at the International Peacekeeping and Security Center located in Yavoriv, Warren said on Wednesday.
A multi-national exercise focused on mine-counter measure training, Exercise Breeze, concluded in July.
French signals intelligence ship Dupuy de Lôme (A759), is reported in the Black Sea, as part of an ongoing presence mission following the Russian seizure of the Crimea region of Ukraine in March.
All warship from countries without a coast on the Black Sea operate under the 1936 Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits.
Montreux rules call for foreign warships to depart the Black Sea after 21 days.
With a steady rotation of assets, the number of NATO ships in the Black Sea has been up to nine - the highest level in several decades.
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Pentagon Kicks Off New Technology Initiative

By:
Published: • Updated:
A microwave/electro-optic (MS32) electronics engineer at Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Corona Division, uses visible lasers to align various optical components on Aug. 29, 2014. US Navy Photo

A microwave/electro-optic (MS32) electronics engineer at Naval Surface Warfare Center 
(NSWC), Corona Division, uses visible lasers to align various optical components
on Aug. 29, 2014. US Navy Photo
The U.S. Defense Department is projecting a future where the United States will no longer hold an insurmountable advantage over its adversaries. As such, the Pentagon is launching an initiative to spur technological innovation in an attempt to maintain America’s military edge.
“We must find new and creative ways to sustain, and in some areas expand, our advantages even as we deal with more limited resources,” Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel wrote in a Nov. 15 memo.
In the memo, Hagel charged Deputy Defense Secretary Bob Work to lead the effort—which has been dubbed the “third offset strategy.” To that end, the Pentagon will train new leaders in new ways, initiate new long-term research and development efforts and develop new operational concepts to take the maximum possible advantage of those technologies.
Work, who was speaking at the DefenseOne Summit earlier today, said that the Pentagon’s lead in various technological advances it fields will not last long. While in previous decades, American advances in technologies such as stealth afforded some long-lived advantages, modern competitors will narrow the gap quickly through their research and development—and espionage, Work said.
As such, the Pentagon might keep some of its advances secret like it did with the Lockheed Martin F-117 Nighthawk stealth fighter when that aircraft became operational in the early 1980s.

Iran unveils the dates on building new nuclear reactors, amount of uranium enrichment

20 November 2014, 12:56 (GMT+04:00)
http://en.trend.az/iran/politics/2335169.html





Photo: Iran unveils the dates on building new nuclear reactors, amount of uranium enrichment / Politics
Tehran, Iran, Nov. 20

By Dalga Khatinoglu - Trend:
The head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran says that Iran and Russia signed an agreement on building two new nuclear reactors in the coming years, one of them is scheduled to start construction in 1.5 years.

Giving a live interview on Channel Two TV broadcast Nov. 19, Ali Akbar Salehi the head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran said that both of new reactors are to be constructed in the Busheher nuclear power plant based on a 1992 agreement.

The Russia started re-construction of Busheher nuclear power plant in 1996, based on 1992 agreement between two countries.

German companies started construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant in 1975 but the work was stopped in 1979 after the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

Expressing Russia's delay to complete the first reactor of Busher, Salehi said that reconstruction of a nuclear reactor is harder than building a new one, but the second reactor is projected to be complete in 18 months. Russia completed the first reactor of Busher in 2011, 15 years after starting the construction and 19 years after sealing the agreement.

Salehi said that according to the projected plans, Iran needs 20,000 megawatts of nuclear power and has held “hard” negotiations with Russia since 2013 to realize the plan. He
added that the construction of the second new nuclear reactor would start two years after starting the development of first new one.

He underlined that beside reactor construction agreement, Iran and Russia signed a protocol about the needed nuclear fuel for new reactor.
Russia has committed to supply nuclear fuel for the first reactor, which was commissioned in 2011 for ten years. Russia delivered 82 tons of nuclear fuel in 2008 and 30 more tons in May 2011 to Iran.

The head of the Atomic Energy Agency of Iran argued that signed reactor constructions with Russia, enforces Iran's position in nuclear talks with P5+1, namely, in practice, Iran needs the capacity to supply nuclear fuel for two reactors in the next eight years.
Salehi said that we need 190,000 separative work units (SUW) uranium enrichment capacity annually by 2022.

Before him, the Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in July that Iran needs 190,000 SUWs enrichment capacity, without mentioning when Iran will need it.

Salehi said that the first reactor of Bushehr had produced 7 billion KWh of electricity until several months ago. Iran's annual power output is 70,000 megawatt, equals 263 billion KWh.
Iran and P5+1 (the US, Britain, France, Russia and China plus Germany ) is negotiating to reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by Nov.24.

You can follow him on Twitter @dalgakhatinoglu.
Follow us on Twitter @TRENDNewsAgency

Nuclear Power in Iran

(Updated November 2014)
http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Countries-G-N/Iran/
  • A large nuclear power reactor is operating in Iran, after many years construction, and a second is planned.
  • The country also has a major program developing uranium enrichment, which was concealed for many years.
  • Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities, or its work on heavy water-related projects, as required by the UN Security Council.
Iran produced 240 billion kWh gross in 2011, giving per capita consumption of about 3200 kWh/yr. Its 2011 electricity production comprised 160 TWh from gas, 67 TWh from oil, both of which it has in abundance, 12 TWh from hydro which is less reliably available, and the first contribution from nuclear power. Demand is growing about 4% per year, and Iran trades electricity with Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, Turkmenistan and Turkey. Net export is about 7 TWh/yr. 

In mid-2013 generating capacity was 68 GWe. The country plans to boost generating capacity to 122 GWe by 2022, with substantial export potential. 

Nuclear power developments

In 1957 a civil nuclear program was established under the US Atoms for Peace program.
In 1974 the Shah announced a target of 23,000 MWe of nuclear capacity to free up oil and gas for export. Preliminary agreements with Siemens KWU and Framatome for four nuclear power plants were signed.

In 1975 construction of two 1,293 MWe (gross) PWR units was started 18 km south of Bushehr in Bushehr province on the Persian Gulf by Siemens KWU, based on the Biblis B reactor in Germany. The contract was actually signed in mid-1976 and some $3 billion paid. After the Islamic revolution, further payment was withheld and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit 1 substantially complete and unit two about half complete. The plant was damaged by Iraqi air strikes in 1984-88.

At Darkhovin, on the Karun River close to the Iraq border, there were also two French 910 MWe units which in January 1979 had just started construction under a $2 billion October 1977 contract with Framatome. These were cancelled in April 1979, and their engineering components were retained in France, being built there as Gravelines C, units 5&6, which came on line in 1985. In 1992, the Islamic Republic of Iran signed an agreement with China to build two 300 MWe reactors at the Darkhovin site, similar to those at Qinshan in China and Chashma in Pakistan, but China withdrew before construction started.

The original 1974 plan called for construction of four units at Bushehr, then two units at Isfahan, 340 km south of Teheran, to come on line in mid-1980s and two units at Saveh, near Teheran. The Isfahan and Saveh units were to be 1300 MWe class KWU types with dry cooling using two 260 m tall and 170 m wide dry cooling towers. They would have been the first large nuclear plants to use dry cooling.

In 2013 and 2014 senior officials were talking of a target of 20 GWe nuclear by 2020. AEOI cites parliamentary approval for this capacity target (if not deadline) as being binding on it.

Bushehr 1

An agreement between the Iranian and Russian governments on building a two-unit nuclear power plant was signed in Moscow in August 1992. This covered both construction and operation of the plant. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) insisted that the project should make full use of the structures and equipment already at Bushehr. In 1994, Russia's Minatom agreed with AEOI to complete unit 1 of Bushehr nuclear power plant with a VVER-1000 unit, using mostly the infrastructure already in place, and a contract was signed in January 1995.

The Russian contractor faced major challenges and an approach to Germany for help was rejected, leaving it to certify and document a lot of unfamiliar bits of equipment. All the main reactor components were fabricated in Russia under a construction contract with Atomstroyexport, based on the V-320 design, but designated V-446 signifying adaptation to the Siemens parts and also high seismic rating. The 1000 MWe (915 MWe net) plant constructed by Atomstroyexport had a succession of construction and start-up delays, and as late as 2007 the project was almost abandoned. All work was under IAEA safeguards and operation is also under safeguards. Some 47,000 pieces of equipment passed scrutiny by Atomstroyexport, another 11,000 seemed to be in working order but the specifications and manuals to them were missing and needed to be restored. Meanwhile, since the 1975 construction start, the nuclear safety requirements in Russia and internationally had become more stringent. Some German parts being integrated into the Russian design therefore required significant upgrades. According to a local report, 24% of the parts are German in origin, 36% are Iranian-made while 40% are Russian-made. 

The original plans had two desalination plants, each of 100,000 m3/day capacity, linked to the reactors, but the Russian project dropped these. It appears that they were added later, and the first phase was commissioned in August 2014. With phase 2, the plant will provide 20% of the potable water for Bushehr city.

After two years delay due to Iran's reluctance to agree to returning used fuel to Russia without being paid for it, two agreements were signed early in 2005 covering both supply of fresh fuel for the new Bushehr nuclear reactor and its return to Russia after use. The Russian agreement means that Iran's nuclear fuel supply is secured for the foreseeable future, removing any justification for enrichment locally.*

* Russia's Atomstroyexport by the end of January 2008 had delivered the 163 fuel assemblies for the initial core of Bushehr plus 17 reserve ones – 82 tonnes of fuel in total. The fuel is enriched 1.6% to 3.62% and is under full international safeguards. The Russian government had withheld supply as negotiations over Iran's uranium enrichment activities proceeded. As of September 2009 the reactor was reported to be 96% complete and testing had begun earlier in the year. Fuel loading was expected by October, with first power soon after, but further delays pushed this to 2010, then to 2011. Atomstroyexport delivered the first one-third core reload by air from TVEL in May 2011 – about 30 tonnes of fuel which will be needed after about 18 months operation.

The reactor was finally due to start up in February 2011 and to "reach first power" in April, and fuel had been loaded by the start of December. However, late in February before starting up it was found that a pump had failed and possibly shed metal particles into the primary cooling system, which could damage the fuel elements. The fuel therefore had to be unloaded, checked and cleaned, and any debris removed from the pressure vessel. The pump concerned was one supplied in the 1970s and was part of the old equipment required to be used under the terms of the Russian contract. Eventually the reactor started up on 8 May 2011, was grid connected early in September 2011, and was expected to enter commercial operation about April 2012, then May 2013, and finally did so in September 2013.* 

* In October 2012 the fuel assemblies were unloaded and put into the spent fuel pond after only two months irradiation, apparently due to indications of some metal fragments in the cooling water remaining from the earlier pump problem. The reactor was reloaded and restarted in December. However, apparently the IAEA was not fully informed of the situation, which caused some international concern about what was happening and why. It was reconnected to the grid in January 2013 and handed over to Iran in September 2013, making it effectively in commercial operation.

AEOI says it will remain under Russian guarantee for another two years from September 2013 “and a number of Russian experts will remain in place to give advice and technical assistance”.* The preliminary agreement states that the first reactor of Bushehr nuclear power plant would be operated by a 50-50 Russian-Iranian joint venture during the one-year warranty period. In August 2010 it was agreed that this JV would operate the plant for up to three years before Atomstroyexport gradually withdrew. However, in September 2011 after grid connection, Rosatom said: "According to the Iranian legislation, only a national company can be an operator of the nuclear power plant", hence Russian specialists would be invited to work under a contract to be awarded by the Nuclear Power Production and Development Company of Iran (NPPD), with their numbers gradually reducing. In May 2012 the first deputy director general of Rosenergoatom Vladimir Asmolov said that all operations related to the reactor equipment control and operation were being carried out by Russian specialists. “There is not a single Iranian operator at Bushehr,” he said. He explained that the Iranian party had signed an agreement with a Rosatom affiliate, Atomtechexport (ATE), which operates the reactor unit. However, Iranian operators have been trained in Russia.

* A Russian report in January 2014 said that 270 employees of Atomtechexport were insured to work in Iran to support “organization of Bushehr nuclear power plant operation, repair and render engineering support to the facility, including the equipment integration.”

Earthquakes in April of 7.7 magnitude and lesser ones in May 2013 are reported to have caused cracks in concrete at Bushehr, but without safety significance. The plant is designed to withstand magnitude 8 quakes. Iran reported to the IAEA that the quakes had caused no damage. In June 2013 the reactor remained shut down due to generator problems, and had apparently been out of action for several months.

The anticipated 7 TWh/yr from the Bushehr reactor frees up about 1.6 million tonnes of oil (11 million barrels) or 1800 million cubic metres of gas per year, which can be exported for hard currency. In 2013 Iran’s Energy Minister said that it saved some $2 billion per year in oil and gas.

Nuclear power reactors 
  type MWe gross, net construction start commercial operation planned close
Bushehr 1 VVER-1000/446 1000, 915 1975, 1994 Sept 2013  
Total (1)   915 MWe net      

Despite high-profile and serious disagreements with IAEA over uranium enrichment, the IAEA continues full involvement with Iran on nuclear safety issues, focused on Bushehr. However, Iran is not a party to the IAEA Convention of Nuclear Safety – it is the only country with an operating nuclear reactor that is not a party to it.

Further nuclear power capacity

The AEOI originally said that construction of a second unit in Bushehr province was to proceed and that feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe had been ordered. Then in December 2008 it said that the next step would be two new 1000 MWe plants nearby, with Bushehr unit 2 shelved. In May 2012 a 1000 MWe Bushehr unit 2 was again announced, with construction involving foreign contractors to begin by March 2014. There was further public mention in August, September and November 2013. In February 2014 AEOI gave the starting date as April 2014 or in the following months. Russia obtained agreement from AEOI that this would be built from scratch, without trying to integrate it into the German-built structure. It is likely to be a similar VVER-1000 (V-392) without the special adaptations to Siemens design. Russia has noted that intergovernmental agreements would need updating and refining.

The Nuclear Power Production & Development Company of Iran (NPPD), closely associated with AEOI, had invited bids in 2007 to construct two large third-generation PWR nuclear reactors – 1000 to 1600 MWe each – near Bushehr, to come on line about 2016. It is not known whether any bids were received then, but anything there would now be a Rosatom VVER project. Russia is the only envisaged source of nuclear power technology, as various government spokesmen set forth hopes and needs.

In March 2014 AEOI said it had agreed with Rosatom to build at least two more 1000 MWe nuclear reactors at Bushehr. AEOI said that the agreement is part of a 1992 deal between the two countries on further nuclear cooperation. Technical and commercial issues were to be worked out, but Iran’s ambassador in Moscow earlier said that the plant, along with other goods, would be bartered for oil (which is subject to UN trade sanctions). A government-level protocol on building two further reactors was signed in April 2014. In November 2014 a further protocol to the original 1992 agreement was signed by Rosatom and AEOI, covering construction of four VVER reactors on a turnkey basis at Bushehr, and four more at another site yet to be determined. These are all to involve maximum local engineering content, and will be fully under IAEA safeguards. As usual with its foreign projects, Rosatom will supply all the fabricated nuclear fuel for the eight units “for the whole period of the nuclear power plant operation” and will take all used fuel back to Russia for reprocessing and storage. (Article 3 of protocol.) However, under the terms of the 1992 agreement, Rosatom and AEOI also signed a memorandum of understanding to “work on necessary arrangements for the fabrication in Iran of the nuclear fuel or its elements to be used in Russian design Units.” 

At the same time a contract for construction of the first two reactors as Bushehr phase II was signed by NIAEP-ASE and the Nuclear Power Production and Development Company of Iran. Two desalination plants are to be part of the project.

In May 2007 the AEOI said it was planning to build an indigenous 360 MWe light water reactor at Darkhowin/Darkhovain on the Karun River in Khuzestan province in the west, close to Iraq at the head of the Gulf. Two Framatome 950 MWe plants were about to be built here in 1970s, and two 300 MWe Chinese plants were planned in the 1990s. The head of NPPD denied that these new ones would use Chinese technology and in October 2008 announced that their design would begin shortly and be completed in six years. In 2011 AEOI said that it planned a 360 MWe plant there, and that its design was well underway, and in May 2012 AEOI said the design of the light water reactor was finished. A further announcement in February 2013 confirmed planning intention for a 360 MWe plant. In May 2013 a senior government official said that Iranian experts were designing a 300 MWe light water reactor for Darkhowin, under IAEA supervision. In May 2014 AEOI said it had made progress on the project. The IAEA has requested, but to early 2013 at least, apparently not been given, design information on this proposed plant.

Increasingly, part of the rationale for sites on the Gulf is desalination (for ‘sweet water’), giving them priority in planning. 

A February 2013 announcement also said that 16 sites had been selected for new nuclear plants to be built over the next 15 years. In December 2013 AEOI said that a majority of Iran’s new nuclear facilities will be on its southern coast on the Persian Gulf and northern coast on the Caspian Sea, while another plant would be in central Iran. It was in talks with Rosatom regarding 4000 MWe of new plant, mainly at Bushehr or in Bushehr province.

Nuclear power reactors planned and proposed 
  type MWe gross construction start commercial operation planned close
Bushehr 2 VVER-1000/392? 1000 March 2015    
Bushehr 3  VVER-1000/V392? 1000 2016?    
planned: 2   2000      
Darkhowin LWR 360      
Bushehr 4 VVER ?      
Bushehr 5  VVER ?      
other 1-4  VVER        
Proposed: 7          

Iran is tectonically active, and nuclear power plants there need to be designed and built accordingly with high seismic criteria. In April 2013, following a magnitude 6.3 earthquake near Bushehr, the Gulf Cooperation Council met and expressed concern about possible radiation releases from the Bushehr nuclear plant. The six GCC Arab states had previously urged Tehran to ensure its facility complies with international safety standards and to join the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety.

Uranium enrichment

Iran has a major project developing uranium enrichment capability. This program is heavily censured by the UN, since no commercial purpose is evident.

The antecedents of this go back to 1974, when Iran loaned $1.18 billion to the French Atomic Energy Commission to build the multinational Eurodif enrichment plant at Tricastin, and it secured a 10% equity in the enterprise, entitling it to 10% of output. The loan was repaid with interest in 1991 but the plant has never delivered any enriched uranium to Iran since the new government in 1979 cancelled its agreements with Eurodif and ceased payments to it. But in 1991 Iran revived its nuclear power ambitions and demanded delivery of its share of uranium under original contract, but this was refused by France due to political sanctions then being in force. Iran views this refusal as proof of the unreliability of outside nuclear supplies and cites the Eurodif experience as the basis for achieving energy independence by developing all of the elements of the nuclear fuel cycle itself. The AEOI still holds the 10% share in Eurodif. Its 10.8 million SWU plant operated by Areva started production in 1979 and closed in mid 2012.

In about 2000 Iran started building at Natanz, 80 km southeast of Qom, a sophisticated enrichment plant, which it declared to IAEA only after it was identified in 2002 by a dissident group. This is known as the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP), and is above ground, but also at Natanz a large underground Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) is being developed. Operations at the PFEP, FEP and the uranium conversion plant (UCF) are under international safeguards, though monitoring is constrained. To May 2010, environmental samples confirmed that both enrichment plants were operating as declared, FEP producing less than 5.0% enrichment. However, in February 2010 about 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium from FEP was taken to PFEP.

Natanz PFEP

At PFEP, two cascades have been designated for production of LEU enriched up to 20% U-235, ostensibly for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), and the balance of the plant is designated for R&D.

One cascade enriches from 3.5% LEU to almost 20%, while the second one takes the tails from the first one and produces about 10% LEU with tails of less than 1% uranium-235. The enriched stream is fed into the first cascade. In total, some 1177 kg of the 3.5% LEU from FEP has been fed into these, and 150kg of 19.75% enriched uranium has been produced from the start of operations to February 2013.

The IAEA earlier responded that the PFEP operations now " required a full revision of the previous safeguards approach". This was agreed in May 2010, including enhanced surveillance and checks. On 23 June 2011 the head of AEOI said: "We have the ability to produce 5 kg (of 20% enriched uranium) each month, but we do not rush." He had earlier said that the TRR required 1.5 kg of fuel per month. In August 2011 he confirmed that Iran had more 20% LEU than it needed for the Tehran research reactor, and that “security measures required that the sensitive part of the facilities would be transferred to underground buildings” – evidently Fordow. The IAEA reported then that monthly production rates of 20 percent LEU had increased significantly, implying better performance of the two IR-1 cascades. The near 20% UF6 is being converted to oxide form at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant at Esfahan. By August 2013 some 185 kg UF6 had produced U3O8 containing 87 kgU, the balance remaining in process.

In total, Iran has fed 1541 kg of 3.5% LEU to produce 189 kg of 19.75% uranium at PFEP since the beginning of operations in February 2010.

International concern regarding the surge of activity in enrichment to about 20% U-235 is based on the fact that in terms of SWU (energy) input this is about 90% of the way to weapons-grade material, and thus would require only a small and possibly clandestine plant to bridge the gap.

The PFEP at Natanz started operating in 2003, and by 2006 a 164-centrifuge IR-1 cascade had produced 3.6% enriched material. Two other cascades were being installed, IR-2 and IR-3, and a 10-machine IR-4 cascade followed by mid-2009. To mid-August 2009, about 140 kg of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) had been fed into various cascades of four types, producing uranium enriched to less than 5%. The IR-1 machine is the local version of Pakistan's P1 centrifuge design, and Iran is undertaking R&D on a variant of the more advanced P2 design. A few of these new design centrifuges designated IR-2, IR-4, IR-5 and IR-6 are installed, but output is intermittent. In November 2013 there were 164 IR-2m centrifuges installed and with 178 IR-4, ine IR-5, 13 IR-6 and one IR-6s centrifuges at PFEP. The IR-2m is reported to be at least three times as efficient s the IR-1.

Natanz FEP 

At the main underground FEP at Natanz, production hall A is being set up with eight units (A24-A28 initially, A21-A23 later), each of 18 cascades with 164 IR-1 centrifuges – total 2952 each unit. In August 2010 the IAEA reported that over 30.7 tonnes of UF6 had been fed into FEP, and 2803 kg of low-enriched uranium hexafluoride (3.5% U-235) had been produced. The target capacity is said to be 54,000 centrifuges. In February 2013 there were 12,699 centrifuges in 74 cascades plus three partially installed, and 53 cascades were operating (8992 centrifuges). By November 2013 the total installed was over 15,420 IR-1 centrifuges. A total of 8271 kg of low-enriched UF6 (3.5% U-235) had been produced at FEP, from over 82 tonnes of UF6 feed, and the rate was steady at 236 kg/month. Capacity in November 2013 was about 6735 SWU/yr. About 1557 kg of the output had been used to make the 19.75 % enriched UF6.

In January 2013 Iran informed the IAEA that it proposed to install IR-2m centrifuges at Natanz and over 1000 had been installed by August. There was preparatory work on the remaining 12 cascades of IR-2 machines. By November 2013 none of these were operating.

Fordow FFEP 

In September 2009, after the fact was exposed internationally, Iran told the IAEA that it was building another enrichment plant at Fordow, about 20 km north of Qom, in an underground tunnel complex on a military base. This Fordow FFEP is designed to have 8 cascades each of 174 IR-1 machines in each of two halls. Evidently construction began in 2006, and in November 2012 it had four IR-1 cascades (two sets tandem) operating, each 174 machines (so 696 centrifuges), producing 19.75% enriched uranium at a rate of 10.6 kg/month. Four further cascades have been installed and ready, and a further eight cascades with equipment in place but not installed. 

Lashkar Ab’ad laser laboratories

This was the site of experiments on undeclared laser enrichment about 2003, and the facility has expanded greatly in recent years. It is not clear what activities are being pursued there, as IAEA has been denied information and access. However, there are some indications that work on laser enrichment may continue. In 2010 there was a high-profile announcement that the country has laser enrichment capability.

Enrichment progress and plans

Over 2009-10 the Iranian centrifuge program was set back by the Stuxnet computer virus which affected Iranian companies involved with the control systems for the IR-1 centrifuges. In late 2009 to early 2010 about 1000 centrifuges at FEP were decommissioned. This appears to have been due to Stuxnet affecting frequency converters and causing the motors to over-speed, destroying the units. The normal failure rate of the IR-1 centrifuges is reported as about 10% per year. 

The underground Fordow enrichment plant (FFEP) is evidently playing a larger role in producing 19.75% enriched uranium, using the well-proved IR-1 centrifuges. This positions Iran to stockpile a large amount of 19.75% LEU in a facility better protected against military strikes. 
With about 9000 centrifuges operating through 2013 and to May 2014, most at 0.71 SWU/yr each (though Fordow 0.87), the total is about 6500 SWU/yr capacity at Natanz in May 2014, according to ISIS, and another 600 SWU/yr at Fordow with its 700 operating centrifuges. Across its three facilities, 18,458 IR-1 centrifuges and 1008 IR-2m centrifuges were installed at May 2104. 

To November 2014 Iran had produced a total of 13,397 kg of LEU hexafluoride enriched up to 5%, of which 8390 kg remained in that form, the rest having been further processed. The rate was earlier about 233 kg/month. About 3437 kg of this LEU have been used to make 448 kg of 19.75 % LEU hexafluoride at PFEP and FFEP, and to January 2014 this had been ongoing at about 15 kg/month. This far exceeds Iran’s needs for the Tehran research reactor, and to August 2014 about 15% of this had been made into fuel assemblies for that reactor while the rest was converted to oxide. (About 260 kg of that material could be turned into 56 kg of weapons-grade uranium with input of only 1800 SWU, and the rate of production could readily be increased using installed capacity.)

Uranium Resources and Mining

In the early 1980s Iran purchased 450 tonnes of uranium (531 t U3O8) from South Africa. Some 366 t of this was subsequently converted to UF6 at Esfahan. This is the main, and practically the only, material being used in Iran's enrichment plants.

Iran has very small reported uranium resources, all in a high cost category, about one-third as reasonably assured and two-thirds as inferred resources. It is reported to have significant levels of molybdenum and other impurities which create difficulties in enrichment. AEOI is responsible for uranium exploration, mining and treatment. Most exploration is in central Iran.

The only mining and milling so far is at Gachin/Gchine, near the port of Bandar Abbas on the Persian Gulf, in Hormozgan province. The ore is in surficial salt plugs at 0.20 %U grade, accessed by open pit. The Bandar Abbas Uranium Production Plant (BUPP) began production from Gachin ore in 2006, and operations continue, to produce about 12 tU/yr with acid leaching. This is delivered to the conversion plant at Isfahan.

An underground mine has been developed at Saghand in the central desert region of Yazd province, and AEOI announced commencement of production there in April 2013. Resources of 900 tU at 0.055% U are quoted. The associated Ardakan mill about 75 km west of Saghand is expected to produce 58 tU/yr from the higher-grade ore (av 0.05%) with acid leaching, while lower grade material (0.01 to 0.03%) will be heap leached at site.

In February 2013 AEOI announced that uranium resources had increased to 4000 tU from 1527 tonnes. No details were given.

Other parts of fuel cycle

A uranium conversion plant (UCF) at the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre has 200 t/yr capacity and started up in 2004. It is under IAEA safeguards and the IAEA reported that to November 2014 it had produced 550 tonnes of natural UF6, of which 163 tonnes had been moved to Natanz FEP.

Enrichment activities at Natanz and Fordow are covered above.
A fuel fabrication plant is being built next to the UCF. 
Iran continues producing fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), and one quarter of the 185 kg of near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride (125 kgU) sent for conversion to oxide has been made into 21 TRR fuel assemblies.

Research & Development

The Teheran Nuclear Research Centre was established in 1967 by the AEOI. It has a US-supplied 5 MW pool-type research reactor which has operated since about 1967. The IAEA monitors the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR) and also a Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope production facility (MIX). Since being converted from 93% HEU about 1988 by Argentinian specialists, the TRR runs on 19.75% enriched uranium, and 116 kg of this was supplied from Argentina about 1993 – enough for 10-20 years depending on how the reactor is operated. This had nearly run out in 2009. It was earlier said that the presence of molybdenum in Iranian UF6 means that domestic supplies may be unsuitable at this level of enrichment, but this is unconfirmed. 

In 2009 it seemed likely that Russia might provide some further uranium for TRR fuel blended down from 36% enriched material and fabricated in France, in exchange for an equivalent amount of Iran's (< 5%) enriched uranium from Natanz. This was rejected by Iran, which then tabled a revised version. At issue was the amount of Iran's uranium stockpile to be handed over at one time, and where this would occur. The international negotiators wanted to do this exchange in one large shipment, while Iran preferred several smaller swaps which maintained more of its overall holding for a longer period. In February 2010 the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75%. It is not clear whether the Isfahan fuel fabrication plant can make fuel elements for TRR.

In May 2010, a deal with Brazil and Turkey was announced and submitted to the IAEA whereby Iran would ship 1200 kg of 3.5% enriched uranium to Turkey, and then receive 120 kg of 19.75% enriched uranium fuel elements for the TRR in return from the so-called Vienna Group, comprising the IAEA, USA, Russia and France. This apparently did not proceed.

The Nuclear Technology Center of Isfahan operates four small nuclear research reactors, all supplied by China. The Center is run by the AEOI. In April 2013 the AEOI announced plans for a new research reactor at Bonab, and in June the location was reported as Zarghan, in East Azerbaijan province, respectively south and north of Tabriz.

A plant for making research reactor fuel plates for TRR was expected to be commissioned about the end of 2011, and in August 2012 the IAEA said that ‘a small amount’ of the 19.75% enriched uranium had been used thus.

In June 2010 the AEOI announced that it planned to build four new research reactors for production of medical isotopes, including a 20 MW one to replace TRR when its operational life finishes in 15 years. This plan would justify production of more 20%-enriched uranium at Natanz, which gives rise to international concern. In May 2014 the AEOI announced plans for a 10 MW light water research reactor at Shiraz to produce medical and industrial radioisotopes.

Arak IR-40 heavy water reactor 

Iran is also building a 40 MW heavy water-moderated reactor at Arak fuelled by natural uranium. It is declared as being to replace the old Teheran reactor for production of radioisotopes. 

The IR-40 design is very similar to those used by India and Israel to make plutonium for nuclear weapons, and was apparently designed by Russia's NIKIET. Construction is under way and the incomplete plant was "inaugurated" in August 2006. In August 2009 it was about 63% complete, with the reactor vessel due to be installed in 2011. In July 2011 AEOI reported it as 75% complete. Iran has said that it will be under IAEA safeguards, and has been subject to IAEA inspection during construction. However, from 2006 Iran has declined to provide IAEA with detailed design information on the IR-40 reactor to allay concerns regarding its precise purpose.  An IAEA design verification visit in February 2013 noted that cooling and moderator plumbing was almost complete, though in November critical components were not yet installed. It was expected to start up in 2014, with a delay due to slow progress with fuel fabrication. However, in October 2014 it was still incomplete. In April 2014 AEOI announced that an oxygen-18 production unit for PET had started operation at Arak.

The UN Security Council has demanded that construction of IR-40 cease due to its plutonium production potential. In February 2014 the AEOI said that the reactor was not primarily for plutonium production, that its 9 kg/yr of Pu would not be weapons grade, and anyway AEOI might redesign it to meet western concerns. Also it said that Iran has no reprocessing capacity. US sources have suggested changing the fuel and lowering the power to reduce plutonium production to about 1 kg per year while still enabling its purported use for making radioisotopes.

A heavy water production plant is operating at Arak, but the IAEA was denied access to it from 2011 to November 2013. It began construction in 2001. It can produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water per year.

A fuel manufacturing plant has been constructed at Isfahan to serve the IR-40 reactor and possibly Bushehr and TRR. In May 2009 the IAEA noted that fuel rods were being produced and that an initial fuel assembly for IR-40 had been produced from these. In 2012 production of natural uranium oxide fuel pellets continued. In November 2012 the IAEA noted that a prototype IR-40 natural uranium fuel assembly was to be irradiation tested at TRR. In November 2013 the IAEA said that ten IR-40 fuel assemblies had been made, out of 150 needed for a full core. Fuel production stopped in 2014 under the terms of the Joint Plan of Action (see below).

Organisation, regulation & safety

The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) has been the lead authority since 1974. It is responsible for the establishment of regulations for nuclear and radiation safety (under a 1989 act), licensing facilities, and supervising.

The Nuclear Power Production & Development Company of Iran (NPPD), established in 2004, is responsible for Bushehr.

The Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority (INRA) is responsible for regulation and safety, as well as monitoring, legal compliance and radioactive waste management. It is under the AEOI and maintains a close relationship with its Russian counterpart, Rostechnadzor.

The Nuclear Science & Technology Research Institute (NSTRI) was established in 2002 to take over AEOI’s research role.

Non-proliferation

Iran joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 and concluded its safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974. It has signed the Additional Protocol to this safeguards agreement but has not ratified it.

All Iran's facilities, except the Kalaye plant and the Arak heavy water plant, were under IAEA safeguards as of mid 2003. Details are in the Director-General's reports to the IAEA Board on IAEA website.

Iran originally attracted world attention in 2002 when some previously undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory of the NPT.

An IAEA report in November 2003 showed that Iran had, in a series of contraventions of its safeguards agreement over 22 years, systematically concealed its development of key techniques which are capable of use for nuclear weapons. In particular, that uranium enrichment and plutonium separation from used fuel were carried out on a laboratory scale. Iran admitted to the activities but said they were trivial.

In August 2005 the IAEA Board called upon Iran to suspend work associated with uranium enrichment. In March 2006 the IAEA referred the issue to the UN Security Council, which in 2006 required that “Iran shall without further delay suspend . . . all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.” However Iran has not backed off from its activities in developing uranium enrichment.

On 24 March 2007 the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution imposing further sanctions on Iran and reaffirming that Iran must take the steps required by the IAEA Board, notably to suspend its uranium enrichment activities. The IAEA reported in May 2007 that Iran had ceased providing information required under the Additional Protocol.

The IAEA stated clearly in November 2007 and since that unless the Additional Protocol was ratified and in place it is not possible for the Agency to establish that undeclared nuclear materials and activities are absent. Its "knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing." Meanwhile enrichment continues, the existence of the underground and undeclared Qom plant has come to light, and hence a third UN Security Council resolution appeared likely.

The Iran situation has revived wider concerns about which countries should develop facilities with high proliferation significance – such as enrichment and reprocessing, even under safeguards if there is no evident economic rationale. At some point in the future, such a country could give three months notice of withdrawal from the NPT and reconfigure its facilities for weapons production. The USA asserts that Iran has been in fact developing just such a breakout capability. 

This contention was supported in February 2010 when the government ordered the AEOI to commence enriching Iranian uranium to 19.75% for the Teheran Research Reactor (TRR), thereby significantly closing the gap between its normal low-enriched material and weapons-grade uranium. The 1950 kg of low-enriched uranium (< 5%) moved to PFEP would be enough for vastly more 19.75% enriched uranium than the TRR could conceivably use. In August 2011 the AEOI confirmed that Iran had more 20% LEU than it needed for the Tehran research reactor, and that “security measures required that the sensitive part of the facilities would be transferred to underground buildings” – evidently Fordow.

Since early 2012 Iran has continued to deny the IAEA’s requests for access to the alleged high explosive testing site related to nuclear weaponization experiments at Parchin. The extensive activities, including asphalting much of it, that Iran has undertaken there have seriously undermined the Agency’s ability to conduct effective verification. This is looming as a factor to block implementation of the 2013 Geneva agreement.

Iran has agreed with the IAEA on safeguard measures for the IR-40 heavy water reactor at Arak and has pledged to finalise these by August 2014.

On 11 November 2013 a new Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation was signed with the IAEA whereby “Iran and the IAEA will cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the IAEA to resolve all present and past issues.” It addresses several of IAEA’s secondary concerns other than the main centrifuge enrichment program and the heavy water reactor, but set a three-month target for six measures. The agreement is essentially a test of possible enhanced cooperation on the main issues and to set up a negotiating process. This initiative was in parallel with the P5+1 negotiations. In September 2014 the IAEA reported that Iran was not meeting its obligations under the Framework.

November 2013 Geneva Agreement

An agreement to curb Iran’s evident progress towards nuclear weapons capability was struck on 24 November 2013 between Iran and the foreign ministers of China, France, Germany, Russia, UK, and USA (P5+1 - the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) and a senior EU representative. It links closely to the IAEA Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation signed two weeks earlier.

The initial steps of the Joint Plan of Action cover a term of six months, renewable by mutual consent. For that period, Iran undertook not to enrich uranium to over 5% U-235, nor to make "any further advances" of activities at its Natanz and Fordow enrichment plants or the Arak heavy water reactor. It would not install any further centrifuges beyond the 18,500 then, nor operate the 1000 or so advanced centrifuges among these. It also undertook to dilute half of its "working stock" of 20%-enriched uranium to no more than 5%, with the remainder retained as oxide for fabrication of fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Enhanced monitoring activities would include wider access for IAEA inspectors and provision of information to the IAEA. In return, the countries underook to lift various US and EU sanctions on sectors including petrochemical exports, gold and precious metals and promised that no new nuclear-related sanctions would be imposed by either the UN Security Council or the EU over the six-month period covered by the first step, which commenced on 20 January 2014.

The Geneva interim plan aims to resolve two key issues before a comprehensive deal can be finalized. First, all IAEA concerns about Iran’s past, and possibly ongoing, work on nuclear weapons and other alleged military nuclear activities must be satisfied – Iran had stalled on this for years, notably in blocking IAEA access to the Parchin site. Secondly, Iran needs to address satisfactorily all provisions of UN Security Council resolutions, if not by suspending its centrifuge program as earlier demanded, then taking enough tangible steps to alleviate international concerns about this aspect of its nuclear program and the Arak heavy water reactor.

According to the action plan, the parties aim to conclude negotiating and begin implementing a long-term "comprehensive solution" within a year of the adoption of the Geneva agreement. The comprehensive solution would involve a mutually defined enrichment program with "practical limits and transparency measures" to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains peaceful. "Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons," the action plan states. The ultimate objective is the lifting of all nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, and the country's nuclear program being treated in the same way as that in any other non-nuclear weapon state that is party to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT).
The IAEA report on 20 March 2014 said that Iran had not enriched any uranium above 5% at any declared facility and was beginning to downblend or convert its stockpile of this 20% material (75 kg UF6 downblended so far at PFEP, 32 kg UF6 converted to oxide at Fuel Plate FP), it had not installed any further centrifuges at Natanz FEP or Fordow, it had not progressed work on fuel for the IR-40 reactor, it had provided access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine, and it continued R&D at Natanz PFEP including work on the new IR-8 centrifuge. The plant to convert low-enriched UF6 to UO2 was not yet operational.
The IAEA report on 23 May 2014 said that Iran had not enriched any uranium above 5% at any declared facility, had downblended 100 kg of near 20% enriched UF6 and converted the rest to oxide (essentially leaving none as UF6, but with now about 230 kg as oxide), it had not installed any further centrifuges at Natanz FEP or Fordow, it had not progressed work on the Arak IR-40 reactor or made fuel for it, it had provided access to the Arak heavy water plant, and it continued R&D at Natanz PFEP. The 20 July 2014 IAEA report confirmed these data for the near 20% enriched material, and that 1505 kg of ca. 5% enriched UF6 had been converted to UO2.

See also Nuclear Proliferation Case Studies paper.

Main References

OECD NEA & IAEA, 2006, Uranium 2005: Resources, Production and Demand
IAEA website, particularly Iran section
AEOI
http://de.nucleopedia.org/wiki/Kernkraftwerk_Saveh
http://de.nucleopedia.org/wiki/Kernkraftwerk_Isfahan
Institute for Science & International Security, 2009, Nuclear Iran: not inevitable; Jan 2009.
Institute for Science & International Security, 2010, IAEA Iran Report, 18 Feb 2010.
Institute for Science & International Security, 2010, Did Stuxnet Take Out 1,000 Centrifuges at the Natanz Enrichment Plant? Preliminary Assessment, 22 Dec 2010.
Institute for Science & International Security, 2011, Stuxnet Malware & Natanz, 16 Feb 2011.
Institute for Science & International Security, 25/11/2013, The Rocky Path to a Long-Term Settlement with Iran, and 26/11/13 Iran’s Negotiating Track with the IAEA.
Institute for Science & International Security, 2014, IAEA Iran Report, 23 May 2014.
ISIS Nuclear Iran website – reports to 14/11/13
AEOI, late 2011, Nuclear Industry in Iran (booklet).
Khlopkov, Anton & Lutkova, Anna, August 2010, The Bushehr NPP: Why did it take so long? Centre for Energy & Security Studies, Moscow (www.ceness-russia.org)
Rosatom-AEOI protocol 11/11/14 on building eight new reactors
Rosatom-AEOI MOU 11/11/14 on fuel fabrication in Iran.
Both: http://www.rosatom.ru/en/presscentre/highlights/30a77880462a2263af3eefd490c073ed



Risalah Amman




 

Risalah Amman Yang Ditanda Tangani Kurang Lebih 500 Ulama Baik Syiah maupun Sunnah
Risalah ‘Amman (رسالة عمّان) dimulai sebagai deklarasi yang di rilis pada 27 Ramadhan 1425 H bertepatan dengan 9 November 2004 M oleh HM Raja Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein di Amman, Yordania. Risalah Amman (رسالة عمّان) bermula dari upaya pencarian tentang manakah yang “Islam” dan mana yang bukan (Islam), aksi mana yang merepresentasikan Islam dan mana yang tidak (merepresentasikan Islam). Tujuannya adalah untuk memberikan kejelasan kepada dunia modern tentang “Islam yang benar (الطبيعة الحقيقية للإسلام)” dan “kebenaran Islam” (وطبيعة الإسلام الحقيقي).
Untuk lebih menguatkan asas otoritas keagamaan pada pernyataan ini, Raja Abdullah II mengirim tiga pertanyaan berikut kepada 24 ulama senior dari berbagai belahan dunia yang merepresentasikan seluruh Aliran dan Mazhab dalam Islam :
1. Siapakah seorang Muslim ?
2. Apakah boleh melakukan Takfir (memvonis Kafir) ?
3. Siapakah yang memiliki haq untuk mengeluarkan fatwa ?
Dengan berlandaskan fatwa-fatwa ulama besar (العلماء الكبار) –termasuk diantaranya Syaikhul Azhar (شيخ الأزهر), Ayatullah As-Sistaniy (آية الله السيستاني), Syekh Qardhawiy (شيخ القرضاوي)– , maka pada Juli tahun 2005 M, Raja Abdullah II mengadakan sebuah Konferensi Islam Internasional yang mengundang 200 Ulama terkemuka dunia dari 50 negara. Di Amman, ulama-ulama tersebut mengeluarkan sebuah panduan tentang tiga isu fundamental (yang kemudian dikenal dengan sebutan “Tiga Poin Risalah ‘Amman/محاور رسالة عمّان الثلاثة”), Berikut adalah kutipan Piagam Amman dari Konferensi Islam Internasional yang diadakan di Amman, Yordania, dengan tema “Islam Hakiki dan Perannya dalam  Masyarakat Modern” (27-29 Jumadil Ula 1426 H. / 4-6 Juli 2005 M.) dan dihadiri oleh ratusan Ulama’ dari seluruh dunia sebagai berikut:
[1]Siapapun yang mengikuti Madzhab yang 4 dari Ahlussunnah wal Jamaah (Madzhab Hanafiy, Malikiy, Syafi’iy, Hanbali), Madzhab Jakfariy, Madzhab Zaidiyah, Madzhab Ibadiy, Madzhab Dhahiriy, maka dia Muslim dan tidak boleh mentakfir-nya (memvonisnya kafir) dan haram darahnya, kehormatannya dan hartanya. dan juga dalam fatwa Fadlilatusy Syekh Al-Azhar tidak boleh mentakfir ulama-ulama beraqidah Al-Asy’ariyah dan aliran Tashawuf yang hakiki (benar). Demikian juga tidak boleh memvonis kafir ulama-ulama yang berpaham Salafiy yang shahih
Sebagaimana juga tidak boleh memvonis kafir kelompok kaum Muslimin yang lainnya yang beriman kepada Allah dan kepara Rasulullah, rukun-rukun Iman, menghormati rukun Islam dan tidak mengingkari informasi yang berasal dari agama Islam.
[2]. Sungguh diantara madzhab yang banyak tersebut memang terdapat perbedaan (ikhtilaf), maka ulama-ulama dari delapan madzhab tersebut bersepakat dalam mabda’ yang pokok bagi Islam. Semuanya beriman kepada Allah subhanahu wa ta’alaa yang Maha Esa, Al-Qur’an al-Karim adalah Kalamullah, Sayyidina Muhammad ‘alayhis shalatu wassalam adalah Nabi sekaligus Rasul bagi umat manusia seluruhnya, dan mereka bersepakat atas rukun Islam yang 5 : Syadatayn, Shalat, Zakat, puasa Ramadhan, Haji kepa Baitullah, dan juga bersepakat atas Rukun Imam yang 6 ; beriman kepada Allah, Malaikat-Nya, Kitab-kitab-Nya, Rasul-Nya, Hari kiamat, dan kepada Qadar yang baik dan buruk, dan ulama-ulama dari perngikut Madzhab tersebut berbeda pendapat dalam masalah Furu’ (cabang) dan bukan masalah Ushul (pokok), dan itu adalah Rahmat, dan terdahulu telah dikatakan ;
إنّ اختلاف العلماء في الرأي أمرٌ جيّد
“Sesungguhnya ikhtilaf (perbedaan pendapat) para Ulama dalam masalah pemikiran hal yang baik”
[3]. Pengakuan terhadap madzhab-madzhab dalam Islam berarti berkomitmen dengan metodologi (manhaj) dalam hal fatwa ; maka siapapun tidak boleh mengeluarkan fatwa selain yang memenuhi kriteria tertentu dalam setiap madzhab, dan tidak boleh berfatwa selain yang berkaitan dengan manhaj (metodologi) madzhab, tidak boleh seorang pun mampu mengklaim ijtihad dan mengembangkan/membuat madzhab/pendapat baru atau mengelurkan fatwa yang tidak bisa diterima yang dapat mengeluarkan kaum Muslim dari kaidah syar’iyyah, prinsip, ketetapan dari madzhabnya.
Tiga Poin Risalah ‘Amman ini lalu diadopsi oleh kepemimpinan politik dunia Islam pada pertemuan Organisasi Konferensi Islam (OKI) di Mekkah pada Desember 2005. Dan setelah melewati satu tahun periode dari Juli 2005 hingga Juli 2006, piagam ini juga diadopsi oleh enam Dewan Ulama Islam Internasional. Secara keseluruhan, lebih dari 500 ulama Islam terkemuka telah mendukung Risalah ‘Amman dan tiga poin pentingnya.
Di antara penandatangan dan pengesah Risalah Amman ini adalah:
Afghanistan: Hamid Karzai (Presiden).
Amerika Serikat: Prof. Hossein Nasr, Syekh Hamza Yusuf (Institut Zaytuna), Ingrid Mattson (ISNA)
Arab Saudi: Raja Abdullah As-Saud, Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Utsman At-Touaijiri, Syekh Abdullah Sulaiman bin Mani’ (Dewan Ulama Senior).
Bahrain: Raja Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifah, Dr. Farid bin Ya’qub Al-Miftah (Wakil Menteri Urusan Islam)
Bosnia Herzegovina: Prof. Dr. Syekh Mustafa Ceric (Ketua Ulama dan Mufti Agung), Prof. Enes Karic (Profesor Fakultas Studi Islam)
Mesir: Muhammad Sayid Thantawi (Mantan Syekh Al-Azhar), Prof. Dr. Ali Jum’ah (Mufti Agung), Ahmad Al-Tayyib (Syekh Al-Azhar)
India: Maulana Mahmood (Sekjen Jamiat Ulema-i-Hindi)
Indonesia: Maftuh Basyuni (Mantan Menag), Din Syamsuddin (Muhammadiyah), Hasyim Muzadi (NU).
Inggris: Dr. Hassan Shamsi Basha (Ahli Akademi Fikih Islam Internasional), Yusuf Islam, Sami Yusuf (Musisi).
Iran: Ayatullah Ali Khamenei (Wali Amr Muslimin), Ahmadinejad (Presiden), Ayatullah Ali Taskhiri (Sekjen Pendekatan Mazhab Dunia), Ayatullah Fadhil Lankarani.
Irak: Jalal Talabani (Presiden), Ayatullah Ali As-Sistani, Dr. Ahmad As-Samarai (Kepala Dewan Wakaf Sunni).
Kuwait: Syekh Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber As-Sabah.
Lebanon: Ayatullah Husain Fadhlullah, Syekh Muhammad Rasyid Qabbani (Mufti Agung Sunni).
Oman: Syekh Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili (Mufti Agung Kesultanan Oman)
Pakistan: Pervez Musharraf (Presiden), Syekh Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri (Dirjen Pusat Penelitian Islam), Muhammad Taqi Usmani.
Palestina: Syekh Dr. Ikramah Sabri (Mufti Agung dan Imam Al-Aqsha).
Qatar: Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Dr. Ali Ahmad As-Salus (Profesor Syariah Universitas Qatar).
Sudan: Omar Hassan Al-Bashir (Presiden).
Suriah: Syekh Ahmad Badr Hasoun (Mufti Agung), Syekh Wahbah Az-Zuhaili (Kepala Departemen Fikih), Salahuddin Ahmad Kuftaro.
Yaman: Habib Umar bin Hafiz (Darul Mustafa), Habib Ali Al-Jufri.
Yordania: Raja Abdullah II, Pangeran Ghazi bin Muhammad (Dewan Pengawas Institut Aal Al-Bayt), Syekh Izzuddin Al-Khatib At-Tamimi (Hakim Agung), Syekh Salim Falahat (Ikhwanul Muslimin Yordania).

Beberapa tokoh di atas menandatangani dan mengesahkan poin-poin di bawah ini:
Dengan Nama Allah, Maha Pengasih, Maha Penyayang
Shalawat dan salam kehadirat Nabi Muhammad dan keluarganya yang baik dan suci
Siapapun pengikut salah satu dari empat mazhab hukum Islam Sunni (Hanafi, Maliki, Syafii dan Hambali), dua mazhab hukum Islam Syiah (Ja’fari dan Zaidi), mazhab hukum Islam Ibadhi serta mazhab hukum Islam Zahiri adalah seorang Muslim. Menyatakan pengikut (mazhab) tersebut sebagai kafir adalah hal yang mustahil dan dilarang. Sudah pasti bahwa darah, kehormatan dan hartanya adalah terjaga. Selain itu, berdasarkan fatwa Syekh Al-Azhar, adalah tidak mungkin dan tidak diperbolehkan untuk menyatakan kafir kepada penganut keyakinan Asyari atau yang mempraktikkan tasawuf dengan benar (sufi). Demikian juga, tidak mungkin dan tidak diperbolehkan untuk menyatakan kafir kepada pengikut pemikiran Salafi yang sesungguhnya. Hal yang sama juga tidak mungkin dan tidak dibenarkan untuk mengkafirkan kepada kelompok Muslim manapun yang meyakini Tuhan subhânahu wa ta’âlâ dan utusan-Nya shallallâhu ‘alaihi wa (âlihi wa) salâm, rukun iman, dan rukun Islam, dan yang tidak mengingkari segala prinsip utama agama.
Terdapat lebih banyak persamaan di antara berbagai macam mazhab hukum Islam tersebut dari pada perbedaan di antara mereka. Para pengikut delapan mazhab hukum Islam sepakat dalam prinsip dasar Islam. Seluruhnya percaya kepada Allah (Tuhan) Swt. yang Mahaesa; bahwa Alquran adalah kalam Allah dan terpelihara serta terjaga oleh Allah dari segala perubahan dan penyimpangan; dan bahwa pemimpin kita Muhammad shallallâhu ‘alaihi wa (âlihi wa) salâm adalah Nabi dan Rasul bagi seluruh makhluk. Semuanya sepakat dalam hal lima rukun Islam: dua kesaksian keyakinan (syahadatain); salat; zakat; berpuasa di bulan Ramadan, dan haji ke rumah suci Allah (di Mekkah). Semuanya juga sepakat dalam rukun iman: iman kepada Allah (Tuhan), malaikat-Nya, kitab-Nya, utusan-Nya, dan Hari Akhir, dalam Pemeliharaan Tuhan baik dan buruk (qadha dan qadr). Perbedaan pendapat di antara ulama dari delapan mazhab hukum Islam hanya dalam bidang tambahan dan cabang agama (furu’) dan beberapa hal pokok (usul) [dari agama Islam]. Perbedaan pendapat dengan penghormatan dalam hal cabang agama (furu’) adalah rahmat. Dahulu pernah dikatakan bahwa perbedaan pendapat di antara ulama “adalah sebuah rahmat”.
Pengakuan mazhab-mazhab hukum dalam Islam berarti merujuk pada metodologi dasar dalam mengeluarkan fatwa: tidak ada yang dapat mengeluarkan sebuah fatwa tanpa syarat kualifikasi keilmuan. Tidak ada yang dapat mengeluarkan fatwa tanpa merujuk kepada metodologi mazhab hukum Islam. Tidak ada yang dapat mengklaim melakukan ijtihad tidak terbatas dan menciptakan pendapat baru atau mengeluarkan fatwa pertentangan yang dapat mengeluarkan Muslim dari prinsip dan ketentuan syariah dan apa yang telah dibangun dalam kehormatan dari mazhab tersebut.

Lampiran 1: Landasan Fatwa UlamaFatwa-fatwa Ulama Sunni
Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tanthawi, syaikh al-Azhar.
Dr. Ali Jum’ah, mufti besar Mesir.
Syaikh Ahmad Kuftaro, mufti besar Suriah.
Syaikh Said Abd al-Hafizh al-Hijjawi, mufti besar Yordania.
Syaikh Yusuf Qaradhawi, Ketua Dewan Persatuan Ulama Islam.
Syaikh Abdullah ibn Bayyah, wakil presiden Persatuan Ulama Islam Internasional.
Syaikh Muhammad Taqi Utsmani, Pakistan.
Syaikh Abdullah al-Harari al-Habasyi, Lebanon.
Majelis urusan keagamaan, Turki.
Lembaga Fiqh Islam, Saudi Arabia.
Fatwa-fatwa Ulama Syiah Imamiyah
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Sayyid Ali Husayni Khamenei, rahbar Iran.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Sayyid Ali Husayni Sistani, marja’ Irak.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Sayyid Muhammad Said al-Hakim, marja’ Irak.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Syaikh Ishaq al-Fayyad, marja’ Irak.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Syaikh Basyir an-Najan, marja’ Irak.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Sayyid Hasan Ismail Sadr, marja’ Irak.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Sayyid Fadhil Lankarani, marja’ Iran.
Ayatullah al-‘Uzhma Syaikh Muhammad Ali Taskhiri, Sekretaris Jenderal forum taqrib.
Ayatullah al-‘zhma Sayyid Muhammad Husein Fadhlallah, marja’ Libanon.
Lembaga Imam Khu’i, Inggris.
Fatwa-fatwa Ulama lain.
Syaikh Muhammad al-Mansur.
Syikah Humud ibn Abbas.
Syaikh Ahmad ibn Hammad al-Khalili.
Agha Khan.
Lampiran 2: Penandatangan (lebih dari 500 ulama dan cendekiawan dari seluruh dunia)1. Syaikh Yusuf ibn Mahdi: Anggota Komite Fatwa Aljazair.
2. Syaikh Salim ‘Ulwan al-Hasani: Sekjen Dar al-Fatwa Australia.
3. Syaikh Allah-Syakur ibn Himmat Bashazada: Mufti Besar Azerbaijan.
4. Syaikh Musthafa Cheric: Mufti Besar Bosnia Herzegovina.
5. Syaikh Mahmud Malbakri: Imam Masjid & Presiden Dewan Ulama Kamerun.
6. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad Thayyib: Presiden Universitas al-Azhar.
7. Dr. Murad Hoffman: Peneliti dan Cendekiawan Muslim Jerman.
8. Dr. Alwi Syihab: Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia.
9. Dr. Muhammad Maftuh Basyuni: Menteri Agama Indonesia.
10. Dr. Tutty Alawiyah: Presiden Universitas Syafi’i Indonesia.
11. Hasyim Muzadi: Ketua Umum Nahdhatul-Ulama Indonesia.
12. Dr. Din Syamsuddin: Ketua Muhammadiyah Indonesia.
13. Ayatullah Muhammad Wa’izh Zadeh Khurasani: Sekjen Forum Taqrib Iran.
14. Sayyid Muhammad Musawi: Sekjen Liga Ahl al-Bayt Dunia Irak.
15. Syaikh Muhammad Rasyid Qabbani: Mufti Besar Lebanon.
16. Dr. Anwar Ibrahim: Mantan Deputi Perdana Menteri Malaysia.
17. Dr. Kamal Hasan: Presiden Universitas Internasional Islam Malaysia.
18. Syaikh Muhammad Thahir al-Qadri: Dirjen Pusat Penelitian Islam Pakistan.
19. Syaikh Ikrimah Shabri: Mufti Besar dan Imam Masjid al-Aqsha Palestina.
20. Dr. Ali Ahmad as-Salus: Guru Besar Fakultas Syariah Universitas Qatar.
21. Syaikh Rawi ‘Aynuddin: Mufti Besar Rusia.
22. Syaikh Abdullah Sulayman al-Mani’: Anggota Dewan Ulama Saudi Arabia.
23. Imam Shadiq al-Mahdi: Pemimpin Gerakan Anshar Sudan.
24. Prof. Tariq Ramadhan: Inteletual Muslim Swiss.
25. Syaikh Ahmad Badr Hassun: Mufti Besar Suriah.
26. Dr. Muhammad Sa’id al-Buthy: Ketua Departemen Agama Universitas Damaskus Suriah.
27. Syaikh Wahbah Zuhayli: Ketua Departemen Fiqh Fakultas Hukum Universitas Damaskus Suriah.
28. Dr. Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu: Sekjen OKI Turki.
29. Dr. Mustofa Chagici: Mufti Besar Istanbul Turki.
30. Syaikh Ahmad Tamim: Mufti Besar Ukraina.
31. Khursyid Ahmad: Forum Muslim Inggris.
32. Sayyid Husain Nashr: Guru Besar Studi Islam Universitas George Washinton Amerika.
33. Syaikh Muhammad Shadiq: Mufti Besar Uzbekistan.
34. Habib Umar al-Hafizh: Pengasuh Dar al-Mushtafa Yaman.
35. Habib Ali Al-Jufri, Yaman.

sumber : ammanmessage.com

Fatwa Syaikhul Azhar tertanggal 17 Rabi’ul awal tahun 1378 hijriyah, Bahwa Mazhab Ahlul Bayt Syi'ah Imamiyah Adalah Mazhab Yang Sah di Dalam Islam



Fatwa Syaikhul Azhar tertanggal 17 Rabi’ul awal tahun 1378 hijriyah, Bahwa Mazhab Ahlul Bayt Syi’ah Imamiyah Adalah Mazhab Yang Sah di Dalam Islam

[syiar-islam] RISALAH AMMAN – Ijma Ulama Dianggap Akal2an Syiah oleh Wahabi


Assalamu'alaikum wr wb,

RISALAH AMMAN – Ijma Ulama Dianggap Akal2an Syiah oleh Wahabi

Para Ulama Peserta Risalah Amman
1-2 Ulama saja bagi Muslim yang benar harus dihormati keputusannya. Bagaimana dengan Ijma Ulama yang ditanda-tangani 200 Ulama dan sekarang berkembang jadi 552 Ulama?
Cuma Wahabi Takfiri yang jahil saja yang menganggap Ijma' Ulama sebagai main-main atau lemah.
Firman Allah: "…Bertanyalah kepada Ahli Zikir (Ulama) jika kamu tidak mengetahui" [An Nahl 43]
Allah meninggikan ulama dibanding orang2 awam. Pemahaman Ulama terhadap Al Qur'an dan Hadits atau masalah, itu lebih baik daripada pemahaman orang-orang awam:
" ….Allah akan meninggikan orang-orang yang beriman di antaramu dan orang-orang yang diberi ilmu pengetahuan beberapa derajat. Dan, Allah Maha Mengetahui apa yang kamu kerjakan." (QS Al Mujaadilah [58] : 11)
„Adakah sama antara orang-orang yang mengetahui dengan orang-orang yang tidak mengetahui? (Az-Zumar:9)
 
KESEPAKATAN DAMAI YANG DIANGGAP AKAL-AKALAN SYIAH OLEH WAHABI
 
"Risalah Amman – Fatwa Konferensi Ulama Islam Internasional"
Konferensi ini diadakan di Amman, Mamlakah Arabiyyah Yordania, dengan tema "Islam Hakiki dan Perannya dalam Masyarakat Modern". (27-29 Jumadil Ula. 1426 H. / 4-6 Juli 2005 M.)

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim. Shalawat dan salam semoga tercurah pada Baginda Nabi Muhammad Saw. dan keluarganya yang suci. "Wahai manusia, bertakwalah kepada Allah yang telah menciptakan kalian dari satu jiwa…" (QS. an-Nisa ayat 1).

Sesuai dengan fatwa-fatwa yang dikeluarkan oleh yang terhormat:
1. Al-Imam al-Akbar Syaikh Mahmud Syalthut, asy-Syaikh Ahmad Thanthowi, Dewan Rektorat Universitas al-Azhar, Kairo, Mesir.
2. Ayatullah Sayyid Ali as-Sistani Mufti Besar Syi'ah Iraq.
3. Ayatullah 'Udzma Sayyid Ali Khamenei al-Husaini Mufti Besar Syi'ah Iran.
4. Yang Terhormat Mufti Besar Kesultanan Oman.
5. Akademi Fiqih Islam Kerajaan Saudi Arabiyyah.
6. Dewan Urusan Agama Turki.
7. Mufti Akbar Kerajaan Yordania dan Para Anggota Komite Fatwa Nasional Yordania.
8. Syaikh Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi Mufti Besar Sunni Mesir.
 
Sesuai dengan kandungan pidato yang mulia Raja Abdullah II bin al-Hussein, Raja Yordania, pada acara pembukaan konferensi. Sesuai dengan pengetahuan tulus ikhlas kita pada Allah Swt., dan sesuai dengan seluruh makalah penelitian dan kajian yang tersaji dalam konferensi ini serta seluruh diskusi yang timbul darinya. Kami, yang bertandatangan di bawah ini, dengan ini menyetujui dan menegaskan kebenaran butir-butir yang tertera di bawah ini:
 
1) Siapa saja yang mengikuti dan menganut salah satu dari empat madzhab Ahlussunnah (Hanafi, Syafi'i, Maliki, Hanbali), dua madzhab Syi'ah Ja'fariyyah dan Zaidiyyah, madzhab Ibadhiyyah dan madzhab Dzahiriyyah adalah Muslim. Tidak diperbolehkan mengkafirkan salah seorang dari pengikut/penganut madzhab-madzhab yang disebut di atas. Darah, kehormatan dan harta benda salah seorang dari pengikut/penganut madzhab-madzhab yang disebut di atas tidak boleh dihalalkan. Lebih lanjut, tidak diperbolehkan mengkafirkan siapa saja yang mengikuti akidah Asy'ari atau siapa saja yang mengamalkan tasawuf (sufisme). Demikian pula, tidak diperbolehkan mengkafirkan siapa saja yang mengikuti pemikiran Salafi yang sejati. Sejalan dengan itu, tidak diperbolehkan mengkafirkan kelompok Muslim manapun yang percaya pada Allah, mengagungkan dan mensucikanNya, meyakini Rasulullah (Saw.) dan rukun-rukun iman, mengakui lima rukun Islam, serta tidak mengingkari ajaran-ajaran yang sudah pasti dan disepakati dalam agama Islam.
 

2) Ada jauh lebih banyak kesamaan dalam madzhab-madzhab Islam dibandingkan dengan perbedaan-perbedaan di antara mereka. Para pengikut/penganut kedelapan madzhab Islam yang telah disebutkan di atas semuanya sepakat dalam prinsip-prinsip utama Islam (ushuluddin). Semua madzhab yang disebut di atas percaya pada satu Allah Yang Maha Esa dan Makakuasa; percaya pada al-Quran sebagai wahyu Allah; dan bahwa Baginda Muhammad Saw. adalah Nabi dan Rasul untuk seluruh manusia. Semua sepakat pada lima rukun Islam: dua kalimat syahadat (syahadatain), kewajiban shalat, zakat, puasa di bulan Ramadhan, dan Haji ke Baitullah di Mekkah. Semua percaya pada dasar-dasar akidah Islam: kepercayaan pada Allah, para malaikatNya, kitab-kitabNya, para rasulNya, hari akhir, dan takdir baik dan buruk dari sisi Allah. Perbedaan di antara ulama kedelapan madzhab Islam tersebut hanya menyangkut masalah-masalah cabang agama (furu') dan tidak menyangkut prinsip-prinsip dasar (ushul) Islam. Perbedaan pada masalah-masalah cabang agama tersebut adalah rahmat Ilahi. Sejak dahulu dikatakan bahwa keragaman pendapat di antara ulama adalah hal yang baik.

3) Mengakui kedelapan madzhab dalam Islam tersebut berarti bahwa mengikuti suatu metodologi dasar dalam mengeluarkan fatwa: tidak ada orang yang berhak mengeluarkan fatwa tanpa keahlihan pribadi khusus yang telah ditentukan oleh masing-masing madzhab bagi para pengikutnya. Tidak ada orang yang boleh mengeluarkan fatwa tanpa mengikuti metodologi yang telah ditentukan oleh madzhab-madzhab Islam tersebut di atas. Tidak ada orang yang boleh mengklaim untuk melakukan ijtihad mutlak dan menciptakan madzhab baru atau mengeluarkan fatwa-fatwa yang tidak bisa diterima hingga membawa umat Islam keluar dari prinsip-prinsip dan kepastian-kepastian syariah sebagaimana yang telah ditetapkan oleh masing-masing madzhab yang telah disebut di atas.
 
4) Esensi Risalah Amman, yang ditetapkan pada malam Lailatul Qadar tahun 1425 H dan dideklarasikan dengan suara lantang di Masjid al-Hasyimiyyin, adalah kepatuhan dan ketaatan pada madzhab-madzhab Islam dan metodologi utama yang telah ditetapkan oleh masing-masing madzhab tersebut. Mengikuti tiap-tiap madzhab tersebut di atas dan meneguhkan penyelenggaraan diskusi serta pertemuan di antara para penganutnya dapat memastikan sikap adil, moderat, saling memaafkan, saling menyayangi, dan mendorong dialog dengan umat-umat lain.
 
5) Kami semua mengajak seluruh umat untuk membuang segenap perbedaan di antara sesama Muslim dan menyatukan kata dan sikap mereka, menegaskan kembali sikap saling menghargai, memperkuat sikap saling mendukung di antara bangsa-bangsa dan negara-negara umat Islam. Memperkukuh tali persaudaraan yang menyatukan mereka dalam saling cinta di jalan Allah. Dan kita mengajak seluruh Muslim untuk tidak membiarkan pertikaian di antara sesama Muslim dan tidak membiarkan pihak-pihak asing mengganggu hubungan di antara mereka. Allah Swt. berfirman: "Sesungguhnya orang-orang beriman adalah bersaudara. Maka itu islahkan hubungan di antara saudara-saudara kalian dan bertakwalah kepada Allah sehingga kalian mendapat rahmatNya." (QS. al-Hujurat ayat 10).
Amman, Mamlakah Arabiyyah Yordania, 27-29 Jumadil Ula 1426 H/4-6 Juli 2005 M.

Dewan Penandatangan Fatwa Konferensi Ulama Islam Internasional:
 
1. Afghanistan
• Yth. Nusair Ahmad Nour Dubes Afghanistan untuk Qatar
 

2. Aljazair
• Yth. Lakhdar Ibrahimi Utusan Khusus Sekjen PBB; Mantan Menlu Aljazair
• Prof. Dr. Abdullah bin al-Hajj Muhammad al-Ghulamullah Menteri Agama
• Dr. Mustafa Syarif Menteri Pendidikan
• Dr. Sa'id Syaiban Mantan Menteri Agama
• Prof. Dr. Ammar ath-Thalibi Departemen Filsafat, University of Algeria
• Mr. Abu Jara as-Sulthani Ketua LSM Algerian Peace Society Movement
 

3. Austria
• Prof. Anas ash-Shaqfa Ketua Komisi Islam
• Mr. Tarafa Baghajati Ketua LSM Initiative of Austrian Muslims
 

4. Australia
• Syaikh Salim 'Ulwan al-Hassani Sekjen, Darulfatwa, Dewan Tinggi Islam
 

5. Azerbaijan
• Syaikh al-Islam Allahusysyakur bin Hemmat Bashazada Ketua Muslim Administration of the Caucasus
 

6. Bahrain
• Syaikh Dr. Muhammad Ali as-Sutri Menteri Kehakiman
• Dr. Farid bin Ya'qub al-Miftah Sekretaris Kementerian Agama
 

7. Bangladesh
• Prof. Dr. Abu al-Hasan Shadiq Rektor Asian University of Bangladesh
 

8. Bosnia dan Herzegovina
• Prof. Dr. Syaikh Mustafa Ceric Ketua Majlis Ulama dan Mufti Besar Bosnia dan Herzegovina
• Prof. Hasan Makic Mufti Bihac
• Prof. Anes Lj evakovic Peneliti dan Pengajar, Islamic Studies College
 

9. Brazil
• Syaikh Ali Muhmmad Abduni Perwakilan International Islamic Youth Club di Amerika Latin
 

10. Kanada
• Syaikh Faraz Rabbani Guru, Hanafijurisprudence,
 

11. Republik Chad
• Syaikh Dr. Hussein Hasan Abkar Presiden, Higher Council for Islamic Affair; Imam Muslim, Chad
 

12. Mesir
• Prof. Dr. Mahmud Hamdi Zaqzuq Menteri Agama
• Prof. Dr. Ali Jum'ah Mufti Besar Mesir
• Prof. Dr. Ahmad Muhammad ath-Thayyib Rektor Universitas al-Azhar University
• Prof. Dr. Kamal Abu al-Majd Pemikir Islam; Mantan Menteri Informasi
• Dr. Muhammad al-Ahmadi Abu an-Nur Mantan Menteri Agama Mesir; Profesor Fakultas Syariah, Yarmouk University, Jordan
• Prof. Dr. Fauzi az-Zifzaf Ketua Masyayikh al-Azhar; Anggota the Academy of Islamic Research
• Prof. Dr. Hasan Hanafi Peneliti dan Cendekiawan Muslim, Departemen Filsafat, Cairo University
• Prof. Dr. Muhammad Muhammad al-Kahlawi Sekjen Perserikatan Arkeolog Islam;
Dekan Fakultas Studi Kesejarahan Kuno, Cairo University
• Prof. Dr. Aiman Fuad Sayyid Mantan Sekjen, Dar al-Kutub al-Mishriyyah
• Syaikh Dr. Zaghlul Najjar Anggota Dewan Tinggi Urusan Islam, Mesir
• Syaikh Muis Mas'ud Dai Islam
• Dr. Raqid as-Sirjani
• Dr. Muhammad Hidaya
 

13. Perancis
• Syaikh Prof. Dalil Abu Bakr Ketua Dewan Tinggi Urusan Agama Islam dan Dekan Masjid Paris
• Dr. Husain Rais Direktur Urusan Budaya, Masjid Jami' Paris
 

14. Jerman
• Prof. Dr. Murad Hofmann Mantan Dubes Jerman untuk Maroko
• Syaikh Shalahuddin al-Ja'farawi Asisten Sekjen World Council for Islamic Propagation
 

15. India
• H.E. Maulana Mahmud Madani Anggota Parlemen Sekjen Jamiat Ulama Hindia
• Ja'far ash-Shadiq Mufadhdhal Saifudin Cendikiawan Muslim
• Thaha Saifudin Cendikiawan Muslim
• Prof. Dr. Sayyid Aushaf Ali Rektor Hamdard University
• Prof. Dr. Akhtar al-Wasi Dekan College of Humanities and Languages
 

16. Indonesia
• Dr. Tutty Alawiyah Rektor Universitas Islam asy-Syafi'iyah
• Rabhan Abdul Wahhab Dubes RI untuk Yordania
• KH. Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi Mantan Ketua Umum PBNU
• Rozy Munir Mantan Wakil Ketua PBNU
• Muhamad Iqbal Sullam International Conference of Islamic Scholars, Indonesia
 

17. Italia
• Mr. Yahya Sergio Pallavicini Wakil Ketua, Islamic Religious Community of Italy (CO.RE.IS.)
 

18. Maladewa
• Dr. Mahmud asy-Syauqi Menteri Pendidikan
 

19. Republik Islam Iran
• Ayatullah Syaikh Muhammad Ali at-Taskhiri Sekjen Majma' Taqrib bainal Madzahib al-Islamiyyah.
• Ayatullah Muhammad Waez-zadeh al-Khorasani Mantan Sekjen Majma' Taqrib bainal Madzahib al-Islamiyyah
• Prof. Dr. Musthafa Mohaghegh Damad Direktur the Academy of Sciences; Jaksa; Irjen Kementerian Kehakiman
• Dr. Mahmud Muhammadi Iraqi Ketua LSM Cultural League and Islamic Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran
• Dr. Mahmud Mar'ashi an-Najafi Kepala Perpustakaan Nasional Ayatollah Mar'ashi an-Najafi
• Dr. Muhammad Ali Adharshah Sekjen Masyarakat Persahabatan Arab-Iran
• Syaikh Abbas Ali Sulaimani Wakil Pemimpin Spiritual Iran di wilayah Timur Iran
 

20. Iraq
• Grand Ayatullah Syaikh Husain al-Muayyad Pengelola Knowledge Forum
• Ayatullah Ahmad al-Bahadili Dai Islam
• Dr. Ahmad Abdul Ghaffur as-Samara'i Ketua Diwan Waqaf Sunni
 

21. Yordania
• Prof. Dr. Ghazi bin Muhammad Utusan Khusus Raja Abdullah II bin al-Hussein
• Syaikh Izzudin al-Khatib at-Tamimi Jaksa Agung
• Prof. Dr. Abdussalam al-Abbadi Mantan Menteri Agama
• Prof. Dr. Syaikh Ahmad Hlayyel Penasehat Khusus Raja Abdullah dan Imam Istana Raja
• Syaikh Said al-Hijjawi Mufti Besar Yordania
• Akel Bultaji Penasehat Raja
• Prof. Dr. Khalid Touqan Menteri Pendidikan dan Riset
• Syaikh Salim Falahat Ketua Umum Ikhwanul Muslimin Yordania
• Syaikh Dr. Abdul Aziz Khayyat Mantan Menteri Agama
• Syaikh Nuh al-Quda Mantan Mufti Angkatan Bersenjata Yordania
• Prof. Dr. Ishaq al-Farhan Mantan Menteri Pendidikan
• Dr. Abdul Lathif Arabiyyat Mantan Ketua DPR Yordania; Syaikh Abdul Karim Salim Sulaiman al-Khasawneh Mufti Besar Angkatan Bersenjata Yordania
• Prof. Dr. Adel at-Tuwaisi Menteri Kebudayaan
• Mr. Bilal at-Tall Pemimpin Redaksi Koran Liwa'
• Dr. Rahid Sa'id Shahwan Fakultas Ushuluddin, Balqa Applied University
 

22. Kuwait
• Prof. Dr. Abdullah Yusuf al-Ghoneim Kepala Pusat Riset dan Studi Agama
• Dr. Adel Abdullah al-Fallah Wakil Menteri Agama
 

23. Lebanon
• Prof. Dr. Hisyam Nashabih Ketua Badan Pendidikan Tinggi
• Prof. Dr. Sayyid Hani Fahs Anggota Dewan Tinggi Syiah
• Syaikh Abdullah al-Harari Ketua Tarekat Habasyi
• Mr. Husam Mustafa Qaraqi Anggota Tarekat Habasyi
• Prof. Dr. Ridhwan as-Sayyid Fakultas Humaniora, Lebanese University; Pemred Majalah al-Ijtihad
• Syaikh Khalil al-Mais Mufti Zahleh and Beqa' bagian Barat
 

24. Libya
• Prof. Ibrahim ar-Rabu Sekretaris Dewan Dakwah Internasional
• Dr. al-Ujaili Farhat al-Miri Pengurus International Islamic Popular Leadership
 

25. Malaysia
• Dato' Dr. Abdul Hamid Utsman Menteri Sekretariat Negara
• Anwar Ibrahim Mantan Perdana Menteri
• Prof. Dr. Muhammad Hasyim Kamaly Dekan International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation
• Mr. Syahidan Kasem Menteri Negara Bagian Perlis, Malaysia
• Mr. Khairi Jamaludin Wakil Ketua Bidang Kepemudaan UMNO
 

26. Maroko
• Prof. Dr. Abbas al-Jarari Penasehat Raja
• Prof. Dr. Muhammad Farouk an-Nabhan Mantan Kepala Dar al-Hadits al-Hasaniyyah
• Prof. Dr. Ahmad Syauqi Benbin Direktur Perpustakaan Hasaniyyah
• Prof. Dr. Najat al-Marini Departemen Bahasa Arab, Mohammed V University
 

27. Nigeria
• H.H. Prince Haji Ado Bayero Amir Kano
• Mr. Sulaiman Osho Sekjen Konferensi Islam Afrika
 

28. Mamlakah Oman
• Syaikh Ahmad bin Hamad al-Khalili Mufti Besar Kesultanan Oman
• Syaikh Ahmad bin Sa'ud as-Siyabi Sekjen Kantor Mufti Besar
 

29. Pakistan
• Prof. Dr. Dzafar Ishaq Ansari Direktur Umum, Pusat Riset Islam, Islamabad
• Dr. Reza Shah-Kazemi Cendikiawan Muslim
• Arif Kamal Dubes Pakistan untuk Yordania
• Prof. Dr. Mahmud Ahmad Ghazi Rektor Islamic University, Islamabad; Mantan Menteri Agama Pakistan
 

30. Palestina
• Syaikh Dr. Ikrimah Sabri Mufti Besar al-Quds dan Imam Besar Masjid al-Aqsha
• Syaikh Taisir Rajab at-Tamimi Hakim Agung Palestina
 

31. Portugal
• Mr. Abdul Majid Wakil Ketua LSM Banco Efisa
• Mr. Sohail Nakhooda Pemred Islamica Magazine
 

32. Qatar
• Prof. Dr. Syaikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi Ketua Persatuan Internasional Ulama Islam
• Prof. Dr. Aisya al-Mana'i Dekan Fakultas Hukum Islam, University of Qatar
 

33. Rusia
• Syaikh Rawi 'Ainudin Ketua Urusan Muslim
• Prof. Dr. Said Hibatullah Kamilev Direktur, Moscow Institute of Islamic Civilisation
• Dr. Murad Murtazein Rektor, Islamic University, Moskow
 

34. Arab Saudi
• Dr. Abdul Aziz bin Utsman at-Touaijiri Direktur Umum, The Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO)
• Sayyid al-Habib Muhammad bin Abdurrahman Assegaf
 

35. Senegal
• Al-Hajj Musthafa Sisi Penasehat Khusus Presiden Senegal
 

36. Singapura
• Dr. Ya'qub Ibrahim Menteri Lingkuhan Hidup dan Urusan Muslim
 

37. Afrika Selatan
• Syaikh Ibrahim Gabriels Ketua Majlis Ulama Afrika Utara South African Ulama
 

38. Sudan
• AbdurRahman Sawar adz-Dzahab Mantan Presiden Sudan
• Dr. Isham Ahmad al-Bashir Menteri Agama SWISS
• Prof. Tariq Ramadan Cendikiawan Muslim
 

39. Syria (Suriah)
• Dr. Muhammad Sa'id Ramadhan al-Buti Dai, Pemikir dan Penulis Islam
• Prof. Dr. Syaikh Wahbah Musthafa az-Zuhaili Ketua Departemen Fiqih, Damascus University
• Syaikh Dr. Ahmad Badr Hasoun Mufti Besar Syria
 

40. Thailand
• Mr. Wan Muhammad Nur Matha Penasehat Perdana Menteri
• Wiboon Khusakul Dubes Thailand untuk Irak
 

41. Tunisia
• Prof. Dr. al-Hadi al-Bakkoush Mantan Perdana Menteri Tunisia
• Dr. Abu Bakar al-Akhzuri Menteri Agama
 

42. Turki
• Prof. Dr. Akmaluddin Ilisanoghi Sekjen Organisasi Konferensi Islam (OKI)
• Prof. Dr. Mualla Saljuq Dekan Fakultas Hukum, University of Ankara
• Prof. Dr. Musthafa Qagnci Mufti Besar Istanbul
• Prof. Ibrahim Kafi Donmez Profesor Fiqih University of Marmara
 

43. Ukraina
• Syaykh Dr. Ahmad Tamim Mufti Ukraina
 

44. Uni Emirat Arab
• Mr. Ali bin as-Sayyid Abdurahman al-Hasyim Penasehat Menteri Agama
• Syaikh Muhammad al-Banani Hakim Pengadilan Tinggi
• Dr. Abdusalam Muhammad Darwish al-Marzuqi Hakim Pengadilan Dubai
 

45. Inggris
• Syaikh Abdul Hakim Murad/Tim Winter Dosen, University of Cambridge
• Syaikh Yusuf Islam/Cat Steven Dai Islam dan mantan penyanyi
• Dr. Fuad Nahdi Pemimpin Redaksi Q-News International
• SamiYusuf Penyanyi Lagu-lagu Islam
 

46. Amerika Serikat
• Prof. Dr. Sayyid Hussain Nasr Penulis dan profesor Studi-studi Islam, George Washington University
• Syaikh Hamza Yusuf Ketua Zaytuna Institute
• Syaikh Faisal Abdur Rauf Imam Masjid Jami' Kota New York
• Prof. Dr. Ingrid Mattson Profesor Studi-studi Islam, Hartford Seminary; Ketua Masyarakat Islam Amerika Utara (ISNA)
 

47. Uzbekistan
• Syaikh Muhammad ash-Shadiq Muhammad Yusuf Mufti Besar
 

48. Yaman
• Al-Habib Umar bin Muhammad bin Salim bin Hafidz Ketua I Madrasah Dar al-Mustafa, Tarim
• Al-Habib Ali bin Abdurrahman al-Jufriy Ketua II Madrasah Dar al-Mustafa, Tarim

http://pustakamuhibbin.blogspot.com/2013/08/risalah-amman-fatwa-konferensi-ulama_2762.html
https://www.facebook.com/photo.php?fbid=486060038151340&set=a.356613851095960.85503.347695735321105&type=1&theater
Website Resmi Risalah Amman:
http://www.ammanmessage.com
Poin Risalah Amman
Artinya:
Berdasarkan Fatwa yang diberikan oleh para Ulama Besar (Syekh Al Azhar, Ayatollah Sistani, dan Syeikh Qaradawi), di Juli 2005, Yang Mulia Raja Abdullah II mengadakan Konferensi Islam Internasional yang diikuti 200 Ulama terkemuka dari 50 negara. Di Amman, para Ulama mengeluarkan aturan 3 hal dasar (yang dikenal sebagai 3 hal Risalah Amman):
1. Para Ulama menyatakan bahwa 8 Mazhab dari Sunni, Syi'ah, dan Ibadhi, Aqidah Asy'ari, Sufi, dan pemikiran Salafi Sejati adalah bagian dari Muslim
2. Berdasarkan Definisi di atas mereka melarang Takfir / Pengkafiran di antara Muslim di atas.
3. Berdasarkan Mazhab Mazhab yang sudah ditentukan di atas, fatwa sesat yang mengatas-namakan Islam oleh orang2 bodoh bisa dihindarkan.


Basmallah
THE AMMAN MESSAGE
SUMMARY

'The best resource for those who wish to travel along the straight path in their words and their actions, and in their spiritual and religious life'.
— The Grand Shaykh of the Azhar, Shaykh Mohammed Sayyid Tantawi (may God have mercy on him), 2006.
 

The Amman Message started as a detailed statement released the eve of the 27th of Ramadan 1425 AH / 9th November 2004 CE by H.M. King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein in Amman, Jordan. It sought to declare what Islam is and what it is not, and what actions represent it and what actions do not. Its goal was to clarify to the modern world the true nature of Islam and the nature of true Islam.
 

In order to give this statement more religious authority, H.M. King Abdullah II then sent the following three questions to 24 of the most senior religious scholars from all around the world representing all the branches and schools of Islam: (1) Who is a Muslim? (2) Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate (takfir)? (3) Who has the right to undertake issuing fatwas (legal rulings)?
 

Based on the fatwas provided by these great scholars (who included the Shaykh Al-Azhar; Ayatollah Sistani and Sheikh Qaradawi), in July 2005 CE, H.M. King Abdullah II convened an international Islamic conference of 200 of the world's leading Islamic scholars 'Ulama) from 50 countries. In Amman, the scholars unanimously issued a ruling on three fundamental issues (which became known as the 'Three Points of the Amman Message'):
1. They specifically recognized the validity of all 8 Mathhabs (legal schools) of Sunni, Shi'a and Ibadhi Islam; of traditional Islamic Theology (Ash'arism); of Islamic Mysticism (Sufism), and of true Salafi thought, and came to a precise definition of who is a Muslim.
2. Based upon this definition they forbade takfir (declarations of apostasy) between Muslims.
3. Based upon the Mathahib they set forth the subjective and objective preconditions for the issuing of fatwas, thereby exposing ignorant and illegitimate edicts in the name of Islam.
 

These Three Points were then unanimously adopted by the Islamic World's political and temporal leaderships at the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit at Mecca in December 2005. And over a period of one year from July 2005 to July 2006, the Three Points were also unanimously adopted by six other international Islamic scholarly assemblies, culminating with the International Islamic Fiqh Academy of Jeddah, in July 2006. In total, over 500 leading Muslim scholars worldwid as can be seen on this website [click here to see the entire list] unanimously endorsed the Amman Message and its Three Points.
 

This amounts to a historical, universal and unanimous religious and political consensus (ijma') of the Ummah (nation) of Islam in our day, and a consolidation of traditional, orthodox Islam. The significance of this is: (1) that it is the first time in over a thousand years that the Ummah has formally and specifically come to such a pluralistic mutual inter-recognition; and (2) that such a recognition is religiously legally binding on Muslims since the Prophet (may peace and blessings be upon him) said: My Ummah will not agree upon an error (Ibn Majah, Sunan, Kitab al-Fitan, Hadith no.4085).
 

This is good news not only for Muslims, for whom it provides a basis for unity and a solution to infighting, but also for non-Muslims. For the safeguarding of the legal methodologies of Islam (the Mathahib) necessarily means inherently preserving traditional Islam's internal 'checks and balances'. It thus assures balanced Islamic solutions for essential issues like human rights; women's rights; freedom of religion; legitimate jihad; good citizenship of Muslims in non-Muslim countries, and just and democratic government. It also exposes the illegitimate opinions of radical fundamentalists and terrorists from the point of view of true Islam. As George Yeo, the Foreign Minister of Singapore, declared in the 60th Session of the U.N. General Assembly (about the Amman Message): "Without this clarification, the war against terrorism would be much harder to fight."
 

Finally, whilst this by the Grace of God is a historical achievement, it will clearly remain only principial unless it is put into practice everywhere. For this reason, H.M. King Abdullah II is now seeking to implement it, God willing, through various pragmatic measures, including (1) inter-Islamic treaties; (2) national and international legislation using the Three Points of the Amman Message to define Islam and forbid takfir; (3) the use of publishing and the multi-media in all their aspects to spread the Amman Message; (4) instituting the teaching of the Amman Message in school curricula and university courses worldwide; and (5) making it part of the training of mosque Imams and making it included in their sermons.
 

God says in the Holy Qur'an says:
There is no good in much of their secret conferences save (in) whosoever enjoineth charity and fairness and peace-making among the people and whoso doeth that, seeking the good pleasure of God, We shall bestow on him a vast reward. (Al-Nisa, 4:114).
http://www.ammanmessage.com
Daftar Ulama yang menanda-tangani Risalah Amman (552 Ulama dari 84 negara)
GRAND LIST OF ENDORSEMENTS OF THE AMMAN MESSAGE AND ITS THREE POINTS
(July 2005–July 2006)
Total number of signatures: 552 *
from 84 countries

http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=17&Itemid=31
Firman Allah:
"…Bertanyalah kepada Ahli Zikir (Ulama) jika kamu tidak mengetahui" [An Nahl 43]
Nah kita kalau tak tahu harus bertanya kepada Ulama yang senang berzikir kepada Allah. Bukan ulama Su' yang lupa kepada Allah.
Allah meninggikan ulama dibanding orang2 awam. Pemahaman Ulama terhadap Al Qur'an dan Hadits atau masalah, itu lebih baik daripada pemahaman orang-orang awam:
" ….Allah akan meninggikan orang-orang yang beriman di antaramu dan orang-orang yang diberi ilmu pengetahuan beberapa derajat. Dan, Allah Maha Mengetahui apa yang kamu kerjakan." (QS Al Mujaadilah [58] : 11)
Katakanlah: "Adakah sama orang-orang yang mengetahui dengan orang-orang yang tidak mengetahui?" Sesungguhnya orang yang berakallah yang dapat menerima pelajaran. Az-Zumar [39]: 9).
"Sesungguhnya yang takut kepada Allah di antara hamba-hamba-Nya, hanyalah ulama". (TQS.Fathir [35]: 28)
„Adakah sama antara orang-orang yang mengetahui dengan orang-orang yang tidak mengetahui? (Az-Zumar:9)
"Allah akan meninggikan orang-orang yang beriman diantaramu dan orang-orang yang diberi ilmu pengetahuan beberapa derajat." (Al-Mujadilah:11)
Kita harus memuliakan apa yang dimuliakan Allah:
"Demikianlah, dan barangsiapa mengagungkan perkara-perkara yang dihormati oleh Alloh, maka hal itu lebih baik baginya di sisi Alloh." [al-Hajj: 30]
"Demikianlah, dan barangsiapa mengagungkan syiar-syiar Alloh, maka sesungguhnya hal itu termasuk ketakwaan hati." [al-Hajj: 32]
"Ulama adalah pewaris para Nabi" Begitu sabdanya seperti yang dimuat di HR Abu Dawud.
Bahkan Nabi tidak tanggung2 lebih menghargai seorang ilmuwan daripada satu kabilah. "Sesungguhnya matinya satu kabilah itu lebih ringan daripada matinya seorang 'alim." (HR Thabrani)
Hilangnya ilmu bukan karena ilmu itu dicabut oleh Allah. Bukan karena Kitab Al Qur'an dan Hadits menghilang dari peredaran. Tapi hilang dengan wafatnya para Ulama yang menguasai ilmu tersebut.
Hadis riwayat Abdullah bin Amru bin Ash ra., ia berkata:
Aku pernah mendengar Rasulullah saw. bersabda: Sesungguhnya Allah tidak mengambil ilmu dengan cara mencabutnya begitu saja dari manusia, akan tetapi Allah akan mengambil ilmu dengan cara mencabut (nyawa) para ulama, sehingga ketika Allah tidak meninggalkan seorang ulama pun, manusia akan mengangkat pemimpin-pemimpin yang bodoh yang apabila ditanya mereka akan memberikan fatwa tanpa didasarkan ilmu lalu mereka pun sesat serta menyesatkan. (Shahih Muslim No.4828)
Sesungguhnya Allah tidak menahan ilmu dari manusia dengan cara merenggut tetapi dengan mewafatkan para ulama sehingga tidak lagi tersisa seorang alim. Dengan demikian orang-orang mengangkat pemimpin-pemimpin yang dungu lalu ditanya dan dia memberi fatwa tanpa ilmu pengetahuan. Mereka sesat dan menyesatkan. (Mutafaq'alaih)
Sesungguhnya umatku tidak akan bersatu dalam kesesatan. Karena itu jika terjadi perselisihan maka ikutilah suara terbanyak. (HR. Anas bin Malik)
Baca selengkapnya di: http://media-islam.or.id/2013/05/27/menghormati-dan-mengikuti-ulama-pewaris-nabi/

http://kabarislam.wordpress.com/2013/08/06/risalah-amman-ijma-ulama-dianggap-akal2an-syiah-oleh-wahabi/


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