Perang Rahasia Soeharto
https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/11/29/perang-rahasia-soeharto/
Setelah membahas peranan sipil menghadang pengaruh Aidit cs di https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/3-menguak-aidit/ maka sekarang akan dibahas peranan pihak intel-militer cq jendral Suharto menghadang polit biro
Kalau melihat karir jendral Suharto maka tampaklah bahwa setiap orang mempunyai kelebihan dan kekurangan dan tentu saja sudah lumrah bahwa selalu ada yang setuju dan ada yang tidak setuju dengan sepak terbangnya
Ucapannya (“Criminal matters became a secondary problem,” , “what was most important were matters of a political kind”) menjadi dasar untuk menhalalkan korupsi, penyelundupan, kronisme demi politik praktis
Sebagai orang dibawah naungan Gemini maka
Positip : Tetap menghormati seniornya AH.Nasution dengan juga memberi gelar “jendral besar” Negatip : Menggeser AH.Nasution dari jabatan ketua MPRS
Positip : Memberi bintang jasa pada paman saya Said Reksohadiprodjo untuk bidang pendidikan Negatip : Sebelumnya menggeser paman saya demi kepentingan sesama militer
Perihal SEATO
Baik jendral AH.Nasution, A.Yani dan Suharto karirnya lagi berkibar tidak lama setelah SEATO dibentuk pada tanggal 8 September 1954 di Manila sesuai dengan doktrin the American Truman Doctrine of creating anti-communist bilateral and collective defense treaties
Anggautanya merupakan kombinasi negara barat yang anti komunis, Inggris, Perancis, Amerika , New Zealand, Pakistan, Pilipina, Thailand
Pakistan keluar di tahun 1972 setelah kemerdekaan Bangladesh, Perancis membatalakan bantuan keuangan di tahun 1975,on 20 February 1976
SEATO bubar pada tanggal 30 June 1977.
Walaupun SEATO bubar maka sekarang kegiatannya diganti oleh CIA dengan bantuan ekonomi/pelatihan ke agen agen di negara negara Asia Tenggara
Sejarah CIA – Seskoad
Sejak 1953, AS berkepentingan untuk membantu mencetuskan krisis di Indonesia, yang diakui sebagai “penyebab langsung” yang merangsang BK mengakhiri sistem parlementer Indonesia dan menyatakan berlakunya keadaan darurat militer, serta memasukkan “korp perwira” secara resmi dalam kehidupan politik (14 Maret 1957) Sedangkan langkah-langkah yang dilakukan CIA untuk mewujudkan ambisinya tersebut yakni dengan menggandeng faksi militer kanan –seperti Soeharto, Walandouw, Suwarto, Sarwo Edhie, Kemal Idris, Ibnu Sutowo, Basuki Rahmat, Djuhartono
Kontrol terhadap AD ini dianggap penting, karena AS menganggap hanya AD yang mampu mengimbangi kekuatan PKI. Lalu didirikanlah SESKOAD tahun 1958 di Bandung yang mendapatkan dukungan penuh dari Pentagon, RAND dan Ford Foundation
Khusus bagi jenderal Suharto dunia inteligen bukan hal yang baru baginya karena di tahun 1959 gara gara skandal penyelundupan dimutasikan ke Seskoad di Bandung dan pula sejak berpangkat brigadier-general di tahun 1960, telah diangkat menjadi kepala inteligen Angkatan Darat … jangan jangan sebelumnya sudah ada ikatan kerjasama dengan CIA ..
Ketika Kolonel Suharto menjabat sebagai Panglima Diponegoro, ia dikenal sebagai sponsor penyelundupan dan berbagai tindak pelanggaran ekonomi lain dengan dalih untuk kesejahteraan anak buahnya. Suharto membentuk geng dengan sejumlah pengusaha seperti Lim Siu Liong, Bob Hasan, dan Tek Kiong, konon masih saudara tirinya. Dalam hubungan ini Kolonel Suharto dibantu oleh Letkol Munadi, Mayor Yoga Sugomo, dan Mayor Sujono Humardani. Komplotan bisnis ini telah bertindak jauh antara lain dengan menjual 200 truk AD selundupan kepada Tek Kiong.
Persoalannya dilaporkan kepada Letkol Pranoto Reksosamudro yang ketika itu menjabat sebagai Kepala Staf Diponegoro, bawahan Suharto. Maka MBAD membentuk suatu tim pemeriksa yang diketuai Mayjen Suprapto dengan anggota S Parman, MT Haryono, dan Sutoyo. Langkah ini diikuti oleh surat perintah Jenderal Nasution kepada Jaksa Agung Sutarjo dalam rangka pemberantasan korupsi untuk menjemput Kolonel Suharto agar dibawa ke Jakarta pada 1959. Ia akhirnya dicopot sebagai Panglima Diponegoto dan digantikan oleh Pranoto. Kasus Suharto tersebut akhirnya dibekukan karena kebesaran hati Presiden Sukarno (D&R, 3 Oktober 1998:18).
Nasution mengusulkan agar Suharto diseret ke pengadilan militer, tetapi tidak disetujui oleh Mayjen Gatot Subroto … Kemudian ia dikirim ke Seskoad di Bandung
Selanjutnya ketika Suharto hendak ditunjuk sebagai Ketua Senat Seskoad, hal itu ditentang keras oleh Brigjen Panjaitan dengan alasan moralitas
Di Bandung Kolonel Suharto bertemu dengan Kolonel Suwarto, Wadan Seskoad, hal ini sangat berpengaruh terhadap perjalanan hidup Suharto selanjutnya. Sekolah Komando Angkatan Darat (Seskoad) di Bandung yang telah berdiri sejak 1951 ini merupakan sebuah think tank AD, pendidikan militer Indonesia tertua, terbesar dan paling berpengaruh. Seskoad telah menjadi tempat penggodogan perkembangan doktrin militer di Indonesia. Sampai 1989 telah meluluskan 3500 perwira. Para alumninya menjadi tokoh terkemuka dalam pemerintahan. Hampir 100 orang menjadi sekretaris jenderal, gubernur, pimpinan lembaga-lembaga nasional atau badan-badan non departemental. Presiden, Wakil Presiden, dan lebih 30 menteri merupakan alumni Seskoad.
Suwarto sendiri pernah menempuh pendidikan Infantry Advance Course di Fort Benning pada 1954 dan Command and General Staff College di Fort Leavenworth, AS pada 1958. Ia bersahabat dengan Prof Guy Pauker, konsultan RAND (Research and Development Corporation) yang dikunjunginya pada 1963 dan 1966. Suwartolah yang menjadikan Seskoad sebagai think tank politik MBAD, mengarahkan para perwira AD menjadi pemimpin politik potensial (Sundhaussen 1988:245).Guy Pauker adalah pengamat masalah Asia, orang penting dalam Rand Corporation, kelompok pemikir (think tank) CIA*. Sejak itu Seskoad biasa disebut sebagai negara dalam negara, membuat garis politiknya sendiri, bahkan mempunyai perjanjian kerjasama dan bantuan dari AS terlepas dari politik pemerintah RI.
Suharto, murid baru yang masuk pada Oktober 1959 ini telah mendapatkan perhatian besar dari sang guru. Pada awal 1960-an Suharto dilibatkan dalam penyusunan Doktrin Perang Wilayah serta dalam kebijaksanaan AD dalam segala segi kegiatan pemerintah dan tugas kepemerintahan. Peran Suharto dalam civic mission menempatkan dirinya dan sejumlah opsir yang condong pada PSI dalam pusat pendidikan dan pelatihan yang disokong oleh CIA lewat pemerintah AS, suatu program bersifat politik (Scott 1999:81). Pada masa Bandung Kolonel Suharto inilah agaknya hubungan Suwarto-Syam-Suharto-CIA mendapatkan dimensi baru
Seskoad memancarkan pamornya sebagian besar karena jasa Suwarto, sangat besar perannya dalam perkembangan politik. Karena jasanya pula maka Seskoad menjadi pusat pemikiran politik serta menghadapi perkembangan PKI
Perkembangan sejarah menunjukkan bahwa Suharto benar-benar tidak “sebodoh” yang diperkirakan Jenderal Nasution, juga tidak sekedar koppig seperti yang disebut oleh Bung Karno.
Kebetulan atau Balas Dendam
Nama-nama pahlawan revolusi berhubungan langsung dengan peradilan perihal pemecatannya sebagai Panglima Diponegoro karena bertindak sebagai sponsor penyelundupan (team peradilan MBAD – blokir karir)
Ahmad Yani, Jend. Anumerta
Donald Ifak Panjaitan, Mayjen. Anumerta
M.T. Haryono, Letjen. Anumerta
Siswono Parman, Letjen. Anumerta
Suprapto, Letjen. Anumerta
Sutoyo Siswomiharjo, Mayjen. Anumert
Bahan pemikiran
(BENARKAH ISSUE INI..??.. ATW HANYA PEMIKIRAN INTELIGEN.. UTK MEMBUAT SKENARIO.. N SUATU DALIH AGAR ADANYA GERAKAN YG SDH LAMA DI AGENDAKAN..??>> NOTE...??>> SIAPA YG PUNYA AGENDA..?? YG SCR KELENGKAPAN INFO N PUSAT2 KOMUNIKASI AKSI.. NAMPAKNYA BERPUSAT HNY LINK-PK HARTO.. N SYAM.. N AIDIT..??.. SIAPA LAGI SEBENRANYA YNG MENGOLAH INFO INTELIGEN N YG TERLIBAT SCR IN ACTION...?? DIMANA POSISI INTEL SENIOR PK HARTO ...AL: ... YOGA SUGAMA.. N SUTOPO YUWONO..CS ?? N YANG LAENNYA SBG ORG KEPERCAYAAN PK HARTO.. DLM KENDALI MASA.. N MEDIA MASA.. >> KONON ADA ALI MURTOPO N SUDOMO CS..YG BARU KMD MUNCUL SBG POSISI KUNCI KENDALI MASA N LINTAS MILITER ....?? DARI KESIAGAAN N JARINGAN YG DMK LENGKAP.. N TERKONSOLIDASI SCR RAPI N PENUH RAHASIA..?? MK CENTRAL KOMANDO ADA PADA TITIK KOMANDO AGENDA YG LBH FOKUS.. N ORANG2 LAPANGAN YG TERLIBAT AKSI ADALAH KENALAN N DALAM KENDALI KOMADO AKSI MILITER YG SANGAT TERJALIN RAPIH ITU.. HNY PD TITIK ... PK HARTO-SYAM-AIDIT..??>> SDG SAS 1 YANI N NASUTION CS.. SAS 2 SUKARNO.. N SAS 3.. AIDIT..CS.. N PR PELAKU AKSI.. UNTK MMBUNGKAM INFO N DATA2 VALID.. SHINGGA SMW BS DIAMANKAN DLM KENDALI MASA N POLITIK N MILITER..>> SMW PERLU DATA BARU.. N PERLU DIUNGKAP DG BENAR..??>> )
Di Halim bung Sukarno menepuk Supardjo dan berucap “jangan ada pembunuhan lagi”
Pembantu Letnan Dua Djahurub – Prajurit Resimen Tjakrabirwa –
Beragabung dengan pasukan LETTU Doel Arif dan menyerang dan membunuh
Jendral A.H. Nasution (lolos)
Sersan Satu Marinir Hadiwinarto P. Soeradi (NRP. 37265) – Prajurit Resimen Tjakrabirwa
Sersan Satu Marinir Hadiwinarto P. Soeradi (NRP. 37265) – Prajurit Resimen Tjakrabirwa
Sebagai seorang “didikan Syam (PKI)” dengan sendirinya Untung menggangap jendral Nasution cs sebagai jendral berhaluan kanan yang perlu diamankan di area AURI yang dianggap setia pada Soekarno atas arahan Aidit dan Syam
Perihal Pak Harto tidak memberi reaksi atas info dari Kol Latif apakah karena mengetahui bahwa Dewan Jendral itu hanya issue saja dan baru kemudian bereaksi ketika Untung mengumumkan G30S liwat RRI?
CIA saja kecolongan gara gara musuh dalam selimut yang meneruskan kepada PK Cina dan PKI dan percaya atas issue Dewan jendral
Bagaimanakah scenario sebenarnya dari G30S itu ..?
(asumsi..atw bocoran inteligen pk harto..??)
Besar kemungkinan seperti berikut ini:Bung Karno – Untung
Kesalahan fatal menilai sebuah Kesempatan
Syam melihat kesempatan untuk membunuh para jendral dan melimpahkan kesalahan pada masalah intern militer..dewan jendralUntung melihat kesempatan untuk menjadi pimpinan G30S .. berjasa pada bung Karno dan PKI..
Anggota-Anggota Resimen Tjakrabirawa
Komandan Resimen Cakrabirawa , Brigjen Sabur
Brigadir Jendral TNI. Sabur – Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa
Kolonel Maulwi Saelan – Wakil Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa
Letnan Kolonel Untung bin Syamsuri – Komandan Batalyon I Tjakrabirawa – Pembrontak/Pemimpin PKI
Letnan Kolonel Ali Ebram – Staf Asisten I Intelijen Resimen Tjakrabirawa
Letnan Satu Doel Arif – Komandan Resimen Tjakrabirawa – Pemberontak/Pemimpin Pasukan PKI yang membunuh Jendral-Jendral TNI-AD (Pasukan Pasopati PKI)
Bung Karno – Soepardjo
Keberadaan Brig,Jen Soepardjo (loyal kepada bung Karno) di Jakarta
menjadi teka teki karena seharusnya berada di Kalimantan ..menurut saya
keberadaannya hanya dimungkinkan karena mendapat perintah langsung dari
Bung Karno walaupun merupakan bawahan Soeharto … kenapa dipanggil ke
Jakarta… apakah dalam rangka mengamankan ke-6 jendral yang dianggap
mbalelo…?
Bung Karno – Soeharto
Sebagai seorang yang loyal kepada bung Karno maka besar kemungkinan
Soeharto mengirimkan pasukan Diponegoro dan Brawijaya ke Jakarta untuk
ber jaga jaga apabila pasukan Siliwangi (Nasution dan Yani) melancarkan
kudeta sesuai isue dewan jendral atau pihak PKI membuat keonaran
Pada waktu itu Brig.jen Soeharto berada diluar lingkaran para jendral … Jen.Nasution pernah mau memecatnya di masa lalu ..Jen.Yani meliwatinya dalam karir..
Kesalahan fatal menilai sebuah Kesempatan
Surat Perintah 11 Maret …merupakan alat untuk menggeser AIDIT sebagai ketua umum PKI liwat Soeharto dan sebagai ketua umum defakto PKI dapat menggendalikan PKI sehingga merasa tidak ada gunanya membubarkan PKI serta juga sebagai pengimbang Junta MiliterBung Karno – CIA
Tentu pihak CIA risih kalau Bung Karno menjadi tokoh Komunis diluar Rusia dan Cina …melihat kesempatan untuk menggesernya dengan keberadaan SP 11 Maret tersebutBaca pula https://intranet2012.wordpress.com/2012/10/29/3-menguak-aidit/
Sepintas lalu kelihatan bahwa hubungan antara Seskoad dan Polit Biro serasi sekali
Tetapi sesungguhnya ke-2 pihak intel sedang melakukan infiltrasi ke pihak lawan masing masing dan ber-pura pura kompak demi konsep Nasakom
Perihal G30S
Puncak dari pertarungan politik di Indonesia, khususnya pada 1959-1965, adalah Peristiwa 30 September 1965, ketika mereka yang bertarung terjebak kepada pilihan ‘mendahului atau didahului’. Mereka yang mendahului ternyata terperosok, sebagaimana yang didahului pun roboh, dan Soekarno terlindas di tengah persilangan karena gagal meneruskan permainan keseimbangan kekuasaan.
Soekarno, misalnya, dari dirinyalah muncul cetusan untuk menindak para jenderal yang tidak loyal, yang dilaporkan pada dirinya dalam pola intrik istana. Cetusannya itu, terutama kepada Letnan Kolonel Untung, menjadi awal kematian enam jenderal dan seorang perwira menengah, meskipun ia mungkin tidak ‘mengharapkan’ pembunuhan terjadi. Dipa Nusantara Aidit, adalah orang yang mengantar terjadinya peristiwa menjadi kekerasan berdarah ketika ia memanfaatkan Untung yang mendapat perintah penindakan dari Soekarno, dan mendorongkan peristiwa itu terjadi sebagai masalah internal Angkatan Darat, sambil menjalankan rencana jangka panjangnya sendiri. Dan pengelolaan atas masalah internal Angkatan Darat ini, mendapat bentuk yang nyaris ‘sempurna’ sebagai makar dalam penanganan Sjam tokoh Biro Khusus PKI, dengan mengoptimalkan peranan Letnan Kolonel Untung.
Lalu
Jenderal Soeharto muncul dari balik tabir blessing in disguise,
mengambil peran penting dengan segala teka-teki yang untuk sebagian
belum terpecahkan hingga kini. Dan akhirnya, berkuasa
Kenyataan lain yang tidak bisa diabaikan, adalah fakta bahwa Soeharto
lah yang telah membantu dengan radiogramnya mendatangkan dua batalion
dari Jawa Timur dan Jawa Tengah yang terlibat dalam Gerakan 30
September. Soeharto membiarkan dan menunggu sampai ‘bisul’ pecah. Lalu
bertindak. Ini secara kuat mengesankan betapa Soeharto telah bekerja
dengan suatu peran yang abu-abu.
Di pihak militer, adalah Letnan Jenderal Ahmad Yani dan rekan-rekannya para jenderal yang memperoleh ‘peran’ sebagai korban, sesuatu yang sebenarnya bisa ‘dihindarkan’ dengan ketajaman analisa terhadap laporan-laporan intelijen dan gambaran situasi yang ada. Mayor Jenderal Soeharto adalah ‘pihak ketiga’ dalam pergulatan kekuasaan dan untuk sebagian muncul sebagai ‘kuda hitam’ yang tak terduga
Di pihak militer, adalah Letnan Jenderal Ahmad Yani dan rekan-rekannya para jenderal yang memperoleh ‘peran’ sebagai korban, sesuatu yang sebenarnya bisa ‘dihindarkan’ dengan ketajaman analisa terhadap laporan-laporan intelijen dan gambaran situasi yang ada. Mayor Jenderal Soeharto adalah ‘pihak ketiga’ dalam pergulatan kekuasaan dan untuk sebagian muncul sebagai ‘kuda hitam’ yang tak terduga
Ternyata, ia adalah ‘orang lain’ bagi Letnan Jenderal Ahmad Yani dan
kawan-kawan, serta bagi Jenderal Abdul Harris Nasution. Pada sisi dan
episode lain, Soeharto secara kontroversial memerintahkan Kolonel Yasir
Hadibroto untuk langsung ‘mengeksekusi’ mati DN Aidit setelah ia ini
tertangkap di Jawa Tengah.
Dalam menghadapi makar terhadap pemerintah, menurut standar normal,
tertangkapnya tokoh yang dianggap perencana atau pemimpin makar, justru
merupakan pintu masuk untuk mengungkap segala latar belakang peristiwa.
Untuk mengetahui jaringan makar, sehingga memudahkan untuk menangkap
mereka yang terlibat, untuk selanjutnya diselesaikan melalui jalur
hukum. Bila Soeharto meyakini PKI sebagai partai yang berdiri di
belakang makar, seperti yang sering dikatakannya sendiri di kemudian
hari, semestinya ia ‘menjaga’ Aidit untuk kepentingan interogasi lanjut,
bukannya ‘memerintahkan’ Aidit dieliminasi. Pembunuhan langsung
terhadap Aidit, tidak bisa tidak berarti Soeharto ingin menutupi suatu
rahasia yang bisa terungkap bila Aidit dibiarkan hidup, apapun rahasia
itu.Menurut kabar tokoh tokoh G30S merupakan kenalan lamanya …?
Letkol Untung
Brigjen Soepardjo
Ia berasal dari Divisi Siliwangi, pasukan Suparjo lah yang telah
berhasil menangkap gembong DI Kartosuwiryo dan mengakhiri pemberontakan
DI di Jawa Barat. Kemudian ia ditugaskan ke Kostrad, lalu menjabat
sebagai Panglima Kopur II Kostrad di bawah Jenderal Suharto. Tokoh ini
juga cukup dekat dengan Suharto. Hampir dapat dipastikan bahwa tokoh ini
pun, seperti kedua tokoh sebelumnya yakni Letkol Untung dan Kolonel
Latief, seseorang yang memiliki kesetiaan tinggi kepada Presiden
Sukarno.
Suparjo merupakan anggota kelompok yang biasa disebut kelompok Kolonel Suwarto (Seskoad Bandung), yang di dalamnya terdapat Alamsyah, Amir Makhmud, Basuki Rakhmad, Andi Yusuf, Yan Walandow. Yang terakhir ini seorang kolonel yang ikut pemberontakan Permesta, kemudian menjadi pengusaha. Ia mempunyai hubungan lama dengan CIA dan menjadi petugas Suharto dalam mencari dana dari luar negeri. Ia pun anggota trio Suharto-Syam-Latief cs
Suparjo merupakan anggota kelompok yang biasa disebut kelompok Kolonel Suwarto (Seskoad Bandung), yang di dalamnya terdapat Alamsyah, Amir Makhmud, Basuki Rakhmad, Andi Yusuf, Yan Walandow. Yang terakhir ini seorang kolonel yang ikut pemberontakan Permesta, kemudian menjadi pengusaha. Ia mempunyai hubungan lama dengan CIA dan menjadi petugas Suharto dalam mencari dana dari luar negeri. Ia pun anggota trio Suharto-Syam-Latief cs
Kol.A.Latief
Latief sendiri menyatakan karier kemiliterannya nyaris selalu mengikuti jejak Suharto. Pada gilirannya membuat hubungan Latief dan Suharto bukan lagi sekedar bawahan dan atasan, melainkan sudah sebagai dua sahabat. Suharto tahu Latief tak akan melakukan sesuatu yang dapat merugikan dirinya. Sudah sejak setelah agresi kedua, Latief merasa selalu mendapatkan kepercayaan dari Suharto sebagai komandannya yakni memimpin pasukan pada saat yang sulit. Ketika Trikora pun ia masih dicari bekas komandannya itu, tetapi Latief sedang mengikuti Seskoad. Pada bulan Juni 1965 Mayjen Suharto meminta agar Latief dapat memimpin suatu pasukan di Kalimantan Timur, akan tetapi Umar Wirahadikusuma menolak melepasnya karena tenaganya diperlukan untuk tugas keamanan di Kodam V Jaya.
Latief sendiri menyatakan karier kemiliterannya nyaris selalu mengikuti jejak Suharto. Pada gilirannya membuat hubungan Latief dan Suharto bukan lagi sekedar bawahan dan atasan, melainkan sudah sebagai dua sahabat. Suharto tahu Latief tak akan melakukan sesuatu yang dapat merugikan dirinya. Sudah sejak setelah agresi kedua, Latief merasa selalu mendapatkan kepercayaan dari Suharto sebagai komandannya yakni memimpin pasukan pada saat yang sulit. Ketika Trikora pun ia masih dicari bekas komandannya itu, tetapi Latief sedang mengikuti Seskoad. Pada bulan Juni 1965 Mayjen Suharto meminta agar Latief dapat memimpin suatu pasukan di Kalimantan Timur, akan tetapi Umar Wirahadikusuma menolak melepasnya karena tenaganya diperlukan untuk tugas keamanan di Kodam V Jaya.
Kamaruzaman Syam
Pada tahun 1964, ditunjuk sebagai kepala Polit-biro PKI yang terdiri dari 5 orang yaitu:Sjam, Pono (Supono Marsudidjojo), Bono, Wandi dan Hamim.
Ke-3 orang pertama mempunyai tugas berhubungan dengan pihak militer untuk mendapatkan informasi
Semua anggauta diwajibkan untuk menyembunyikan keanggautaan partai di PKI
Setiap bulan mereka bertemu dan meneruskan kepada Aidit untuk mendapatkan perintah selanjutnya .. Hanya Aidit dan beberapa anggauta senior mengetahui keberadaan Polit Biro ini … bagi orang luar maka Sjam-Pono-Bono dikira mata mata militer .. ke-3nya mempunyai kartu identitas untuk masuk ke “Army bases” dan setiap orang mempunyai kontak … tujuan utamanya bukan untuk merekut akan tetapi mendapatkan info dan sebagai gantinya mereka memberikan info perihal teroris muslim …bukankah mereka anti komunis?
Rupanya baik
bung Karno dan Suharto
sudah jauh hari memikirkan cara
bagaimana menjinakan PKI
bung Karno dan Suharto
sudah jauh hari memikirkan cara
bagaimana menjinakan PKI
Kenapa Bung Karno makin dekat ke PKI
Usaha menggambil alih kedudukan Ketua Umum PKI liwat Nasakom dan Pancasila
Usaha menggambil alih kedudukan Ketua Umum PKI liwat Nasakom dan Pancasila
Sebagai seorang sipil Demokrat (semua partai punya hak yang sama) maka jalan yang ditempuh bung Karno adalah melalui konsep Nasakom dan Pancasila untuk menghadang PKI kalu perlu melakukan kudeta ketua umum PKI
Kenapa badan inteligen Militer mendekati Polit Biro ??
Sebagai seorang militer maka Suharto melalui "badan inteligen" melakukan langkah langkah serangan terselubung yang mematikan
Tiada Pilihan selain memainkan lakon Anta Seno gugur
Antaredja : Lapor, siap untuk maju ke padang KurusetraKresna : weleh weleh ngger tidak ada musuh yang dapat menandingi Dewa Kematian, karena dengan cicin Mustikabumi kamu akan hidup lagi begitu menyentuh bumi dengan kata lain kau tidak bisa mati dan hal itu akan mengacaukan rencana para Dewata perihal Perang Bharatajuda…bagaimana agar Pandawa menang kau gunakan aji Upasanta untuk menjilat telapak kakimu
Antareja : Lho iya AKU mati dong…..?
Kresna : Apa kamu tidak mau berkorban untuk Pendawa…?
Antareja : Oke, kau kan dewa Kehidupan, jadi nggak masalah kalau aku mati…nanti kau hidupkan aku lagi…he..he..
At his Mayesty request
It is time to go
It is time to go
Baca pula pembahasan
Jendral A.H.Nasution
Karir
Karir
Atas campur tangan DPR dalam urusan intern Militer maka pada tanggal
17 October 1952, Nasution dan Simatupang melakukan show of force didepan
istana presiden dengan meriam Tank mengarah ke istana dan meminta agar
DPR dibubarkan
Presden Sukarno berhasil menghimbau baik tentara dan masyarakat untuk bubar .. akibatnya baik Nasution dan Simatupang dipecat dari dinas militer di bulan Desember 1952
Presden Sukarno berhasil menghimbau baik tentara dan masyarakat untuk bubar .. akibatnya baik Nasution dan Simatupang dipecat dari dinas militer di bulan Desember 1952
Pada tanggal 27 October 1955, Nasution di rehab ke posisi lamanya sebagai Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat
Jendral Ahmad Yani
Karir
Karir
Pasukannya berhasil menduduki Padang and Bukittinggi, dan untuk itu maka dipromosikan sebagai wakil 2 Kepala Staff Angkatan Darat pada tanggal 1 September 1962
Jendral Suharto
karir
karir
Menurut penulis buku The Smiling General (1969) OG. Roeder, Suharto was “well known for his tough, but not brutal, methods”.
Mari kita semua mengheningkan cipta bagi mereka yang telah berjasa bagi nusa dan bangsa
Benedict Anderson’s View of Nationalism
The child of late empire, who transformed the field of area studies, lived a life beyond boundaries.
In 1967, Sudisman, the
general secretary of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), whose ranks
had just been decimated in a series of massacres that left hundreds of
thousands dead, was put on trial. Of the top five PKI leaders, Sudisman
was the only one who appeared in court; the others were shot. Two
foreigners were always present in the Jakarta courtroom: Benedict
O’Gorman Anderson, a 30-year-old scholar of Indonesia, and Herbert
Feith, a colleague of Anderson’s from Australia.
Amid the parade of Communist witnesses, only two of them
spoke out in protest in the courtroom and refused to incriminate others.
One was an old woman who subsequently went mad; the other, Anderson
recalled many years later, “was this little Chinese kid who looked
nineteen or twenty. Very calmly, and with great dignity, he gave his
testimony. I was so impressed by it.”
Sudisman, who received a death sentence, also maintained
his composure. In 2001, Anderson told me that he “was so dignified, so
calm, and his speech was so great, that I felt a kind of moral
obligation” to do something: “As Sudisman was leaving the courtroom for
the last time, he looked at me and Herb. He didn’t say anything, but I
had such a strong feeling that he was thinking: ‘You have to help us.
Probably you two are the only ones I can trust to make sure that what I
said will survive.’ It was like an appeal from a dying man.” Anderson
answered that appeal in 1975, when he translated Sudisman’s speech into
English from a smuggled copy of the court transcript. A radical printing
collective in Australia published it as an orange-colored, 28-page
pamphlet titled “Analysis of Responsibility,” with an admiring
introduction by the translator.
After Sudisman’s trial, Anderson’s ability to do
research in Java would eventually be curtailed. The young scholar,
entirely fluent in Indonesian, was being watched: A US embassy document
from 1967 stated that Anderson was “regarded…as an outright Communist
or at least a fellow traveler.” He also found himself under attack in
the Indonesian press: The magazine Chas, which reportedly had
ties to the country’s intelligence services, called him a “useful idiot”
in a front-page article. In April 1972, Anderson was expelled from the
country. It was the beginning of an exile that would endure for almost
three decades.
With Indonesia closed to him, Anderson journeyed to
Bangkok in 1974. “It was a wonderful time to be there,” he later said. A
heady interlude between dictatorships allowed Thai radicalism to
flower. The good times ended in 1976, when the military overthrew the
civilian regime and publicly shot and hanged student radicals in
downtown Bangkok.
Still, the period Anderson spent in Thailand was
essential to his intellectual growth, as it forced him to think
comparatively—which, at the time, was rare among area-studies scholars.
“Being in Thailand,” he later said, “forced me to think all the time
about if I had to write about Thailand and Indonesia in one space, how
would I do it?” Anderson, who died in Batu, Indonesia, in December at
the age of 79, overcame that challenge, and the result was Imagined Communities (1983), a classic analysis of nationalism that has been translated into 29 languages.
* * *
In June 2001, when Anderson was 64, I traveled to upstate New York to profile him for Lingua Franca.
He lived in Freeville, eight miles east of Ithaca, in a spacious old
farmhouse surrounded by grazing cattle and with a barn topped by a
Javanese-style weather vane. For three days, we sat and talked in a
breezy kitchen packed with unruly stacks of crime novels, scholarly
journals, Asian newspapers, and doctoral theses. Mounted on a wall was a
striking black-and-white photograph of a youthful Sukarno, the
left-wing nationalist who led Indonesia to independence in 1949 and was
overthrown by General Suharto in 1967.
As I prepared to leave, I inquired if Anderson intended
to write a memoir, and he said no. But two years later, an editor at a
Japanese publishing house asked him for a small autobiographical volume.
“Embarrassed rejection” was his initial response: “Professors in the
West rarely have interesting lives. Their values are objectivity,
solemnity, formality and—at least officially—self-effacement.” But when a
special friend and former student, Kato Tsuyoshi, of Kyoto University,
agreed to assist him with the book and then translate it into Japanese,
Anderson consented. It was published, to his satisfaction, in Japan in
2009.
From the outset of the project, Benedict’s brother, the
historian and critic Perry Anderson, urged him to publish the memoir in
English, but he brushed the idea aside. In 2015, with his 80th birthday
approaching, he changed his mind. Shortly before his death, Anderson
completed the final draft of A Life Beyond Boundaries, which is
now before us. It’s a neat and tidy book about his unusual trajectory
and sensibility, infused with inside jokes, idiosyncratic asides, and
sly humor. It is also a tart overview of academic life. But mostly the
memoir is a primer for cosmopolitanism and an argument for traversing
geographical, historical, linguistic, and disciplinary borders.
The history of the Anderson family reads like a Conrad
novel. Benedict’s great-great-grandfather, along with a
great-great-uncle, joined the United Irishmen Rebellion of 1798, for
which they did time in prison. A nephew of theirs took part in the
uprising of 1848, and thereafter fled to Paris, Istanbul, and,
eventually, the United States, where he became a member of the New York
State Supreme Court. Another branch of the family tree has Anglo-Irish
landowners and military officers who served the British empire in Burma,
Afghanistan, Hong Kong, and India.
Anderson’s intrepid, linguistically gifted father spent
most of his career in China as an employee of the Chinese Maritime
Customs Service, which began as a tool of British and French
imperialists and, in his son’s words, was responsible for taxing
“imperial China’s maritime trade with the outside world.” Benedict was
born in Kunming in 1936, but his father made a consequential decision in
1941 to move the family to California: Had they remained in China, they
might have been imprisoned in a Japanese internment camp.
In 1945, the family moved to Ireland, where they lived
in a house full of “Chinese scrolls, pictures, clothes and costumes,
which we would often dress up in for fun.” The radio was another source
of entertainment and enlightenment: In the evenings, the family listened
to classic novels that were read aloud on the BBC by distinguished
actors, “so that our imaginations were filled with figures like Anna
Karenina, the Count of Monte Cristo, Lord Jim, Uriah Heep, Tess of the
D’Urbervilles, and so on.” In those years, traveling theater groups
proliferated in Ireland, and the Anderson children (including Benedict’s
sister Melanie) absorbed plays by Shakespeare, Shaw, Wilde, Sheridan,
and O’Casey.
His father died young, when Benedict was 9, and the
children were dispatched to boarding schools in England. His English
mother, who was passionate about books and ideas, was scraping by on a
pension, so Benedict had to win scholarships. He ended up garnering one
of 13 vacant slots at Eton, a place that immediately sharpened his sense
of class distinction. The scholarship boys lived in a separate dorm
from the sons of the British aristocracy and had to wear a special
“medieval” outfit. But he received an extraordinary old-fashioned
education in literature, art history, ancient history, archaeology, and
comparative modern history.
At the core of the curriculum was rigorous language
study in Latin, Greek, French, German, and a bit of “Cold War Russian.”
(Later, Anderson would learn Indonesian, Javanese, Thai, Tagalog, Dutch,
and Spanish.) The memorization and recitation of poems in Latin and
French were an essential aspect of his education; his teachers also
asked him to translate English poems into Latin and even to compose
poems in that language. Few students after him were educated in so
rigorous a fashion. It was the end of an era.
Having flourished at Eton, Anderson found Cambridge
University to be a tranquil holiday. He became enamored of film
(Japanese cinema, especially) and felt the first stirrings of
politicization. One afternoon during the Suez Crisis of 1956, he crossed
the campus and saw a group of brown-skinned students demonstrating:
Suddenly, out of the blue, the protestors were assaulted by a gang of big English student bullies, most of them athletes. They were singing “God Save the Queen!” To me this was incomprehensible, and reprehensible.
The protestors, mostly Indians and Ceylonese, were much smaller and thinner, and so stood no chance.… I tried to intervene to help them, only to have my spectacles snatched off my face and smashed in the mud.
After graduating from Cambridge, Anderson lingered at home
for six months, quarreling with his mother, who wanted him to become a
British diplomat. An alternative presented itself when a friend invited
him to work as a teaching assistant in Cornell University’s department
of government. He arrived in Ithaca during a snowstorm in January 1958
and stayed there for the duration of his long, productive career.
* * *
The 1950s and ’60s were heady years to be a graduate
student in Southeast Asian studies at Cornell: It and Yale were the only
American universities with robust programs in that area. Money was
plentiful, not only from the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, but also
from the US government, which was keen to understand peasant rebellions
and nationalist movements in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Anderson
savored the intellectual excitement of toiling in a new field: “students
felt like explorers investigating unknown societies and terrains.” His
peers—some of whom were from Burma, Vietnam, and Indonesia—literally
built the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, installing steel pillars to
reinforce the rotting floors of the abandoned frat house where the
program was located.
Some of the most pleasurable pages in A Life Beyond Boundaries
feature finely etched, affectionate portraits of Anderson’s mentors.
First among them was George Kahin, the savvy department chairman who was
a specialist in Indonesia’s late-1940s struggles for independence from
the Dutch, and whose sympathy for Indonesian nationalism would later
result in the temporary revocation of his passport during the McCarthy
years. Anderson writes that Kahin, who had participated in Quaker
activism in defense of Japanese-Americans in the 1940s, “formed me
politically.” Another influence was Claire Holt, a Russian-speaking Jew
from Latvia who, after working as a ballet critic in Paris and New York,
moved to Indonesia and became the lover of the German archeologist
Wilhelm Stutterheim, who shared her deep interest in Indonesia’s
precolonial civilizations. Holt had no scholarly credentials, but Kahin
brought her to Cornell to teach Indonesian languages to his graduate
students. Anderson spent countless hours in her house, absorbing her
extensive knowledge of traditional Javanese art, dance, and culture;
sometimes they would read Russian poetry aloud to each other. “Claire
Holt,” he writes, “was very special to me.”
Two other men, in the early days, were close to his
heart. Harry Benda was a Czech Jew whose business career in Java was
interrupted by the Japanese occupiers, who put him in an internment camp
that nearly ended his life. Later, Benda made his way to Cornell, where
he wrote a dissertation on the relationship between the Japanese and
Muslims in prewar and wartime Indonesia. John Echols was a “perfect
American gentleman” who knew a dozen languages and compiled the first
English-language Indonesian dictionary. Anderson’s adoration of
dictionaries derived from Echols: “Still today,” he writes, “the
favorite shelf in my personal library is filled only with dictionaries
of many kinds.”
Anderson was lucky not only in his mentors, but also in
the loose institutional arrangements at Cornell that cemented his
career: “Against normal recruitment rules—which require competitive
candidacies, extensive interviews, and hostility to ‘nepotism’—I walked
into an assistant professorship without any interviews and without any
outside candidate being considered.”
Kahin, his principal mentor, had urged Anderson to
undertake a dissertation on the Japanese occupation of Indonesia from
1942 to 1945, and the young scholar landed in Jakarta in December 1961.
His first glimpse of the country was unforgettable: “I remember vividly
the ride into town with all the taxi’s windows open. The first thing
that hit me was the smell—of fresh trees and bushes, urine, incense,
smoky oil lamps, garbage, and, above all, food in the little stalls that
lined most of the main streets.” He would remain in Indonesia for
almost two and a half years.
Jakarta was not yet a heaving, smog-filled megacity:
There were few cars, and the various neighborhoods still had a distinct
character. Foreigners were scarce. In contrast to the social hierarchies
Anderson had observed in the UK and Ireland, he was immediately struck
by the “egalitarianism” around him: He lived near a street where, after
dark, men would play chess on the sidewalks, and he noticed that clerks
and pedicab drivers would face off against high government officials and
debonair businessmen. For the young Anderson, this was “a kind of
social heaven.” The language came easily: His Indonesian took flight
after four months, and he found that “without self-consciousness, I
could talk happily with almost anyone—cabinet ministers, bus drivers,
military officers, maids, businessmen, waitresses, schoolteachers,
transvestite prostitutes, minor gangsters and politicians.” (His
connection to the language deepened with the years: Anderson told me
that he did much of his thinking in Indonesian.)
When Anderson wasn’t laboring in Jakarta’s archives, he
got to know Java, wandering through the old royal palaces; attending
performances of shadow plays and spirit possession; exploring the
Borobudur, the Buddhist stupa built in the 10th century (once he slept
till dawn on the stupa’s highest terrace “next to the Enlightened
Ones”); and visiting tiny villages of the interior.
From the evidence of this memoir, Anderson, lost in the
reveries of fieldwork and leisure, was largely unaware of the escalating
political frictions that would soon cause Java to explode.
* * *
On October 1, 1965, six Indonesian generals were
murdered and their bodies tossed down a well. The left-wing president,
Sukarno, was detained; General Suharto took control and blamed the coup
attempt on the PKI. It was the beginning of what Anderson would call
“the catastrophe”—a series of massacres that, according to a CIA study
from 1968, were comparable to the Soviet purges of the 1930s and the
Nazi mass murders of World War II.
Anderson and two colleagues (Ruth McVey and Frederick
Bunnell) observed these events from the safety of Ithaca. But they were
determined to provide an intellectual response to the Indonesian
calamity, and they immediately set out to prove that the official
account was flawed. Relying on a vast cache of provincial Indonesian
newspapers at Cornell, as well as Indonesian radio transcripts, the trio
produced, in January 1966, a 162-page report that became known as the
Cornell Paper.
The document, which took three months to write, insisted
that the coup attempt was not a Communist power grab, but an “internal
army affair” spearheaded by colonels from the province of Central Java.
Kahin, who was always keen to push US foreign policy in a more humane
direction, sent the Cornell Paper to Assistant Secretary of State
William Bundy, and it soon found its way to Joseph Kraft, a syndicated
columnist who disseminated the conclusions of the young Cornell
scholars.
In my discussions with Anderson in 2001, he defended the
main thrust of the Cornell Paper—that an intra-military dispute
triggered the violence—and he spoke with immense passion, and in
fascinating detail, about the events of 1965–66. Alas, much of what he
related to me is absent from A Life Beyond Boundaries.
The PKI, he explained, had a parliamentary orientation
that resembled the Italian Communist Party’s. In the early 1960s, he
admired its nationalism, its incorruptibility, and its opposition to the
Vietnam War. But the years had given him a clear-eyed sense of the
PKI’s errors. It was completely unarmed, but it embraced the rhetoric of
Maoism: “That was a huge mistake. It created fear and anxiety about the
Communist Party. It wasn’t a guerrilla army. That’s why they were
massacred; they were all out in the open.”
When the Indonesian government permitted Anderson to
return to the country in 1999, he attended a meeting of those who had
survived the terror of the 1960s. The meeting took place in a
nondescript Jakarta building owned by the Ministry of Manpower; most of
the attendees were elderly. He recalled it as “an incredibly
overwhelming experience,” akin to a Quaker meeting, where people talked
about their lives and experiences. When he took his seat, a buzz went
around the room; the foreign scholar was persuaded to speak. Afterward, a
dignified Chinese man who was around 50 approached him. Anderson
realized that before him was the “kid” who, 32 years earlier, had
challenged the judge at Sudisman’s trial in 1967. They spent a day
together and Anderson heard his tale, which he related to me:
Many of the Communists, when they were trying to escape the sweeps on them, fled into the Chinese ghettos, partly because the Chinese are much more closemouthed than the Indonesians are, partly because these ghettos are accustomed to a certain level of clandestinity. And this kid, who was a radical kid, was somehow recruited by Sudisman to be his personal courier in terms of contacting other people who were hiding underground.
Is the Cornell Paper a work of lasting scholarship? Anderson
insisted in 2001 that the events of October 1, 1965, were “manipulated
from the top by General Suharto,” whom he considered the puppet master
of the conspiracy. Contemporary scholars of the September 30th
Movement—or G30S, as the plotters were known—have a different view. In a
recent e-mail to me, University of British Columbia historian John
Roosa, the author of the 2006 study Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup D’État in Indonesia, noted:
I argued that Suharto knew about the plot beforehand but was not involved in it. From what is known I think it is clear that Suharto was not the mastermind. All Ben had was speculation. He speculated that Suharto, if not the mastermind, played the role of spoiler: Suharto had planted double-agents in the G30S group…who then sabotaged the plot, making sure that it committed an atrocity (killing the generals) and then collapsed. I think this is overreaching…. Ben also wanted to acquit the PKI of any involvement…. The argument of the Cornell Paper—Javanese officers acting on their own—is completely wrong.
According to Roosa, top PKI leaders, including the chairman,
D.N. Aidit, were deeply involved in the plot: “Aidit’s idea was to use
military personnel who were loyal to the PKI to get rid of the army
generals they suspected of being the key right-wing generals who were
promoting anticommunism.” But matters went awry: “The initial plan seems
to have been to capture the generals alive and present them to Sukarno,
but the plotters didn’t carry out the plan with much concern for
keeping the generals alive—three were shot or stabbed when they resisted
being abducted.”
Given Anderson’s emotional connection to these events,
one would expect that a memoir by him would contain a great deal about
the “catastrophe.” But the carnage is evoked fleetingly and from a
peculiar angle, in a brief passage about his comrade Pipit Rochijat
Kartawidjaja, an Indonesian exile and “eternal student” in Berlin who,
during the long Suharto dictatorship, clashed frequently and
successfully with the “small, corrupt” Indonesian consulate in Berlin,
effectively headed by an intelligence officer. Pipit, Anderson writes,
is “an amazingly gifted and fearless satirical writer” whose articles
are distinguished by “a mixture of formal Indonesian, Jakarta slang and
Low Javanese,” a style that incorporated “Javanese wayang-lore,
Sino-Indonesian kung-fu comic books, scatology and brazenly sexual jokes
to make his friends laugh their heads off.”
Anderson, who credits Pipit with teaching him how to
write fluently in Indonesian, translated one of his articles into
English, an essay entitled “Am I PKI… or Non-PKI?,” which was based on
incidents that Pipit had witnessed, as a young man, on a sugar estate in
East Java in 1965. Pipit’s essay was full of black humor, but, Anderson
says, “the horror haunted him”:
In his article he described how regular customers at the local brothel stopped going there when they saw the genitals of communists nailed to the door, and he recalled rafts piled high with mutilated corpses which floated down the Brantas river through the town of Kediri where he lived.
Writing at the end of his life, in a memoir that feels
post-ideological, Anderson chose to accentuate the halcyon days in
Java—the motorcycle trips through the interior, the sidewalk chess
games, the full moon over Borobudur—instead of the ruination of a
country he loved.
* * *
Anderson’s early work on Indonesia’s independence
struggle of the 1940s led him to think seriously about nationalism: He
saw how a skilled nationalist intelligentsia, based in Jakarta, had
summoned not only a nation called Indonesia but also a new language,
Indonesian, which became the language of resistance to the Dutch
colonial rulers. Imagined Communities also grew out of the
political realities in Southeast Asia following the Vietnam War. The
book emerged from what Anderson viewed, in the early 1980s, as a
“fundamental transformation in the history of Marxism and Marxist
movements”: the wars between Vietnam, Cambodia, and China in 1978–79.
Anderson simply couldn’t understand why Marxist regimes were fighting
each other instead of the Western imperialists. It was a worrying
spectacle: “I was haunted by the prospect of further full-scale wars
between the socialist states.”
Anderson began a comprehensive study of nationalism, a
force whose power and complexity were not explained by his sort of
Marxist theory. In writing Imagined Communities, he was partly inspired by Tom Nairn’s The Break-up of Britain
(1977), which, in Anderson’s words, had described the UK “as the
decrepit relic of a pre-national, pre-republican age and thus doomed to
share the fate of Austro-Hungary.” But Anderson strongly disagreed with
Nairn’s contention that “‘nationalism’ is the pathology of modern
developmental history, as inescapable as ‘neurosis’ in the individual.”
Anderson argued that nationalism was neither a pathology nor a fixed,
immutable force. Instead, he wrote, “it is an imagined political
community…because the members of even the smallest nation will never
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet
in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”
In an afterword to the 2006 edition of Imagined Communities,
Anderson reflected on the book’s enormous success: “In the 1980s it was
the only comparative study of nationalism’s history intended to combat
Eurocentrism, and making use of non-European language sources. It was
also the only one with a marked prejudice in favor of ‘small
countries’”—Hungary, Thailand, Switzerland, Vietnam, Scotland, and the
Philippines. Imagined Communities also broadly coincided with
the rise of theory in the academy: It attempted to combine, he wrote in
2006, “a kind of historical materialism with what later on came to be
called discourse analysis; Marxist modernism married to postmodernism
avant la lettre.”
Anderson says in the memoir that he wanted to provoke
his fellow scholars: “I deliberately brought together Tsarist Russia
with British India, Hungary with Siam and Japan, Indonesia with
Switzerland, and Vietnam with French West Africa…. These comparisons
were intended to surprise and shock, but also to ‘globalize’ the study
of the history of nationalism.”
What enabled him, in a learned fashion, to compare
Hungary with Japan was a cast of mind that was always wide-ranging,
endlessly curious, and interdisciplinary. When he surveys academic life,
he sees thick disciplinary walls that breed narrow, provincial
thinking. He tells us that, in his seminars on nationalism, he took
pleasure in making students look outside their cubby holes:
I forced the young anthropologists to read Rousseau, political scientists a nineteenth-century Cuban novel, historians Listian economics, and sociologists and literary comparativists Maruyama Masao. I picked Maruyama because he was a political scientist, an Asian/Japanese, and a very intelligent man who read in many fields and had a fine sense of humour and history. It was plain to me that the students had been so professionally trained that they did not really understand each other’s scholarly terminology, ideology or theory.
He was also determined to steer them clear of jargon-filled
writing, self-importance, and a reluctance (among American scholars) to
learn difficult foreign languages. On the whole, he finds academia much
too solemn, and likens professors to medieval monks determined to
eradicate “frivolity.” As a student at Cambridge, he filled his papers
with jokes, digressions, and sarcasm. In his early days at Cornell, he
was immediately informed that “scholarship is a serious
enterprise”—which made him reflect: “Now I understand what traditional
Chinese foot-binding must have felt like.”
* * *
Anderson survived a heart attack in 1996 and retired
from Cornell in 2001, after which he spent half of each year at his
apartment in a lower-middle-class district of Bangkok—a zone, he told
me, “full of small businesspeople, schoolteachers, mistresses of
policemen, this sort of thing.” Liberated from his teaching and
administrative duties, he threw himself into a number of projects: a
book about anarchism and anticolonial nationalisms, Under Three Flags
(which, he says, has “mystified many readers”); a literary-political
biography of Kwee Thiam Tjing, the Sino-Indonesian journalist and
columnist whose work, Anderson believed, embodied the finest qualities
of humanism and cosmopolitanism in early-20th-century Indonesia; and an
effort of “amateurish anthropology,” The Fate of Rural Hell: Asceticism and Desire in Buddhist Thailand. He never lost his passion for literature, and helped to translate Man Tiger
by the young Indonesian writer Eka Kurniawan, whose “novels and short
stories are in a class of their own, far above all authors in Southeast
Asia that I know,” and whose sensibility he compared to that of Gabriel
García Márquez.
He continued to think about nationalism, which is “a
powerful tool of the state and the institutions attached to it,” and
which, in nations ranging from China to Pakistan to Sri Lanka, is
“easily harnessed by repressive and conservative forces, which, unlike
earlier anti- dynastic nationalisms, have little interest in
cross-national solidarities.” He continued to reflect, too, on the fate
of the left:
For a long time, different forms of socialism—anarchist, Leninist, New Leftist, social-democratic—provided a ‘global’ framework in which a progressive, emancipationist nationalism could flourish. Since the fall of ‘communism’ there has been a global vacuum, partially filled by feminism, environmentalism, neo-anarchism and various other ‘isms,’ fighting in different and not always cooperative ways against the barrenness of neoliberalism and hypocritical ‘human rights’ interventionism. But a lot of work, over a long period of time, will be needed to fill the vacuum.
Anderson tells us that A Life Beyond Boundaries has
two principal themes: “The first is the importance of translation for
individuals and societies. The second is the danger of arrogant
provincialism, or of forgetting that serious nationalism is tied to
internationalism.” He was heartened by the fact that, in area studies,
many young Japanese are now learning Burmese; young Thais, Vietnamese;
and Filipinos, Korean. Such students, he says, “are beginning to see a
huge sky above them”:
It is important to keep in mind that to learn a language is not simply to learn a linguistic means of communication. It is also to learn the way of thinking and feeling of a people who speak and write a language which is different from ours. It is to learn the history and culture underlying their thoughts and emotions and so to learn to empathize with them.
His memoir concludes with a coda about memory, technology,
and poetry, in which his prime target is Google: “Google is an
extraordinary ‘research engine,’ says Google, without irony in its use
of the word ‘engine,’ which in Old English meant ‘trickery’ (as is
reflected in the verb ‘to engineer’) or even ‘an engine of torture.’”
Anderson frets that future generations may never know the actual feel of
a book: “Japanese books are bound one way, Burmese books another.”
Groupthink rules: “The faith students have in Google is almost
religious.”
As a student, he was enthralled by the cadence and
rhymes of poems he had memorized, such as Rimbaud’s “dizzying ‘Le Bateau
ivre.’” Today, search has supplanted memorization: “One effect of ‘easy
access to everything’ is the acceleration of a trend that I had already
noticed long before Google was born: there is no reason to remember anything, because we can retrieve ‘anything’ by other means.”
The poems he memorized in his youth stayed with him
always. In 2007, he was invited to Leningrad to assist with a class on
nationalism for young teachers in Russian provincial universities.
Addressing them, he remembered some Russian from his days at Eton and
proceeded to recite the final stanza of a poem by Vladimir Mayakovsky,
who perished, amid murky circumstances, in Moscow in 1930. To his
astonishment, all of the students joined with him:
Shine always,“I was in tears by the end,” recalls Anderson. “Some of the students, too.”
Shine everywhere,
To the depth of the last day!
Shine—
And to hell with everything else!
That’s my motto—
And the sun’s!
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