Selasa, 05 September 2017

........... CIA saja kecolongan gara gara musuh dalam selimut yang meneruskan kepada PK Cina dan PKI dan percaya atas issue Dewan jendral ..???>> ..Dewan jendral merupakan isue kalangan militer (Yani, Sutoyo cs) untuk mengelabui PKI Perihal Pak Harto tidak memberi reaksi atas info dari Kol Latif apakah karena mengetahui bahwa Dewan Jendral itu hanya issue saja dan baru kemudian bereaksi ketika Untung mengumumkan G30S liwat RRI????.... >>>Bahan pemikiran (BENARKAH ISSUE INI..??.. ATW HANYA PEMIKIRAN INTELIGEN.. UTK MEMBUAT SKENARIO.. N SUATU DALIH AGAR ADANYA GERAKAN YG SDH DISIAPKAN N DI AGENDAKAN..??>> NOTE...??>> SIAPA YG PUNYA AGENDA..?? YG SCR KELENGKAPAN INFO N PUSAT2 KOMUNIKASI AKSI.. NAMPAKNYA BERPUSAT HNY LINK-PK HARTO.. N SYAM.. N AIDIT..??.. SIAPA LAGI SEBENRANYA YNG MENGOLAH INFO INTELIGEN N YG TERLIBAT SCR IN ACTION...?? DIMANA POSISI INTEL SENIOR PK HARTO ...AL: ... YOGA SUGAMA.. N SUTOPO YUWONO..CS ?? N YANG LAENNYA SBG ORG KEPERCAYAAN PK HARTO.. DLM KENDALI MASA.. N MEDIA MASA.. >> KONON ADA ALI MURTOPO N SUDOMO CS..YG BARU KMD MUNCUL SBG POSISI KUNCI KENDALI MASA N LINTAS MILITER ....?? DARI KESIAGAAN N JARINGAN YG DMK LENGKAP.. N TERKONSOLIDASI SCR RAPI N PENUH RAHASIA..?? MK CENTRAL KOMANDO ADA PADA TITIK KOMANDO AGENDA YG LBH FOKUS.. N ORANG2 LAPANGAN YG TERLIBAT AKSI ADALAH KENALAN N ORNG2 DALAM KENDALI KOMADO AKSI MILITER YG SANGAT TERJALIN RAPIH ITU.. HNY PD TITIK ... PK HARTO-SYAM-AIDIT..??>> SDG SAS 1 YANI N NASUTION CS.. SAS 2 SUKARNO.. N SAS 3.. AIDIT..CS.. N PR PELAKU AKSI.. UNTK MMBUNGKAM INFO N DATA2 VALID.. SHINGGA SMW BS DIAMANKAN DLM KENDALI MASA N POLITIK N MILITER..>> SMW PERLU DATA BARU.. N PERLU DIUNGKAP DG BENAR..??>> ) >> ... Sebelumnya bung Karno curhat kepada Untung perihal keberadaan Dewan jendral (yang dipimpin jendral berhaluan kanan) Di Halim bung Sukarno menepuk Supardjo dan berucap “jangan ada pembunuhan lagi”..>> INI ISSUE ATW INFO INTELIGEN PK HARTO.. SHINGGA .. ADA DALIH AGAR GERAKAN ITU BS SESUAI AGENDA.. N SKENARIO..??>> DARI MANA TAU BHW BUNG KARNO CURHAT KPD LETKOL UNTUNG..?? >> KENAPA TIDAK CURHATNYA BK ITU.. KPD SABUR ATAW SAELAN.. ATW KPD MANGIL..??>> KLW MEMANG ADA KECURIGAAN KPD YANI N NASUTION CS.. KNP BK MALAH MENYATAKN BHW KLW DIA MENINGGAL MK YG PANTAS MENGGANTIKN KEDUDUKN BK.. ADALAH AHMAD YANI..??>> APAKAH INI SEKEDAR BASA BASI POLITIK.. ATAW SESUNGGUHNYA BK MEMILKI KEPERCAYAAN PENUH KEPADA AHMAD YANI..??>> LALU KALW BENER2 AHMAD YANI DI JADIKAN CALON PENGGANTI BK...?? SIAPA YG PALING MERASA DIRUGIKAN.. N ATW MERASA PALING TERSAKITI OLEH PILIHAN POLITIK .. SAAT ITU...??>> JANGAN2 .. FAKTOR2 INI YNG MMBIAT JALANNYA PERMAINN INTELIGEN INTERNAL TNI.. N CQ AD.. TIMBUL DUALISME.. KRN AMBISI.. N KETAKUTAN YG BS SAJA TERJADI SE WAKTU2..??>> MK ISSUE DEWAN JENDRAL.. SPERTI DIFOKUSKAN.. KPD YANI N NASUTION CS.. SDG YG LAEN SE OLAH .. HNY SBG MILITER BIASA..??>> MK INTEL2 BERMUKA DUA.. ATAW DISEBUT DOUBLE ATW TRIPLE AGENTS.. BERKASAK KUSUK MEMAINKAN KARTU2 DUSTA.. N MEMBUAT INTRIK.. AGAR TIMBUL GERAKAN.. YG SCR FAKTA SANGAT DISOKONG OLEH PKI..??>> MK TAK PLAK LAGI ADA PENGKHIANAT DI TNI AD .. N MEMAINKN JARINGAN CIA.. N INTEL CINA PKC.. MMBUAT ISSUE ITU SEPERTI SEMAKIN DIMATANGKAN..>> SMW KOMANDO GERAKAN MILITER.. DR PERSIAPAN.. N JARINGAN INFO INTELIGEN.. TERPUSAT DG LINK-PK HARTO-SYAM-AIDIT. CS..>> ...>>

Perang Rahasia Soeharto

https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/11/29/perang-rahasia-soeharto/





Setelah membahas peranan sipil menghadang pengaruh Aidit cs di https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/3-menguak-aidit/ maka sekarang akan dibahas peranan pihak intel-militer cq jendral Suharto menghadang polit biro
Kalau melihat karir jendral Suharto maka tampaklah bahwa setiap orang mempunyai kelebihan dan kekurangan dan tentu saja sudah lumrah bahwa selalu ada yang setuju dan ada yang tidak setuju dengan sepak terbangnya

Ucapannya (“Criminal matters became a secondary problem,” , “what was most important were matters of a political kind”) menjadi dasar untuk menhalalkan korupsi, penyelundupan, kronisme demi politik praktis
 


Sebagai orang dibawah naungan Gemini maka


  • Ada kemampuan mampu “ngapusi”
  • Dapat bersifat Positip dan Negatip pada saat yang sama
  •   Positip : ketika mereka yang anti Bung Karno hendak me Mahmilubkannya maka ucapannya sebagai “Mikul duwur Pendem Jero” membuat yang lain mundur teratur Negatip : bung Karno tidak boleh terima tamu/keluarganya
     
    Positip : Tetap menghormati seniornya AH.Nasution dengan juga memberi gelar “jendral besar” Negatip : Menggeser AH.Nasution dari jabatan ketua MPRS
     
    Positip : Memberi bintang jasa pada paman saya Said Reksohadiprodjo untuk bidang pendidikan Negatip : Sebelumnya menggeser paman saya demi kepentingan sesama militer
     

    Perihal SEATO

     


    Baik jendral AH.Nasution, A.Yani dan Suharto karirnya lagi berkibar tidak lama setelah SEATO dibentuk pada tanggal 8 September 1954 di Manila sesuai dengan doktrin the American Truman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defense treaties
    Anggautanya merupakan kombinasi negara barat yang anti komunis, Inggris, Perancis, Amerika , New Zealand, Pakistan, Pilipina, Thailand
    Pakistan keluar di tahun 1972 setelah kemerdekaan Bangladesh, Perancis membatalakan bantuan keuangan di tahun 1975,on 20 February 1976
    SEATO bubar pada tanggal 30 June 1977.
    Walaupun SEATO bubar maka sekarang kegiatannya diganti oleh CIA dengan bantuan ekonomi/pelatihan ke agen agen di negara negara Asia Tenggara
     

    Sejarah CIA – Seskoad




    Sejak 1953, AS berkepentingan untuk membantu mencetuskan krisis di Indonesia, yang diakui sebagai “penyebab langsung” yang merangsang BK mengakhiri sistem parlementer Indonesia dan menyatakan berlakunya keadaan darurat militer, serta memasukkan “korp perwira” secara resmi dalam kehidupan politik (14 Maret 1957) Sedangkan langkah-langkah yang dilakukan CIA untuk mewujudkan ambisinya tersebut yakni dengan menggandeng faksi militer kanan –seperti Soeharto, Walandouw, Suwarto, Sarwo Edhie, Kemal Idris, Ibnu Sutowo, Basuki Rahmat, Djuhartono
    Kontrol terhadap AD ini dianggap penting, karena AS menganggap hanya AD yang mampu mengimbangi kekuatan PKI. Lalu didirikanlah SESKOAD tahun 1958 di Bandung yang mendapatkan dukungan penuh dari Pentagon, RAND dan Ford Foundation
    Khusus bagi jenderal Suharto dunia inteligen bukan hal yang baru baginya karena di tahun 1959 gara gara skandal penyelundupan dimutasikan ke Seskoad di Bandung dan pula sejak berpangkat brigadier-general di tahun 1960, telah diangkat menjadi kepala inteligen Angkatan Darat … jangan jangan sebelumnya sudah ada ikatan kerjasama dengan CIA ..

    Ketika Kolonel Suharto menjabat sebagai Panglima Diponegoro, ia dikenal sebagai sponsor penyelundupan dan berbagai tindak pelanggaran ekonomi lain dengan dalih untuk kesejahteraan anak buahnya. Suharto membentuk geng dengan sejumlah pengusaha seperti Lim Siu Liong, Bob Hasan, dan Tek Kiong, konon masih saudara tirinya. Dalam hubungan ini Kolonel Suharto dibantu oleh Letkol Munadi, Mayor Yoga Sugomo, dan Mayor Sujono Humardani. Komplotan bisnis ini telah bertindak jauh antara lain dengan menjual 200 truk AD selundupan kepada Tek Kiong.
    Persoalannya dilaporkan kepada Letkol Pranoto Reksosamudro yang ketika itu menjabat sebagai Kepala Staf Diponegoro, bawahan Suharto. Maka MBAD membentuk suatu tim pemeriksa yang diketuai Mayjen Suprapto dengan anggota S Parman, MT Haryono, dan Sutoyo. Langkah ini diikuti oleh surat perintah Jenderal Nasution kepada Jaksa Agung Sutarjo dalam rangka pemberantasan korupsi untuk menjemput Kolonel Suharto agar dibawa ke Jakarta pada 1959. Ia akhirnya dicopot sebagai Panglima Diponegoto dan digantikan oleh Pranoto. Kasus Suharto tersebut akhirnya dibekukan karena kebesaran hati Presiden Sukarno (D&R, 3 Oktober 1998:18).
    Nasution mengusulkan agar Suharto diseret ke pengadilan militer, tetapi tidak disetujui oleh Mayjen Gatot Subroto … Kemudian ia dikirim ke Seskoad di Bandung
    Selanjutnya ketika Suharto hendak ditunjuk sebagai Ketua Senat Seskoad, hal itu ditentang keras oleh Brigjen Panjaitan dengan alasan moralitas
    Di Bandung Kolonel Suharto bertemu dengan Kolonel Suwarto, Wadan Seskoad, hal ini sangat berpengaruh terhadap perjalanan hidup Suharto selanjutnya. Sekolah Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad) di Bandung yang telah berdiri sejak 1951 ini merupakan sebuah think tank AD, pendidikan militer Indonesia tertua, terbesar dan paling berpengaruh. Seskoad telah menjadi tempat penggodogan perkembangan doktrin militer di Indonesia. Sampai 1989 telah meluluskan 3500 perwira. Para alumninya menjadi tokoh terkemuka dalam pemerintahan. Hampir 100 orang menjadi sekretaris jenderal, gubernur, pimpinan lembaga-lembaga nasional atau badan-badan non departemental. Presiden, Wakil Presiden, dan lebih 30 menteri merupakan alumni Seskoad.
    Suwarto sendiri pernah menempuh pendidikan Infantry Advance Course di Fort Benning pada 1954 dan Command and General Staff College di Fort Leavenworth, AS pada 1958. Ia bersahabat dengan Prof Guy Pauker, konsultan RAND (Research and Development Corporation) yang dikunjunginya pada 1963 dan 1966. Suwartolah yang menjadikan Seskoad sebagai think tank politik MBAD, mengarahkan para perwira AD menjadi pemimpin politik potensial (Sundhaussen 1988:245).Guy Pauker adalah pengamat masalah Asia, orang penting dalam Rand Corporation, kelompok pemikir (think tank) CIA*. Sejak itu Seskoad biasa disebut sebagai negara dalam negara, membuat garis politiknya sendiri, bahkan mempunyai perjanjian kerjasama dan bantuan dari AS terlepas dari politik pemerintah RI.
    Suharto, murid baru yang masuk pada Oktober 1959 ini telah mendapatkan perhatian besar dari sang guru. Pada awal 1960-an Suharto dilibatkan dalam penyusunan Doktrin Perang Wilayah serta dalam kebijaksanaan AD dalam segala segi kegiatan pemerintah dan tugas kepemerintahan. Peran Suharto dalam civic mission menempatkan dirinya dan sejumlah opsir yang condong pada PSI dalam pusat pendidikan dan pelatihan yang disokong oleh CIA lewat pemerintah AS, suatu program bersifat politik (Scott 1999:81). Pada masa Bandung Kolonel Suharto inilah agaknya hubungan Suwarto-Syam-Suharto-CIA mendapatkan dimensi baru
    Seskoad memancarkan pamornya sebagian besar karena jasa Suwarto, sangat besar perannya dalam perkembangan politik. Karena jasanya pula maka Seskoad menjadi pusat pemikiran politik serta menghadapi perkembangan PKI
    Perkembangan sejarah menunjukkan bahwa Suharto benar-benar tidak “sebodoh” yang diperkirakan Jenderal Nasution, juga tidak sekedar koppig seperti yang disebut oleh Bung Karno.


    Kebetulan atau Balas Dendam

    Nama-nama pahlawan revolusi berhubungan langsung dengan peradilan perihal pemecatannya sebagai Panglima Diponegoro karena bertindak sebagai sponsor penyelundupan (team peradilan MBAD – blokir karir)



     Ahmad Yani, Jend. Anumerta
    Donald Ifak Panjaitan, Mayjen. Anumerta
    M.T. Haryono, Letjen. Anumerta
    Siswono Parman, Letjen. Anumerta
    Suprapto, Letjen. Anumerta
    Sutoyo Siswomiharjo, Mayjen. Anumert





      Bahan pemikiran

    (BENARKAH ISSUE INI..??.. ATW HANYA PEMIKIRAN INTELIGEN.. UTK MEMBUAT SKENARIO.. N SUATU DALIH AGAR ADANYA GERAKAN YG SDH LAMA DI AGENDAKAN..??>> NOTE...??>> SIAPA YG PUNYA AGENDA..?? YG SCR KELENGKAPAN INFO N PUSAT2 KOMUNIKASI AKSI.. NAMPAKNYA BERPUSAT HNY LINK-PK HARTO.. N SYAM.. N AIDIT..??.. SIAPA LAGI SEBENRANYA YNG MENGOLAH INFO INTELIGEN N YG TERLIBAT SCR IN ACTION...?? DIMANA POSISI INTEL SENIOR PK HARTO ...AL: ... YOGA SUGAMA.. N SUTOPO YUWONO..CS ?? N YANG LAENNYA SBG ORG KEPERCAYAAN PK HARTO.. DLM KENDALI MASA.. N MEDIA MASA.. >> KONON ADA ALI MURTOPO N SUDOMO CS..YG BARU KMD MUNCUL SBG POSISI KUNCI KENDALI MASA N LINTAS MILITER ....?? DARI KESIAGAAN N JARINGAN YG DMK LENGKAP.. N TERKONSOLIDASI SCR RAPI N PENUH RAHASIA..?? MK CENTRAL KOMANDO ADA PADA TITIK KOMANDO AGENDA YG LBH FOKUS.. N ORANG2 LAPANGAN YG TERLIBAT AKSI ADALAH KENALAN N DALAM KENDALI KOMADO AKSI MILITER YG SANGAT TERJALIN RAPIH ITU.. HNY PD TITIK ... PK HARTO-SYAM-AIDIT..??>> SDG SAS 1 YANI N NASUTION CS.. SAS 2 SUKARNO.. N SAS 3.. AIDIT..CS.. N PR PELAKU AKSI.. UNTK MMBUNGKAM INFO N DATA2 VALID.. SHINGGA SMW BS DIAMANKAN DLM KENDALI MASA N POLITIK N MILITER..>> SMW PERLU DATA BARU.. N PERLU DIUNGKAP DG BENAR..??>> )


  • Sebelumnya bung Karno curha
  •  
  •  
  • t kepada Untung perihal keberadaan Dewan jendral (yang dipimpin jendral berhaluan kanan)
    Di Halim bung Sukarno menepuk Supardjo dan berucap “jangan ada pembunuhan lagi”

  • Pembantu Letnan Dua Djahurub – Prajurit Resimen Tjakrabirwa – Beragabung dengan pasukan LETTU Doel Arif dan menyerang dan membunuh Jendral A.H. Nasution (lolos)
    Sersan Satu Marinir Hadiwinarto P. Soeradi (NRP. 37265) – Prajurit Resimen Tjakrabirwa

    Sebagai seorang “didikan Syam (PKI)” dengan sendirinya Untung menggangap jendral Nasution cs sebagai jendral berhaluan kanan yang perlu diamankan di area AURI yang dianggap setia pada Soekarno atas arahan Aidit dan Syam

  • Dewan jendral merupakan isue kalangan militer (Yani, Sutoyo cs) untuk mengelabui PKI
    Perihal Pak Harto tidak memberi reaksi atas info dari Kol Latif apakah karena mengetahui bahwa Dewan Jendral itu hanya issue saja dan baru kemudian bereaksi ketika Untung mengumumkan G30S liwat RRI?


  • CIA saja kecolongan gara gara musuh dalam selimut yang meneruskan kepada PK Cina dan PKI dan percaya atas issue Dewan jendral

    Bagaimanakah scenario sebenarnya dari G30S itu ..?

    (asumsi..atw bocoran inteligen pk harto..??)

    Besar kemungkinan seperti berikut ini:

    Bung Karno – Untung

  • Bung Karno karena kurang kepercayaan pada loyalitas pihak militer (Nasution dan Yani) membentuk pasukan Cakrabirawa dimana Untung merupakan salah satu anggautanya dan menceritakan perihal Dewan Jendral kepadanya
  • Untung sebagai seorang loyal yang kepada Aidit langsung mengambil inisiatip begitu mendengar issue “Dewan Jendral” dan mengamankan (hidup atau mati) ke-6 jendral yang dianggap mbalelo terhadap bung Karno

  • Kesalahan fatal menilai sebuah Kesempatan

    Syam melihat kesempatan untuk membunuh para jendral dan melimpahkan kesalahan pada masalah intern militer..dewan jendral
    Untung melihat kesempatan untuk menjadi pimpinan G30S .. berjasa pada bung Karno dan PKI..

     
    Anggota-Anggota Resimen Tjakrabirawa
    Komandan Resimen Cakrabirawa , Brigjen Sabur

    Brigadir Jendral TNI. Sabur – Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa
    Kolonel Maulwi Saelan – Wakil Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa
    Letnan Kolonel Untung bin SyamsuriKomandan Batalyon I Tjakrabirawa – Pembrontak/Pemimpin PKI
    Letnan Kolonel Ali Ebram – Staf Asisten I Intelijen Resimen Tjakrabirawa
    Letnan Satu Doel Arif – Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa – Pemberontak/Pemimpin Pasukan PKI yang membunuh Jendral-Jendral TNI-AD (Pasukan Pasopati PKI)
     

    Bung Karno – Soepardjo

    Keberadaan Brig,Jen Soepardjo (loyal kepada bung Karno) di Jakarta menjadi teka teki karena seharusnya berada di Kalimantan ..menurut saya keberadaannya hanya dimungkinkan karena mendapat perintah langsung dari Bung Karno walaupun merupakan bawahan Soeharto … kenapa dipanggil ke Jakarta… apakah dalam rangka mengamankan ke-6 jendral yang dianggap mbalelo…?
     

    Bung Karno – Soeharto

    Sebagai seorang yang loyal kepada bung Karno maka besar kemungkinan Soeharto mengirimkan pasukan Diponegoro dan Brawijaya ke Jakarta untuk ber jaga jaga apabila pasukan Siliwangi (Nasution dan Yani) melancarkan kudeta sesuai isue dewan jendral atau pihak PKI membuat keonaran
    Pada waktu itu Brig.jen Soeharto berada diluar lingkaran para jendral … Jen.Nasution pernah mau memecatnya di masa lalu ..Jen.Yani meliwatinya dalam karir..

    Kesalahan fatal menilai sebuah Kesempatan

    Surat Perintah 11 Maret …merupakan alat untuk menggeser AIDIT sebagai ketua umum PKI liwat Soeharto dan sebagai ketua umum defakto PKI dapat menggendalikan PKI sehingga merasa tidak ada gunanya membubarkan PKI serta juga sebagai pengimbang Junta Militer

    Bung Karno – CIA

    Tentu pihak CIA risih kalau Bung Karno menjadi tokoh Komunis diluar Rusia dan Cina …melihat kesempatan untuk menggesernya dengan keberadaan SP 11 Maret tersebut

    Baca pula https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/3-menguak-aidit/


    Sepintas lalu kelihatan bahwa hubungan antara Seskoad dan Polit Biro serasi sekali

  • Pada tanggal 29 Juni 1963 Menteri/ Wakil Ketua MPRS/Ketua CC PKI D. N. Aidit memberikan ceramah di hadapan para mahasiswa Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat (SESKOAD) atas permintaan Mayor Jendral Sudirman, pemimpin sekolah tersebut.
  • Bagi orang luar maka Sjam-Pono-Bono dikira mata mata militer .. ke-3nya mempunyai kartu identitas untuk masuk ke “Army bases” dan setiap orang mempunyai kontak … tujuan utamanya bukan untuk merekut akan tetapi mendapatkan info dan sebagai gantinya mereka memberikan info perihal teroris muslim …bukankah mereka anti komunis?
  •  


  •  
    Tetapi sesungguhnya ke-2 pihak intel sedang melakukan infiltrasi ke pihak lawan masing masing dan ber-pura pura kompak demi konsep Nasakom
     
     


    Perihal G30S



    Puncak dari pertarungan politik di Indonesia, khususnya pada 1959-1965, adalah Peristiwa 30 September 1965, ketika mereka yang bertarung terjebak kepada pilihan ‘mendahului atau didahului’. Mereka yang mendahului ternyata terperosok, sebagaimana yang didahului pun roboh, dan Soekarno terlindas di tengah persilangan karena gagal meneruskan permainan keseimbangan kekuasaan.

    Soekarno, misalnya, dari dirinyalah muncul cetusan untuk menindak para jenderal yang tidak loyal, yang dilaporkan pada dirinya dalam pola intrik istana. Cetusannya itu, terutama kepada Letnan Kolonel Untung, menjadi awal kematian enam jenderal dan seorang perwira menengah, meskipun ia mungkin tidak ‘mengharapkan’ pembunuhan terjadi. Dipa Nusantara Aidit, adalah orang yang mengantar terjadinya peristiwa menjadi kekerasan berdarah ketika ia memanfaatkan Untung yang mendapat perintah penindakan dari Soekarno, dan mendorongkan peristiwa itu terjadi sebagai masalah internal Angkatan Darat, sambil menjalankan rencana jangka panjangnya sendiri. Dan pengelolaan atas masalah internal Angkatan Darat ini, mendapat bentuk yang nyaris ‘sempurna’ sebagai makar dalam penanganan Sjam tokoh Biro Khusus PKI, dengan mengoptimalkan peranan Letnan Kolonel Untung.



    Lalu Jenderal Soeharto muncul dari balik tabir blessing in disguise, mengambil peran penting dengan segala teka-teki yang untuk sebagian belum terpecahkan hingga kini. Dan akhirnya, berkuasa
    Kenyataan lain yang tidak bisa diabaikan, adalah fakta bahwa Soeharto lah yang telah membantu dengan radiogramnya mendatangkan dua batalion dari Jawa Timur dan Jawa Tengah yang terlibat dalam Gerakan 30 September. Soeharto membiarkan dan menunggu sampai ‘bisul’ pecah. Lalu bertindak. Ini secara kuat mengesankan betapa Soeharto telah bekerja dengan suatu peran yang abu-abu.
    Di pihak militer, adalah Letnan Jenderal Ahmad Yani dan rekan-rekannya para jenderal yang memperoleh ‘peran’ sebagai korban, sesuatu yang sebenarnya bisa ‘dihindarkan’ dengan ketajaman analisa terhadap laporan-laporan intelijen dan gambaran situasi yang ada. Mayor Jenderal Soeharto adalah ‘pihak ketiga’ dalam pergulatan kekuasaan dan untuk sebagian muncul sebagai ‘kuda hitam’ yang tak terduga
    Ternyata, ia adalah ‘orang lain’ bagi Letnan Jenderal Ahmad Yani dan kawan-kawan, serta bagi Jenderal Abdul Harris Nasution. Pada sisi dan episode lain, Soeharto secara kontroversial memerintahkan Kolonel Yasir Hadibroto untuk langsung ‘mengeksekusi’ mati DN Aidit setelah ia ini tertangkap di Jawa Tengah.
    Dalam menghadapi makar terhadap pemerintah, menurut standar normal, tertangkapnya tokoh yang dianggap perencana atau pemimpin makar, justru merupakan pintu masuk untuk mengungkap segala latar belakang peristiwa. Untuk mengetahui jaringan makar, sehingga memudahkan untuk menangkap mereka yang terlibat, untuk selanjutnya diselesaikan melalui jalur hukum. Bila Soeharto meyakini PKI sebagai partai yang berdiri di belakang makar, seperti yang sering dikatakannya sendiri di kemudian hari, semestinya ia ‘menjaga’ Aidit untuk kepentingan interogasi lanjut, bukannya ‘memerintahkan’ Aidit dieliminasi. Pembunuhan langsung terhadap Aidit, tidak bisa tidak berarti Soeharto ingin menutupi suatu rahasia yang bisa terungkap bila Aidit dibiarkan hidup, apapun rahasia itu.

    Menurut kabar tokoh tokoh G30S merupakan kenalan lamanya …?


    Letkol Untung

  • Liwat RRI Medan Merdeka jakarta dinyatakan sebagai pimpinan G30 September


  • Dalam divisi Diponegoro di Jawa Tengah merupakan bawahan Suharto,yang menghadiri pernikahannya di tahun1964.


  • Di Hukum mati pada bulan September 1967




  • Brigjen Soepardjo
    Ia berasal dari Divisi Siliwangi, pasukan Suparjo lah yang telah berhasil menangkap gembong DI Kartosuwiryo dan mengakhiri pemberontakan DI di Jawa Barat. Kemudian ia ditugaskan ke Kostrad, lalu menjabat sebagai Panglima Kopur II Kostrad di bawah Jenderal Suharto. Tokoh ini juga cukup dekat dengan Suharto. Hampir dapat dipastikan bahwa tokoh ini pun, seperti kedua tokoh sebelumnya yakni Letkol Untung dan Kolonel Latief, seseorang yang memiliki kesetiaan tinggi kepada Presiden Sukarno.

    Suparjo merupakan anggota kelompok yang biasa disebut kelompok Kolonel Suwarto (Seskoad Bandung), yang di dalamnya terdapat Alamsyah, Amir Makhmud, Basuki Rakhmad, Andi Yusuf, Yan Walandow. Yang terakhir ini seorang kolonel yang ikut pemberontakan Permesta, kemudian menjadi pengusaha. Ia mempunyai hubungan lama dengan CIA dan menjadi petugas Suharto dalam mencari dana dari luar negeri. Ia pun anggota trio Suharto-Syam-Latief cs












    Kol.A.Latief
    Latief sendiri menyatakan karier kemiliterannya nyaris selalu mengikuti jejak Suharto. Pada gilirannya membuat hubungan Latief dan Suharto bukan lagi sekedar bawahan dan atasan, melainkan sudah sebagai dua sahabat. Suharto tahu Latief tak akan melakukan sesuatu yang dapat merugikan dirinya. Sudah sejak setelah agresi kedua, Latief merasa selalu mendapatkan kepercayaan dari Suharto sebagai komandannya yakni memimpin pasukan pada saat yang sulit. Ketika Trikora pun ia masih dicari bekas komandannya itu, tetapi Latief sedang mengikuti Seskoad. Pada bulan Juni 1965 Mayjen Suharto meminta agar Latief dapat memimpin suatu pasukan di Kalimantan Timur, akan tetapi Umar Wirahadikusuma menolak melepasnya karena tenaganya diperlukan untuk tugas keamanan di Kodam V Jaya. 


    Kenyataan bahwa Latief tidak dihukum mati, menimbulkan suatu spekulasi bahwa ia memiliki keterangan yang lebih sempurna yang disimpan di luar Indonesia dengan pesan supaya segera diumumkan jika ia dibunuh

     
    Kamaruzaman Syam
    Pada tahun 1964, ditunjuk sebagai kepala Polit-biro PKI yang terdiri dari 5 orang yaitu:
    Sjam, Pono (Supono Marsudidjojo), Bono, Wandi dan Hamim.
    Ke-3 orang pertama mempunyai tugas berhubungan dengan pihak militer untuk mendapatkan informasi
    Semua anggauta diwajibkan untuk menyembunyikan keanggautaan partai di PKI
    Setiap bulan mereka bertemu dan meneruskan kepada Aidit untuk mendapatkan perintah selanjutnya .. Hanya Aidit dan beberapa anggauta senior mengetahui keberadaan Polit Biro ini … bagi orang luar maka Sjam-Pono-Bono dikira mata mata militer .. ke-3nya mempunyai kartu identitas untuk masuk ke “Army bases” dan setiap orang mempunyai kontak … tujuan utamanya bukan untuk merekut akan tetapi mendapatkan info dan sebagai gantinya mereka memberikan info perihal teroris muslim …bukankah mereka anti komunis?

    Rupanya baik
    bung Karno dan Suharto
    sudah jauh hari memikirkan cara
    bagaimana menjinakan PKI



    Kenapa Bung Karno makin dekat ke PKI
    Usaha menggambil alih kedudukan Ketua Umum PKI liwat Nasakom dan Pancasila

     


    Sebagai seorang sipil Demokrat (semua partai punya hak yang sama) maka jalan yang ditempuh bung Karno adalah melalui konsep Nasakom dan Pancasila untuk menghadang PKI kalu perlu melakukan kudeta ketua umum PKI


      
    Kenapa badan inteligen Militer mendekati Polit Biro ??

    ChimpShooting


    Sebagai seorang militer maka Suharto melalui "badan inteligen" melakukan langkah langkah serangan terselubung yang mematikan








    Tiada Pilihan selain memainkan lakon Anta Seno gugur

     
    Antaredja : Lapor, siap untuk maju ke padang Kurusetra
    Kresna : weleh weleh ngger tidak ada musuh yang dapat menandingi Dewa Kematian, karena dengan cicin Mustikabumi kamu akan hidup lagi begitu menyentuh bumi dengan kata lain kau tidak bisa mati dan hal itu akan mengacaukan rencana para Dewata perihal Perang Bharatajuda…bagaimana agar Pandawa menang kau gunakan aji Upasanta untuk menjilat telapak kakimu
    Antareja : Lho iya AKU mati dong…..?
    Kresna : Apa kamu tidak mau berkorban untuk Pendawa…?
    Antareja : Oke, kau kan dewa Kehidupan, jadi nggak masalah kalau aku mati…nanti kau hidupkan aku lagi…he..he..
     

    At his Mayesty request
    It is time to go
    Camdessus-Suharto



    Baca pula pembahasan
  • http://books.google.co.id/books?id=t3obtVlTFg0C&pg=PA4&lpg=PA4&dq=eros+djarot+jejak+suharto&source=bl&ots=z9bHG1FY1o&sig=xYki_CiIR2cpqcTBA4puao_knxQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=xLzXUPLmMMP4rQfYvoHgDA&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=eros%20djarot%20jejak%20suharto&f=false
  • https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/engkoh-lim-dan-nekohlim/
  • https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/3-menguak-aidit/
  • http://soeyadi.blog.com/2009/03/21/jejak-soeharto/




  • Jejak karir


    Jendral A.H.Nasution
     
    Karir

  • Ketika ditahun 1940, Nazi Jerman menduduki Belanda maka pemerintah kolonial Belanda mendirikan “officer reserve corps” yang memperbolehkan pendaftaran oleh orang Indonesia … ini satu satunya cara untuk mendapatkan pelatihan militer .. dengan beberapa orang Indonesia mengikuti pelatihan di Akademi Militer di Bandung


  • Di bulan September 1940 dipomosikan sebagai kopral … 3 bulan berikutnya naik menjadi sersan dan akhirnya menjadi perwira pada KNIL.


  • Membantu PETA ketika ditahun 1942 Jepang menduduki Indonesia walaupun tidak menjadi anggautanya


  • Di bulan Mei 1946, dijadikan Regional Commander dari divisi Siliwangi , yang bertugas menjaga keamanan Jawa Barat ..menjadi dasar doktrin pertahanan Angkatan Darat dikemudian hari


  • Ditahun 1948 menjadi Wakil Komandan TKR dan walaupun hanya berpangkat kolonel merupakan orang ke-2 setelah jendral Sudirman


  • Di bulan Juni gagasannya untuk melakukan perang gerilya melawan Belanda diterima


  • Di bulan September 1948 walaupun bukan Komandan TKR akan tetapi menambah pengalaman sebagai Komandan Angkatan Darat pada saat penumpasan pemberontakan PKI di Madiun ..Jendral Sudirman (dalam keadaan sakit) ingin melakukan perundingan dengan Amir Syarifudin dan Musso dan mengirim LetKol Suharto untuk berunding ..Suharto kembali dengan berita bahwa keadaan tenang tenang saja, akan tetapi Nasution tidak mempercayainya dan mengirim pasukan ke Madiun untuk menumpas pemberontakan komunis di bulan September 1948 ..Musso terbunuh dan Aidit kabur ke Cina


  • Di tahun 1950, Nasution menjadi Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat dan TB Simatupang menggantikan Sudirman sebagai Pangad dari ABRI

  • Atas campur tangan DPR dalam urusan intern Militer maka pada tanggal 17 October 1952, Nasution dan Simatupang melakukan show of force didepan istana presiden dengan meriam Tank mengarah ke istana dan meminta agar DPR dibubarkan
    Presden Sukarno berhasil menghimbau baik tentara dan masyarakat untuk bubar .. akibatnya baik Nasution dan Simatupang dipecat dari dinas militer di bulan Desember 1952
    Pada tanggal 27 October 1955, Nasution di rehab ke posisi lamanya sebagai Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat

  • Pada tanggal 5 July 1959 Nasution diangkat Nasution Mentri Pertahanan disamping sebagia Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat


  • Pada permulaan tahun 1962, Nasution dan Yani menjadi panglima koordinator “pembebasan Irian Barat” dengan Suharto di Indosesia Timur sebagai panglima
  •  


  • Jendral Ahmad Yani
      Karir

  • Di bulan December 1955, Yani belajar di the Command and General staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Texas (USA) . Sekembalinya di tahun 1956, Yani menjadi staff dari jendral Abdul Harris Nasution sebagai ass.Logistik dan selanjutnya sebagai Wakil Kepala Staff untuk urusan Organisasi dan Personalia


  • Pada bulan August 1958, Ahmad Yani memimpin “Operasi 17 Augustus 17” melawan PRRI di Sumatra Barat
    Pasukannya berhasil menduduki Padang and Bukittinggi, dan untuk itu maka dipromosikan sebagai wakil 2 Kepala Staff Angkatan Darat pada tanggal 1 September 1962


  • Menjadi Menpangad pada tanggal 13 November 1963 (juga sebagai anggauta kabinet), menggantikan jendral Nasution.
  •  



  • Jendral Suharto

    karir

  • Bergabung dengan KNIL ditahun 1940, di Gombong dekat Yogyakarta.


  • Bergabung dengan Polisi Jepang sebagai keibuho (assistant inspector) …setelah itu pindah ke Peta Besar kemungkinan persinggungannya dengan ideologi nationalis dan militer sangat mempengaruhi jalan pikirannya … oleh pihak Jepang maka ex-NCOs, termasuk Suharto dijadikan perwira termasuk latihan dengan pedang Samurai
    Menurut penulis buku The Smiling General (1969) OG. Roeder, Suharto was “well known for his tough, but not brutal, methods”.


  • Sebagai jasanya memerangi sekutu di Magelang dan Semarang diberi pangkat LetKol


  • Membentuk Battalion X Regiment I dan diangkat menjadi Mayor


  • Di tahun In 1950, kol Suharto memimpin Brigade Garuda menumpas RMS


  • Antara tahun 1954 and 1959, menjadi Komandan Devisi Diponegoro yang bertanggung jawab atas Jawa Tengah dan Yogyakarta


  • Di tahun 1959 gara gara skandal penyelundupan dimutasikan ke Seskoad di Bandung…di Bandung dipomosikan menjadi brigadier-general dan di tahun 1960, diangkat menjadi kepala inteligen Angkatan Darat


  • Ditahun 1961, diangkat menjadi kepala KOSTRAD, (a ready-reaction air-mobile force)


  • Di bulan January 1962, menjadi major General dan menjadi komandan lead Operation Mandala,(gabungan operasi angkatan darat-angkatan laut-angkatan udara) untuk pembebasan Irian Barat

  • Mari kita semua mengheningkan cipta bagi mereka yang telah berjasa bagi nusa dan bangsa


    Benedict Anderson’s View of Nationalism

    The child of late empire, who transformed the field of area studies, lived a life beyond boundaries.

    In 1967, Sudisman, the general secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), whose ranks had just been decimated in a series of massacres that left hundreds of thousands dead, was put on trial. Of the top five PKI leaders, Sudisman was the only one who appeared in court; the others were shot. Two foreigners were always present in the Jakarta courtroom: Benedict O’Gorman Anderson, a 30-year-old scholar of Indonesia, and Herbert Feith, a colleague of Anderson’s from Australia.
    Amid the parade of Communist witnesses, only two of them spoke out in protest in the courtroom and refused to incriminate others. One was an old woman who subsequently went mad; the other, Anderson recalled many years later, “was this little Chinese kid who looked nineteen or twenty. Very calmly, and with great dignity, he gave his testimony. I was so impressed by it.”
    Sudisman, who received a death sentence, also maintained his composure. In 2001, Anderson told me that he “was so dignified, so calm, and his speech was so great, that I felt a kind of moral obligation” to do something: “As Sudisman was leaving the courtroom for the last time, he looked at me and Herb. He didn’t say anything, but I had such a strong feeling that he was thinking: ‘You have to help us. Probably you two are the only ones I can trust to make sure that what I said will survive.’ It was like an appeal from a dying man.” Anderson answered that appeal in 1975, when he translated Sudisman’s speech into English from a smuggled copy of the court transcript. A radical printing collective in Australia published it as an orange-colored, 28-page pamphlet titled “Analysis of Responsibility,” with an admiring introduction by the translator.
    After Sudisman’s trial, Anderson’s ability to do research in Java would eventually be curtailed. The young scholar, entirely fluent in Indonesian, was being watched: A US em­bassy document from 1967 stated that Anderson was “regarded…as an outright Communist or at least a fellow traveler.” He also found himself under attack in the Indonesian press: The magazine Chas, which reportedly had ties to the country’s intelligence services, called him a “useful idiot” in a front-page article. In April 1972, Anderson was expelled from the country. It was the beginning of an exile that would endure for almost three decades.
    With Indonesia closed to him, Anderson journeyed to Bangkok in 1974. “It was a wonderful time to be there,” he later said. A heady interlude between dictatorships allowed Thai radicalism to flower. The good times ended in 1976, when the military overthrew the civilian regime and publicly shot and hanged student radicals in downtown Bangkok.
    Still, the period Anderson spent in Thailand was essential to his intellectual growth, as it forced him to think comparatively—which, at the time, was rare among area-studies scholars. “Being in Thailand,” he later said, “forced me to think all the time about if I had to write about Thailand and Indonesia in one space, how would I do it?” Anderson, who died in Batu, Indonesia, in December at the age of 79, overcame that challenge, and the result was Imagined Communities (1983), a classic analysis of nationalism that has been translated into 29 languages.
    * * *
    In June 2001, when Anderson was 64, I traveled to upstate New York to profile him for Lingua Franca. He lived in Freeville, eight miles east of Ithaca, in a spacious old farmhouse surrounded by grazing cattle and with a barn topped by a Javanese-style weather vane. For three days, we sat and talked in a breezy kitchen packed with unruly stacks of crime novels, scholarly journals, Asian newspapers, and doctoral theses. Mounted on a wall was a striking black-and-white photograph of a youthful Sukarno, the left-wing nationalist who led Indonesia to independence in 1949 and was overthrown by General Suharto in 1967.
    As I prepared to leave, I inquired if Anderson intended to write a memoir, and he said no. But two years later, an editor at a Japanese publishing house asked him for a small autobiographical volume. “Embarrassed rejection” was his initial response: “Professors in the West rarely have interesting lives. Their values are objectivity, solemnity, formality and—at least officially—self-effacement.” But when a special friend and former student, Kato Tsuyoshi, of Kyoto University, agreed to assist him with the book and then translate it into Japanese, Anderson consented. It was published, to his satisfaction, in Japan in 2009.
    From the outset of the project, Benedict’s brother, the historian and critic Perry Anderson, urged him to publish the memoir in English, but he brushed the idea aside. In 2015, with his 80th birthday approaching, he changed his mind. Shortly before his death, Anderson completed the final draft of A Life Beyond Boundaries, which is now before us. It’s a neat and tidy book about his unusual trajectory and sensibility, infused with inside jokes, idiosyncratic asides, and sly humor. It is also a tart overview of academic life. But mostly the memoir is a primer for cosmopolitanism and an argument for traversing geographical, historical, linguistic, and disciplinary borders.
    The history of the Anderson family reads like a Conrad novel. Benedict’s great-great-grandfather, along with a great-great-uncle, joined the United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798, for which they did time in prison. A nephew of theirs took part in the uprising of 1848, and thereafter fled to Paris, Istanbul, and, eventually, the United States, where he became a member of the New York State Supreme Court. Another branch of the family tree has Anglo-Irish landowners and military officers who served the British empire in Burma, Afghanistan, Hong Kong, and India.
    Anderson’s intrepid, linguistically gifted father spent most of his career in China as an employee of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, which began as a tool of British and French imperialists and, in his son’s words, was responsible for taxing “imperial China’s maritime trade with the outside world.” Benedict was born in Kunming in 1936, but his father made a consequential decision in 1941 to move the family to California: Had they remained in China, they might have been imprisoned in a Japanese internment camp.
    In 1945, the family moved to Ireland, where they lived in a house full of “Chinese scrolls, pictures, clothes and costumes, which we would often dress up in for fun.” The radio was another source of entertainment and enlightenment: In the evenings, the family listened to classic novels that were read aloud on the BBC by distinguished actors, “so that our imaginations were filled with figures like Anna Karenina, the Count of Monte Cristo, Lord Jim, Uriah Heep, Tess of the D’Urbervilles, and so on.” In those years, traveling theater groups proliferated in Ireland, and the Anderson children (including Benedict’s sister Melanie) absorbed plays by Shakespeare, Shaw, Wilde, Sheridan, and O’Casey.
    His father died young, when Benedict was 9, and the children were dispatched to boarding schools in England. His English mother, who was passionate about books and ideas, was scraping by on a pension, so Benedict had to win scholarships. He ended up garnering one of 13 vacant slots at Eton, a place that immediately sharpened his sense of class distinction. The scholarship boys lived in a separate dorm from the sons of the British aristocracy and had to wear a special “medieval” outfit. But he received an extraordinary old-fashioned education in literature, art history, ancient history, archaeology, and comparative modern history.
    At the core of the curriculum was rigorous language study in Latin, Greek, French, German, and a bit of “Cold War Russian.” (Later, Anderson would learn Indonesian, Javanese, Thai, Tagalog, Dutch, and Spanish.) The memorization and recitation of poems in Latin and French were an essential aspect of his education; his teachers also asked him to translate English poems into Latin and even to compose poems in that language. Few students after him were educated in so rigorous a fashion. It was the end of an era.
    Having flourished at Eton, Anderson found Cambridge University to be a tranquil holiday. He became enamored of film (Japanese cinema, especially) and felt the first stirrings of politicization. One afternoon during the Suez Crisis of 1956, he crossed the campus and saw a group of brown-skinned students demonstrating:
    Suddenly, out of the blue, the protestors were assaulted by a gang of big English student bullies, most of them athletes. They were singing “God Save the Queen!” To me this was incomprehensible, and reprehensible.
    The protestors, mostly Indians and Ceylonese, were much smaller and thinner, and so stood no chance.… I tried to intervene to help them, only to have my spectacles snatched off my face and smashed in the mud.
    After graduating from Cambridge, Anderson lingered at home for six months, quarreling with his mother, who wanted him to become a British diplomat. An alternative presented itself when a friend invited him to work as a teaching assistant in Cornell University’s department of government. He arrived in Ithaca during a snowstorm in January 1958 and stayed there for the duration of his long, productive career.
    * * *
    The 1950s and ’60s were heady years to be a graduate student in Southeast Asian studies at Cornell: It and Yale were the only American universities with robust programs in that area. Money was plentiful, not only from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, but also from the US government, which was keen to understand peasant rebellions and nationalist movements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Anderson savored the intellectual excitement of toiling in a new field: “students felt like explorers investigating unknown societies and terrains.” His peers—some of whom were from Burma, Vietnam, and Indonesia—­literally built the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, installing steel pillars to reinforce the rotting floors of the abandoned frat house where the program was located.
    Some of the most pleasurable pages in A Life Beyond Boundaries feature finely etched, affectionate portraits of Anderson’s mentors. First among them was George Kahin, the savvy department chairman who was a specialist in Indonesia’s late-1940s struggles for independence from the Dutch, and whose sympathy for Indonesian nationalism would later result in the temporary revocation of his passport during the McCarthy years. Anderson writes that Kahin, who had participated in Quaker activism in defense of Japanese-­Americans in the 1940s, “formed me politically.” Another influence was Claire Holt, a Russian-speaking Jew from Latvia who, after working as a ballet critic in Paris and New York, moved to Indonesia and became the lover of the German archeologist Wilhelm Stutterheim, who shared her deep interest in Indonesia’s precolonial civilizations. Holt had no scholarly credentials, but Kahin brought her to Cornell to teach Indonesian languages to his graduate students. Anderson spent countless hours in her house, absorbing her extensive knowledge of traditional Javanese art, dance, and culture; sometimes they would read Russian poetry aloud to each other. “Claire Holt,” he writes, “was very special to me.”
    Two other men, in the early days, were close to his heart. Harry Benda was a Czech Jew whose business career in Java was interrupted by the Japanese occupiers, who put him in an internment camp that nearly ended his life. Later, Benda made his way to Cornell, where he wrote a dissertation on the relationship between the Japanese and Muslims in prewar and wartime Indonesia. John Echols was a “perfect American gentleman” who knew a dozen languages and compiled the first English-language Indonesian dictionary. Anderson’s adoration of dictionaries derived from Echols: “Still today,” he writes, “the favorite shelf in my personal library is filled only with dictionaries of many kinds.”
    Anderson was lucky not only in his mentors, but also in the loose institutional arrangements at Cornell that cemented his career: “Against normal recruitment rules—which require competitive candidacies, extensive interviews, and hostility to ‘nepotism’—I walked into an assistant professorship without any interviews and without any outside candidate being considered.”
    Kahin, his principal mentor, had urged Anderson to undertake a dissertation on the Japanese occupation of Indonesia from 1942 to 1945, and the young scholar landed in Jakarta in December 1961. His first glimpse of the country was unforgettable: “I remember vividly the ride into town with all the taxi’s windows open. The first thing that hit me was the smell—of fresh trees and bushes, urine, incense, smoky oil lamps, garbage, and, above all, food in the little stalls that lined most of the main streets.” He would remain in Indonesia for almost two and a half years.
    Jakarta was not yet a heaving, smog-filled megacity: There were few cars, and the various neighborhoods still had a distinct character. Foreigners were scarce. In contrast to the social hierarchies Anderson had observed in the UK and Ireland, he was immediately struck by the “egalitarianism” around him: He lived near a street where, after dark, men would play chess on the sidewalks, and he noticed that clerks and pedicab drivers would face off against high government officials and debonair businessmen. For the young Anderson, this was “a kind of social heaven.” The language came easily: His Indonesian took flight after four months, and he found that “without self-consciousness, I could talk happily with almost anyone—cabinet ministers, bus drivers, military officers, maids, businessmen, waitresses, schoolteachers, transvestite prostitutes, minor gangsters and politicians.” (His connection to the language deepened with the years: Anderson told me that he did much of his thinking in Indonesian.)
    When Anderson wasn’t laboring in Jakarta’s archives, he got to know Java, wandering through the old royal palaces; attending performances of shadow plays and spirit possession; exploring the Borobudur, the Buddhist stupa built in the 10th century (once he slept till dawn on the stupa’s highest terrace “next to the Enlightened Ones”); and visiting tiny villages of the interior.
    From the evidence of this memoir, Anderson, lost in the reveries of fieldwork and leisure, was largely unaware of the escalating political frictions that would soon cause Java to explode.
    * * *
    On October 1, 1965, six Indonesian generals were murdered and their bodies tossed down a well. The left-wing president, Sukarno, was detained; General Suharto took control and blamed the coup attempt on the PKI. It was the beginning of what Anderson would call “the catastrophe”—a series of massacres that, according to a CIA study from 1968, were comparable to the Soviet purges of the 1930s and the Nazi mass murders of World War II.
    Anderson and two colleagues (Ruth McVey and Frederick Bunnell) observed these events from the safety of Ithaca. But they were determined to provide an intellectual response to the Indonesian calamity, and they immediately set out to prove that the official account was flawed. Relying on a vast cache of provincial Indonesian newspapers at Cornell, as well as Indonesian radio transcripts, the trio produced, in January 1966, a 162-page report that became known as the Cornell Paper.
    The document, which took three months to write, insisted that the coup attempt was not a Communist power grab, but an “internal army affair” spearheaded by colonels from the province of Central Java. Kahin, who was always keen to push US foreign policy in a more humane direction, sent the Cornell Paper to Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, and it soon found its way to Joseph Kraft, a syndicated columnist who disseminated the conclusions of the young Cornell scholars.
    In my discussions with Anderson in 2001, he defended the main thrust of the Cornell Paper—that an intra-military dispute triggered the violence—and he spoke with immense passion, and in fascinating detail, about the events of 1965–66. Alas, much of what he related to me is absent from A Life Beyond Boundaries.
    The PKI, he explained, had a parliamentary orientation that resembled the Italian Communist Party’s. In the early 1960s, he admired its nationalism, its incorruptibility, and its opposition to the Vietnam War. But the years had given him a clear-eyed sense of the PKI’s errors. It was completely unarmed, but it embraced the rhetoric of Maoism: “That was a huge mistake. It created fear and anxiety about the Communist Party. It wasn’t a guerrilla army. That’s why they were massacred; they were all out in the open.”
    When the Indonesian government permitted Anderson to return to the country in 1999, he attended a meeting of those who had survived the terror of the 1960s. The meeting took place in a nondescript Jakarta building owned by the Ministry of Manpower; most of the attendees were elderly. He recalled it as “an incredibly overwhelming experience,” akin to a Quaker meeting, where people talked about their lives and experiences. When he took his seat, a buzz went around the room; the foreign scholar was persuaded to speak. Afterward, a dignified Chinese man who was around 50 approached him. Anderson realized that before him was the “kid” who, 32 years earlier, had challenged the judge at Sudisman’s trial in 1967. They spent a day together and Anderson heard his tale, which he related to me:
    Many of the Communists, when they were trying to escape the sweeps on them, fled into the Chinese ghettos, partly because the Chinese are much more closemouthed than the Indonesians are, partly because these ghettos are accustomed to a certain level of clandestinity. And this kid, who was a radical kid, was somehow recruited by Sudisman to be his personal courier in terms of contacting other people who were hiding underground.
    Is the Cornell Paper a work of lasting scholarship? Anderson insisted in 2001 that the events of October 1, 1965, were “manipulated from the top by General Suharto,” whom he considered the puppet master of the conspiracy. Contemporary scholars of the September 30th Movement—or G30S, as the plotters were known—have a different view. In a recent e-mail to me, University of British Columbia historian John Roosa, the author of the 2006 study Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup D’État in Indonesia, noted:
    I argued that Suharto knew about the plot beforehand but was not involved in it. From what is known I think it is clear that Suharto was not the mastermind. All Ben had was speculation. He speculated that Suharto, if not the mastermind, played the role of spoiler: Suharto had planted double-agents in the G30S group…who then sabotaged the plot, making sure that it committed an atrocity (killing the generals) and then collapsed. I think this is overreaching…. Ben also wanted to acquit the PKI of any involvement…. The argument of the Cornell Paper—­Javanese officers acting on their own—is completely wrong.
    According to Roosa, top PKI leaders, including the chairman, D.N. Aidit, were deeply involved in the plot: “Aidit’s idea was to use military personnel who were loyal to the PKI to get rid of the army generals they suspected of being the key right-wing generals who were promoting anticommunism.” But matters went awry: “The initial plan seems to have been to capture the generals alive and present them to Sukarno, but the plotters didn’t carry out the plan with much concern for keeping the generals alive—three were shot or stabbed when they resisted being abducted.”
    Given Anderson’s emotional connection to these events, one would expect that a memoir by him would contain a great deal about the “catastrophe.” But the carnage is evoked fleetingly and from a peculiar angle, in a brief passage about his comrade Pipit Rochijat Kartawidjaja, an Indonesian exile and “eternal student” in Berlin who, during the long Suharto dictatorship, clashed frequently and successfully with the “small, corrupt” Indonesian consulate in Berlin, effectively headed by an intelligence officer. Pipit, Anderson writes, is “an amazingly gifted and fearless satirical writer” whose articles are distinguished by “a mixture of formal Indonesian, Jakarta slang and Low Javanese,” a style that incorporated “Javanese wayang-lore, Sino-Indonesian kung-fu comic books, scatology and brazenly sexual jokes to make his friends laugh their heads off.”
    Anderson, who credits Pipit with teaching him how to write fluently in Indonesian, translated one of his articles into English, an essay entitled “Am I PKI… or Non-PKI?,” which was based on incidents that Pipit had witnessed, as a young man, on a sugar estate in East Java in 1965. Pipit’s essay was full of black humor, but, Anderson says, “the horror haunted him”:
    In his article he described how regular customers at the local brothel stopped going there when they saw the genitals of communists nailed to the door, and he recalled rafts piled high with mutilated corpses which floated down the Brantas river through the town of Kediri where he lived.
    Writing at the end of his life, in a memoir that feels post-ideological, Anderson chose to accentuate the halcyon days in Java—the motorcycle trips through the interior, the sidewalk chess games, the full moon over Borobudur—instead of the ruination of a country he loved.
    * * *
    Anderson’s early work on Indonesia’s independence struggle of the 1940s led him to think seriously about nationalism: He saw how a skilled nationalist intelligentsia, based in Jakarta, had summoned not only a nation called Indonesia but also a new language, Indonesian, which became the language of resistance to the Dutch colonial rulers. Imagined Communities also grew out of the political realities in Southeast Asia following the Vietnam War. The book emerged from what Anderson viewed, in the early 1980s, as a “fundamental transformation in the history of Marxism and Marxist movements”: the wars between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in 1978–79. Anderson simply couldn’t understand why Marxist regimes were fighting each other instead of the Western imperialists. It was a worrying spectacle: “I was haunted by the prospect of further full-scale wars between the socialist states.”
    Anderson began a comprehensive study of nationalism, a force whose power and complexity were not explained by his sort of Marxist theory. In writing Imagined Communities, he was partly inspired by Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain (1977), which, in Anderson’s words, had described the UK “as the decrepit relic of a pre-national, pre-republican age and thus doomed to share the fate of Austro-Hungary.” But Anderson strongly disagreed with Nairn’s contention that “‘nationalism’ is the pathology of modern developmental history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual.” Anderson argued that nationalism was neither a pathology nor a fixed, immutable force. Instead, he wrote, “it is an imagined political community…because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”
    In an afterword to the 2006 edition of Imagined Communities, Anderson reflected on the book’s enormous success: “In the 1980s it was the only comparative study of nationalism’s history intended to combat Eurocentrism, and making use of non-European language sources. It was also the only one with a marked prejudice in favor of ‘small countries’”—Hungary, Thailand, Switzerland, Vietnam, Scotland, and the Philippines. Imagined Communities also broadly coincided with the rise of theory in the academy: It attempted to combine, he wrote in 2006, “a kind of historical materialism with what later on came to be called discourse analysis; Marxist modernism married to postmodernism avant la lettre.”
    Anderson says in the memoir that he wanted to provoke his fellow scholars: “I deliberately brought together Tsarist Russia with British India, Hungary with Siam and Japan, Indonesia with Switzerland, and Vietnam with French West Africa…. These comparisons were intended to surprise and shock, but also to ‘globalize’ the study of the history of nationalism.”
    What enabled him, in a learned fashion, to compare Hungary with Japan was a cast of mind that was always wide-ranging, endlessly curious, and interdisciplinary. When he surveys academic life, he sees thick disciplinary walls that breed narrow, provincial thinking. He tells us that, in his seminars on nationalism, he took pleasure in making students look outside their cubby holes:
    I forced the young anthropologists to read Rousseau, political scientists a nineteenth-century Cuban novel, historians Listian economics, and sociologists and literary comparativists Maruyama Masao. I picked Maruyama because he was a political scientist, an Asian/Japanese, and a very intelligent man who read in many fields and had a fine sense of humour and history. It was plain to me that the students had been so professionally trained that they did not really understand each other’s scholarly terminology, ideology or theory.
    He was also determined to steer them clear of jargon-filled writing, self-importance, and a reluctance (among American scholars) to learn difficult foreign languages. On the whole, he finds academia much too solemn, and likens professors to medieval monks determined to eradicate “frivolity.” As a student at Cambridge, he filled his papers with jokes, digressions, and sarcasm. In his early days at Cornell, he was immediately informed that “scholarship is a serious enterprise”—which made him reflect: “Now I understand what traditional Chinese foot-binding must have felt like.”
    * * *
    Anderson survived a heart attack in 1996 and retired from Cornell in 2001, after which he spent half of each year at his apartment in a lower-middle-class district of Bangkok—a zone, he told me, “full of small businesspeople, schoolteachers, mistresses of policemen, this sort of thing.” Liberated from his teaching and administrative duties, he threw himself into a number of projects: a book about anarchism and anti­colonial nationalisms, Under Three Flags (which, he says, has “mystified many readers”); a literary-political biography of Kwee Thiam Tjing, the Sino-Indonesian journalist and columnist whose work, Anderson believed, embodied the finest qualities of humanism and cosmopolitanism in early-20th-century Indonesia; and an effort of “amateurish anthropology,” The Fate of Rural Hell: Asceticism and Desire in Buddhist Thailand. He never lost his passion for literature, and helped to translate Man Tiger by the young Indonesian writer Eka Kurniawan, whose “novels and short stories are in a class of their own, far above all authors in Southeast Asia that I know,” and whose sensibility he compared to that of Gabriel García Márquez.
    He continued to think about nationalism, which is “a powerful tool of the state and the institutions attached to it,” and which, in nations ranging from China to Pakistan to Sri Lanka, is “easily harnessed by repressive and conservative forces, which, unlike earlier anti- dynastic nationalisms, have little interest in cross-national solidarities.” He continued to reflect, too, on the fate of the left:
    For a long time, different forms of socialism—anarchist, Leninist, New Leftist, social-democratic—provided a ‘global’ framework in which a progressive, emancipationist nationalism could flourish. Since the fall of ‘communism’ there has been a global vacuum, partially filled by feminism, environmentalism, neo-anarchism and various other ‘isms,’ fighting in different and not always cooperative ways against the barrenness of neoliberalism and hypocritical ‘human rights’ interventionism. But a lot of work, over a long period of time, will be needed to fill the vacuum.
    Anderson tells us that A Life Beyond Boundaries has two principal themes: “The first is the importance of translation for individuals and societies. The second is the danger of arrogant provincialism, or of forgetting that serious nationalism is tied to internationalism.” He was heartened by the fact that, in area studies, many young Japanese are now learning Burmese; young Thais, Vietnamese; and Filipinos, Korean. Such students, he says, “are beginning to see a huge sky above them”:
    It is important to keep in mind that to learn a language is not simply to learn a linguistic means of communication. It is also to learn the way of thinking and feeling of a people who speak and write a language which is different from ours. It is to learn the history and culture underlying their thoughts and emotions and so to learn to empathize with them.
    His memoir concludes with a coda about memory, technology, and poetry, in which his prime target is Google: “Google is an extraordinary ‘research engine,’ says Google, without irony in its use of the word ‘engine,’ which in Old English meant ‘trickery’ (as is reflected in the verb ‘to engineer’) or even ‘an engine of torture.’” Anderson frets that future generations may never know the actual feel of a book: “Japanese books are bound one way, Burmese books another.” Groupthink rules: “The faith students have in Google is almost religious.”
    As a student, he was enthralled by the cadence and rhymes of poems he had memorized, such as Rimbaud’s “dizzying ‘Le Bateau ivre.’” Today, search has supplanted memorization: “One effect of ‘easy access to everything’ is the acceleration of a trend that I had already noticed long before Google was born: there is no reason to remember anything, because we can retrieve ‘anything’ by other means.”
    The poems he memorized in his youth stayed with him always. In 2007, he was invited to Leningrad to assist with a class on nationalism for young teachers in Russian provincial universities. Addressing them, he remembered some Russian from his days at Eton and proceeded to recite the final stanza of a poem by Vladimir Mayakovsky, who perished, amid murky circumstances, in Moscow in 1930. To his astonishment, all of the students joined with him:
    Shine always,
    Shine everywhere,
    To the depth of the last day!
    Shine—
    And to hell with everything else!
    That’s my motto—
    And the sun’s!
    “I was in tears by the end,” recalls Anderson. “Some of the students, too.”


     

    Tidak ada komentar:

    Posting Komentar