Presiden Iran sebut kesepakatan nuklir awal masa jaya Teheran
Reporter : Marcheilla Ariesta Putri Hanggoro | Senin, 18 Januari 2016 10:08
http://www.merdeka.com/dunia/presiden-iran-sebut-kesepakatan-nuklir-awal-masa-jaya-teheran.html
Hassan Rouhani. freepressphotos.com ©2013 Merdeka.com
Merdeka.com - Presiden Iran Hassan Rouhani mengatakan
kesepakatan nuklir antara Iran dengan negara-negara dunia, merupakan
masa keemasan bagi Teheran. Kesepakatan nuklir itu diresmikan pada Sabtu
pekan lalu.
"Kesepakatan nuklir merupakan kesempatan yang harus kita ambil untuk
membangun negara. Ini dapat meningkatkan kesejahteraan bangsa, serta
menciptakan stabilitas dan keamanan di kawasan," ucap Rouhani, seperti
dilansir dari Reuters, Minggu (17/1).
Rouhani meyakinkan kesepakatan tersebut bakal membawa hal yang positif bagi Iran.
"Semua orang bahagia kecuali Israel. Mereka penghasut perang terjadi di negara-negara Islam," lanjut dia.
Dampak dari kesepakatan nuklir Iran langsung terasa di negara itu.
Isolasi ekonomi terhadap Iran langsung dicabut sesaat badan pengawas
nuklir PBB, Dewan Energi Atom Internasional (IAEA) mengumumkan
kesepakatan ini.
Selain bahas perjanjian nuklir, Teheran juga mengumumkan pembebasan
lima warga Amerika Serikat. Pertukaran tahanan ini dibalas dengan
dibebaskannya tujuh tahanan Iran oleh Negara Paman Sam itu.
[ard]
Ini syarat membangun pembangkit listrik tenaga nuklir di Indonesia
Reporter : Novita Intan Sari | Minggu, 10 Januari 2016 17:08
http://www.merdeka.com/uang/ini-syarat-membangun-pembangkit-listrik-tenaga-nuklir-di-indonesia
Ilustrasi Nuklir. ©2015 Merdeka.com
Merdeka.com - Pemerintah Jokowi-JK tengah menggodok
kebijakan energi nasional, salah satunya dengan membangun Pembangkit
Listrik Tenaga Nuklir (PLTN). Pembangunan pembangkit ini bertujuan
mengatasi krisis listrik di dalam negeri.
Anggota Dewan Energi Nasional (DEN), Syamsir Abduh menyebut,
pemerintah perlu memenuhi beberapa persyaratan jika ingin membangun
PLTN. Setidaknya, Indonesia harus memiliki teknologi canggih.
"Memang ada beberapa syarat dan pertimbangan pada prinsip nuklir bisa
digunakan. Pertama harus ada kajian teknologi keamanan, kebutuhan
energi yang semakin meningkat, pengurangan emisi karbon, bagaimana
kepentingan nasional, artinya energi nuklir bisa dimanfaatkan," ujarnya
saat acara diskusi Energi Kita yang digagas merdeka.com, RRI, Sewatama,
IJTI, IKN dan IJO di Gedung Dewan Pers, Jakarta, Minggu (10/1).
Menurut dia, sampai saat ini pihaknya belum menerima konfirmasi dari
Badan Tenaga Nuklir Nasional (BATAN) terkait pembangkit nuklir.
Berdasarkan jajak pendapat Sigma Research menyebut 75,3 persen
masyarakat Indonesia setuju pembangunan PLTN.
"Kegunaannya hingga saat ini belum konfirmasi, tetapi kalaupun benar
persoalan siapa yang melakukan tidak harusnya ada lembaga independen di
mana tingkat kepercayaan publik tinggi jadi dari sisi metode pantas
dipersoalkan," jelas dia.
Menurutnya, riset tersebut juga harus dapat disosialisasikan lebih
luas agar masyarakat dapat menerima. "Kalau kajian sudah dilakukan
mendalam, pemahaman sudah juga harus didiskusikan kalau ada ruang
diskusi nuklir ini," ungkapnya.
Seperti diketahui, Kepala BATAN Djarot Sulistio Wisnubroto mengatakan
berdasarkan jajak pendapat yang dilakukan lembaga riset Sigma Research
sejak 2011, persentase masyarakat yang mendukung pembangunan PLTN
sebagai solusi mengatasi krisis listrik berangsur meningkat. Jika pada
2011 persentasenya mencapai 49,5 persen maka pada 2015 menjadi 75,3
persen.
Jajak pendapat tersebut dilakukan kepada 4.000 orang perwakilan dari
34 provinsi sejak Oktober hingga Desember 2015. Menurut dia, jajak
pendapat rutin dilakukan BATAN melalui lembaga riset independen yang
dipilih melalui proses tender tersebut merupakan permintaan dari
pemerintah untuk mengetahui sikap masyarakat terhadap nuklir sebagai
pembangkit listrik.
Berdasarkan jajak pendapat tersebut, ia juga mengatakan dapat
diketahui bahwa pernyataan Presiden yang paling ditunggu masyarakat
sebagai jaminan PLTN akan berjalan aman. Ilmuwan dan BATAN justru berada
di urutan ke-2 dan ke-3 yang ditunggu masyarakat terkait PLTN.
[idr]
Nuclear power in Indonesia
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_power_in_Indonesia
Contents
History
According to Presidential Decree Five in 2006, Indonesia should have four nuclear-power plants built by 2025. Their total capacity will be at least 4,000 MW of electricity, about 1.96 percent of projected electricity demand in 2025 (200,000 to 350,000 MW).[5] Indonesia has stated that the program will be developed in accordance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),[citation needed] and Mohammed ElBaradei was invited to visit the country in December 2006. Protests against plans for nuclear power were held in June 2007 in central Java,[2] and increased in mid-2007.[6]Indonesia and International Nuclear co-operation
Indonesia is a member of the IAEA, and a signatory to the NPT.Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
On December 6, 2011 the Indonesian Parliament ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Indonesia agreed not to conduct nuclear-weapons testing,[7][8] but nuclear power plants are unaffected.Cooperation with other countries
In 2006 Indonesia signed treaties for nuclear cooperation with a number of countries, including South Korea, Russia, Australia and the United States. Australia has indicated its willingness to supply Indonesia with uranium for peaceful purposes. A well-publicized agreement with a Russian company to build a floating nuclear reactor in Gorontalo ran aground; Indonesia has since made it clear that it wants a higher-capacity nuclear power plant, and will construct a land-based plant. In mid-2014, BATAN and Russia's state-owned Rosatom have signed an agreement for developing the (30MW) Indonesia's first nuclear power plant.[9]IAEA appraisal
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) considers Indonesia ready to develop nuclear energy in a statement issued in November 2009. Its appraisal considered four readiness aspects: human resources, stakeholders, industry and regulations. The Indonesian Nuclear Board (BATAN) has carried out research since the 1980s.[10]National Nuclear Energy Agency (BATAN)
BATAN is Indonesia’s National Nuclear Energy Agency; it is an Executive Agency based in Indonesia as referred to in Indonesia Law Number 10 of Year 1997 on Nuclear Power, also in Indonesia Presidential Regulation No. 46. In 2013 BATAN is referred to as Non-Ministerial Government Institution responsible to the President via the Ministry of Research and Technology. BATAN has the task of carrying out Indonesian governmental duties in the field of research, development and utilization of nuclear science and technology in accordance to the provisions of the legislation.BATAN exported a small amount of molybdenum-99 fission material (Mo99) to Malaysia, the Philippines and Bangladesh (with a total value of Rp 50 billion ($5.5 million) in 2011. Due to a drop in world radioisotope production and increased demand from China and Japan, BATAN will invest Rp 100 billion ($11.1 million) to increase its production capacity to 900 Ci per week (from its present 40 Ci). Full capacity could be realized in 2013, but large-scale exports are possible by late 2012.[11]
Reactor locations
For research purposes, the following experimental nuclear reactors have already been built in Indonesia:- Kartini nuclear research reactor in Yogyakarta, Central Java
- MPR RSG-GA Siwabessy nuclear research reactor in Serpong, Banten
- Triga Mark III nuclear research reactor in Bandung, West Java
BATAN continues searching for uranium sources and suitable sites for nuclear power plants. Bangka Belitung is geologically stable and near the country's greatest electricity-consuming regions: Java and Sumatra. Local residents are more receptive to hosting a nuclear power plant, compared with other locations. Although local residents were opposed, BATAN was still considering the previously-studied locations of Mount Muria, Jepara, Central Java and Serang, Banten.[13]
In July 2011, the Bangka Belitung governor requested the government to continue its plans for nuclear power plants in the Muntok and Permis areas between 2025 and 2030. The two plants will produce two gigawatts of electricity at a cost of Rp 70 trillion ($8.2 billion), producing 40 percent of electricity needs in Sumatra, Java and Bali.[14]
Several locations have been proposed for nuclear reactors to generate electricity:
- Cape Muria, Kudus (Central Java)
- Muria Nuclear Power Plant Planning
- Gorontalo, in northernSulawesi
- Bangka Belitung province (two plants with a total capacity of 18 GW)[15]
- Kalimantan[16][full citation needed]
Proposals
A physics lecturer from Airlangga University has stated that the need for electricity continues to increase, while fossil-fuel reserves are being depleted; Indonesia is ready and able to develop a nuclear-power plant. Nuclear experts have conducted nuclear research since the 1970s.[18] The Indonesian Nuclear Energy Regulation Agency BAPETEN has confirmed that seven nuclear supervisors were on IAEA missions in several countries (including one in Tokyo, Japan), and Indonesia is ready to operate nuclear power plants as soon as those facilities are built.[19]Despite the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Indonesia is unlikely to halt its plan to build its first nuclear-power plant due to an electricity crisis. A nuclear-energy development head at Indonesia's National Nuclear Energy Agency said that concerns about a disaster such as Japan's were misplaced; plants in Indonesia would use more advanced technology than the four-decade-old reactors at the Fukushima plant in Japan.[20] Modern plants are designed to operate in the circumstances of total power failure like that experienced at Fukushima, relying on passive safety systems that do not require electricity to function.
Natural resources
Indonesia has at least two uranium mines: the Remaja-Hitam and Rirang-Tanah Merah mines, located in western Kalimantan (Borneo). If these prove insufficient, the country may import uranium.National Nuclear Energy Agency predicted that Indonesia has 70,000 tonnes Uranium reserves (from hypotetic category to definite category) and 170,000 tonnes Thorium reserves (all in hypotetic category). Mostly Uranium found in West Kalimantan and the rest in Papua, Bangka Belitung dan West Sulawesi, while Thorium found mostly in Bangka Belitung and the rest in West Kalimantan. In Mamuju Regency, West Sulawesi, Uranium is detected about 100-1.500 ppm (part per million) and Thorium about 400-1.800 ppm. Singkep district, Mamuju Regency has the highest Gamma Radiation in Indonesia.[21]
Controversy
Indonesia's nuclear plans have met with criticism from Greenpeace, other groups and individuals. In June 2007 nearly 4,000 protesters rallied in Central Java, calling on the government to abandon plans to build a nuclear power plant in their area. Specific concerns included the dangers posed by nuclear waste and the location of the country on the Pacific Ring of Fire, with geological activity (such as earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) hazardous to nuclear reactors.[2]See also
- Economy of Indonesia
- List of nuclear reactors
- List of small nuclear reactor designs
- Nuclear marine propulsion
- Neutron transport
- Nuclear power by country
- One Less Nuclear Power Plant
- Radioisotope thermoelectric generator
- Safety engineering
- Sayonara Nuclear Power Plants
- Small modular reactor
- Thorium-based nuclear power
- World Nuclear Industry Status Report
References
- B Kunto Wibisono. "Indonesia miliki cadangan uranium 70.000 ton". Anataranews.com. Retrieved November 30, 2014.
Sources
- Nuclear Power Development in Indonesia by Soedyartomo Soentono, National Atomic Energy Agency, Indonesia.
- Indonesian Policy on the Development and Utilization of Nuclear Energy by M. Hatta Rajasa, State Minister for Research and Technology, Republic of Indonesia.
- Paper from 2003 that includes organograms of BAPETEN an BATAN
External links
- IAEA pagine on Indonesia
- Website of BAPETEN (Indonesian and English)
- Website van BATAN (Indonesian and English)
- Thousands of Indonesians protest plan to build Indonesian nuclear plant
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The problem is, Indonesia`s need for electricity is continuing to go up, while fossil fuel reserves are to be depleted soon. In fact, the oil price is currently soaring, [said] Khusnun Ain, a lecturer at the Physics Department of the Science and Mathematics Faculty of Airlangga University. ... In view of the Indonesian capability for nuclear technology, he said Indonesian nuclear experts are ready and prepared, yet they have successfully conducted some nuclear research safely.
Future Risks of an Iran Nuclear Deal
WASHINGTON — As President Obama begins his three-week push to win approval of the Iran
nuclear deal, he is confronting this political reality: His strongest
argument in favor of passage has also become his greatest vulnerability.
Mr.
Obama has been pressing the case that the sharp limits on how much
nuclear fuel Iran can hold, how many centrifuges it can spin and what
kind of technology it can acquire would make it extraordinarily
difficult for Iran to race for the bomb over the next 15 years.
His
problem is that most of the significant constraints on Tehran’s program
lapse after 15 years — and, after that, Iran is free to produce uranium
on an industrial scale.
“The
chief reservation I have about the agreement is the fact that in 15
years they have a highly modern and internationally legitimized
enrichment capability,” said Representative Adam B. Schiff, a California
Democrat who supports the accord. “And that is a bitter pill to
swallow.”
Even
some of the most enthusiastic backers of the agreement, reached by six
world powers with Iran, say they fear Mr. Obama has oversold some of the
accord’s virtues as he asserts that it would “block” all pathways to a
nuclear weapon.
The Iran Deal in 200 Words
A short overview of highlights from the Iran nuclear pact.
A
more accurate description is that the agreement is likely to delay
Iran’s program for a decade and a half — just as sanctions and sabotage
have slowed Iran in recent years. The administration’s case essentially
is that the benefits over the next 15 years overwhelmingly justify the
longer-term risks of what comes after.
“Of
course there are risks, and they have to be acknowledged,” said R.
Nicholas Burns, who was undersecretary of state in the George W. Bush
administration and has testified before Congress in favor of the deal.
Mr. Obama’s “most convincing argument,” he added, “is that there is no
better alternative out there.”
In
making the administration’s case, Mr. Obama can underscore that
economic sanctions on Iran begin to lift only as it reduces its current
stockpile of low enriched uranium, to 300 kilograms, or 660 pounds. That
is not enough to make a single nuclear weapon, and is a 98 percent
reduction in its current stockpile of nearly 12 tons.
The
accord also calls for regular inspections at Iran’s nuclear
installations and includes arrangements to reimpose international
sanctions if the Iranians are caught cheating.
But
the flip side is that after 15 years, Iran would be allowed to produce
reactor-grade fuel on an industrial scale using far more advanced
centrifuges. That may mean that the warning time if Iran decided to race
for a bomb would shrink to weeks, according to a recent Brookings Institution analysis by Robert J. Einhorn, a former member of the American negotiating team.
Critics
say that by that time, Iran’s economy would be stronger, as would its
ability to withstand economic sanctions, and its nuclear installations
probably would be better protected by air defense systems, which Iran is
expected to buy from Russia.
Some
members of Congress and other experts are urging the administration to
take fresh steps to deter Iran from edging dangerously close to a nuclear weapons capability after the main limits in the agreement expire.
“I
believe it buys 15 years for real,” said Dennis B. Ross, who served as a
White House adviser on Iran during Mr. Obama’s first term and has yet to decide
if he will back the accord. “But I do see vulnerabilities that I feel
must be addressed. The gap between threshold and weapons status after
year 15 is small.”
A Loss of Leverage
The
duration of the agreement is the most important and complex issue.
Under restrictions imposed by the accord, Iran would need a full year to
produce enough nuclear material for a bomb; currently that timeline is
two or three months, according to American intelligence agencies. But
starting at year 10, that “breakout time” would begin to shrink again,
as Iran gets more centrifuges into operation.
Administration
officials argue that it would be obvious if Iran made weapons-grade
fuel, and negotiators secured a permanent ban on the metallurgy needed
to turn the fuel into a bomb.
Supporters
of the agreement are betting that improved intelligence would deter
Iran from racing for a bomb. Under the agreement, inspectors will be
able to monitor the production of rotors and other centrifuge components
for up to 20 years and can monitor Iran’s stocks of uranium ore
concentrate for 25 years.
Skeptics
counter that, after 15 years, the United States would lose much of its
leverage to stop a program. So Mr. Obama is trying to assure Congress
that he and his successors will create that leverage.
In a letter
last week to Representative Jerrold Nadler, a Democrat from New York,
Mr. Obama detailed the expanded military support he has offered Israel
and reaffirmed that the United States retains the option to use economic
sanctions and even military force should Iran break out of its
agreement.
But
Mr. Obama’s letter was mostly a repackaging of previous assurances made
to lawmakers, to Israel and to diplomats from Arab nations by the
Persian Gulf.
Some
backers of the agreement are urging the White House and Congress to do
more. Mr. Schiff and Mr. Ross suggested in interviews that the United
States should put Iran on notice that its production of highly enriched
uranium after the main provisions of the accord expire would be taken by
American officials as an indication that Iran has decided to pursue
nuclear weapons — and could trigger an American military strike.
Photo
And
both said the United States should also be prepared to provide
bunker-busting bombs to Israel to deter Iran from trying to shield
illicit nuclear work underground. Others have called for a long-term
congressional “authorization to use military force” if Iran violated the
accord.
Mr.
Ross has also urged the White House to specify the penalties for
smaller violations of the accord, an idea Mr. Obama rejected in his
letter, saying he wanted to maintain “flexibility” to decide what
responses might be needed.
Energy Secretary Ernest J. Moniz told a House committee last month that any attempt by Iran to produce highly enriched uranium “at any time must earn a sharp response by all necessary means.”
But
some experts like Mr. Einhorn say that this warning should be conveyed
directly, if privately, to Iran and that the United States should also
increase intelligence sharing with the world’s nuclear inspector, the International Atomic Energy Agency, about possible Iranian cheating.
“The way to address challenges not covered by the agreement is to supplement it, not renegotiate it,” Mr. Einhorn said.
Accounting for the Past
One
of the trickier issues for Mr. Obama, and for Congress, is how to
assess whether Iran has truly come clean about its past nuclear
activities, an enormously sensitive issue for the Iranians. And in the
end, it is one that Secretary of State John Kerry
decided not to press too hard during negotiations, for fear it would
undermine the chances of getting stronger inspections for current and
future activity.
The
job of assessing past activities is up to the I.A.E.A. It must certify
on Oct. 15 that Iran is complying with a “road map” for cooperation and
report in December on the agency’s conclusions — especially about Iran’s
alleged work developing nuclear triggers and designing warheads.
Critics
of the accord note that Mr. Kerry and his chief negotiator, Wendy R.
Sherman, said repeatedly that Iran must provide access to “people,
places and documents” that would resolve those questions, something Iran
has refused to do for years. But the I.A.E.A. has never publicly
specified what it is asking, or whom it must meet.
Mr.
Einhorn, in his analysis, concluded that “a full and honest disclosure
by Iran of its past weaponization activities — which would contradict
Tehran’s narrative of an exclusively peaceful program as well the
supreme leader’s fatwa that Islam forbids nuclear weapons — was never in
the cards.”
That said, he concludes, that may not be a “serious obstacle” to concluding Iran’s work has halted.
Accessing Nuclear Sites
While
the accord calls for regular inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites, the
enforcement is of limited duration. For example, while the I.A.E.A. can
request access to all declared nuclear sites under the agreements it has
with all member states, the far more intrusive monitoring at Iran’s
main nuclear enrichment site at Natanz is not mandated after 15 years.
At that point, Iran also would be free to carry out nuclear enrichment
at other locations.
But
the issue that has garnered the most attention is a “24-day” rule for
resolving disputes if Iran refuses to give inspectors access to a
suspicious site — another measure that expires after 15 years. (After
that, inspectors can still demand to enter sites, but under the existing
rules, which do not set a deadline for compliance.) Critics say that is
far different from “anywhere, anytime” access — a phrase Mr. Moniz and
others in the administration used a few months ago, and have come to
regret.
If
Iran balks at an inspection, then a commission — which includes Iran —
can decide on punitive steps, including a reimposition of economic
sanctions. A majority vote of the commission suffices, so even if Iran,
China and Russia objected, the sanctions could go into effect.
That
is the theory. In practice, reimposing sanctions could be politically
challenging. Iran has warned that if sanctions are reimposed it will no
longer be bound by the accord. The I.A.E.A., perhaps fearing its
inspectors would be kicked out, might hesitate to start the 24-day
clock.
Mr.
Moniz argues that the 24-day time frame is sufficient because Iran will
not be able to cover up evidence of nuclear work during that period,
since traces of nuclear materials could be expected well after three
weeks. But some experts say that Iran could cover up smaller-scale
illicit activities, including work on the specialized high-explosives
that might serve as a trigger in a nuclear bomb.
A version of this news analysis appears in print on August 24, 2015, on page A1 of the New York edition with the headline: Future Risks of Iran Deal.
Obama's Unforgivable Betrayal
The president's nuclear accommodation of radical Islamist theocrats threatens Israel's survival
.
Accommodating Iran and risking Israel's future
Never! Never would Iran be allowed to have a nuclear
weapon. That was the pledge of the Clinton and Bush administrations. Not
only that. “Never” was the purpose of 191 nations in agreeing to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It came into force in 1970 to save the
planet from destroying itself and all human life. Hence the near
universal agreement, a unique adherence for an arms control measure.
But the story since then is maddening and ominous. One of the parties to the treaty was Iran, and Iran has been in almost continuous noncompliance with the treaty it agreed to.
Flash forward to the Obama administration. Now the president is no longer trying to stop Iran from going nuclear. “Never” has been slimmed down to 13 years – at best! The Iranians have secured enough nuclear fuel to make the first generation bomb small enough to be dropped from a transport plane. The former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector, Olli Heinonen, reckons the proposed agreement from the Lausanne talks leaves Iran “a threshold breakout nuclear state for the next 10 years.” But we may have only the mirage of an agreement since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his associates are producing tons of ambiguity about what was agreed – and on our side, where unity is essential in dealing with a very slippy adversary, there are troubling discrepancies between the French and U.S. understandings.
Just look at the wriggles and evasions since Lausanne. President Barack Obama said the sanctions would be lifted only after Iran has delivered on its commitments. Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani draw new red lines. They insist on the immediate removal of sanctions on agreement; they reject monitoring of Iran’s military sites and have the nerve to say its subversion – assistance to “resistance” groups – will continue.
Yet the sanctions that took years to put in place are being removed almost immediately, unlinked to a change in Iran’s behavior. The symmetry is grim: The Iranians walk away from long-standing commitments and the Americans compromise on long-standing demands.
Obama had previously stated that “the deal we’ll accept” with Iran “is that they end their nuclear program” and abide by the U.N. resolutions that have been in place. Yet more enrichment will continue with 5,000 centrifuges per decade and all restraints will end in 15 years.
That is the key. By making a breakout time the central measure by which to judge the effectiveness, the administration has made verification the most important part of the agreement. We must be in a position to show that we can detect what the Iranians are doing and when they are doing it. The IAEA inspectors must have access to declared and undeclared sites. The artificial deadline the administration imposed has had the perverse effect of pressuring Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, and not the Iranian government, to make concessions. On almost every key issue, the Iranians won the day as the Obama administration folded. The entire infrastructure of the Iranian nuclear weapons program remains intact.
There is no way to reconcile Obama’s acceptance of Iran as a
threshold nuclear state with a safe fate for Israel. Thus the view
overwhelmingly shared by Israelis that he is risking the Jewish state’s
future. A deal based on this framework after all would threaten the
survival of Israel. Obama has broken with Israel on an existential and
unforgivable level. When Obama finally tightened the sanctions forcing
Iran to the table, he surrendered, especially on the issue of
centrifuges that Iran has developed. Perhaps Obama can afford a bad deal
because he has a year and a half left of his presidency. But the people
in the Middle East have to live with the consequences of Obama’s
agreement with Iran long after he is gone. For that is when the bulk of
the nuclear deal with the world powers will be in effect.
Obama deliberately wrote off the inconvenient view of the country that is most endangered, Israel. He accommodated radical Islamist theocrats when he should have insisted on the opposite, that the survival of Israel is non-negotiable. In effect, he betrayed the trust of the Jewish state. And it is not just Israel that opposes Obama’s deal. The Arab leaders, especially our closest friends, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have made clear they share Israel’s view.
Obama has regularly tried to oversell Americans on this issue. When he became president, Iran had “thousands of centrifuges” which now would be cut down to around 6,000. In fact, according to the New York Post, in 2008 Iran only had 800 centrifuges. It was on Obama’s watch, and because of his perceived weakness, that Iran accelerated its nuclear program. Then, the president asserted that all of Iran’s “paths” to developing a nuclear arsenal would be blocked. Yet, he still acknowledged what is now the common perception that Iran might still be able to build a bomb in just a year.
The president offers false choices between something like this deal and U.S. involvement in another ground war in the Middle East. Why does he not acknowledge the third choice is to force Iran to behave: wider sanctions, diplomatic action and proximity pressures to force Iran to abide by six U.N. resolutions?
In fact, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. must impose the most stringent possible limits on Iran’s ability to produce fissile material. It means permitting Iran only a civilian nuclear power program without enrichment facilities or capabilities. This must be joined with a strict and comprehensive inspection regime underpinned by credible and concrete promises to punish noncompliance. Such a deal must extend as long as the U.S. and its partners believe Iran retains its nuclear weapons ambition, which will threaten its neighbors, and remains the unsettling force in the Middle East.
But none of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the Fordow center will be closed, as The Washington Post noted. Not one of the country’s 19,000 centrifuges will be dismantled. Tehran’s existing pile of enriched uranium will be “reduced” but not necessarily shipped out of the country. In effect, then, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will remain intact even though some of it will be mothballed for 10 years. But when the accord lapses the Islamic Republic will instantly become a threshold nuclear state.
Most upsetting is that even with much greater restriction the deal would not be permanent but instead one or more sunset clauses whereby all limits would ultimately be lifted.
Congress fears it has no substantive input, which means a deal would be implemented without its consent. The vote and voice of Congress is vital to the credibility and durability of a final deal that would be acceptable to the U.S. and not just to this administration.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee understands that breakout time is crucially related to the size of Iran’s stockpile of fissile material. How much of its existing stockpile would Iran be required to ship out of the country? It has reneged on one deal and will try to do it on another if it is allowed to continue its efforts to increase the efficiency of its operating centrifuges. We need prohibitions on such activity, which would also include bans on any and all work on centrifuges other than those currently installed or operated, as well as clear restrictions on when, where, why and how Iran could replace the installed centrifuges.
What would an acceptable deal look like? We need an end to all
research and development activity on advanced centrifuges in Iran; a
significant decrease in the number of centrifuges that are operational
or become operational if Iran breaks the agreement and decides to build a
bomb; the closing of the Fordow facility as an enrichment site, even if
enrichment is suspended there; an agreement to ship Iran’s stockpile of
enriched uranium out of the country; a commitment to scale back its
nuclear programs significantly for 10 to 15 years and to accept intense
international inspections; a willingness to limit enrichment of uranium
at its Natanz facility to a level needed only for civilian purposes; to
cut back installed centrifuges by about two-thirds, while converting
Fordow into a center for peaceful research and foregoing enriching
uranium there for at least 15 years; as well as modifying its Arak
heavy-water reactor to render it incapable of producing plutonium for a
bomb.
Limits on when, where, why and how Iran would replace centrifuges during a breakout time would be crucial to preventing Iran from developing more efficient centrifuges for use immediately after an agreement expires. Iran believes it can continue to use the Fordow underground uranium enrichment plant for developing centrifuges, while the U.S. says no enrichment could take place there for 15 years.
The United States should stand by its original demands to shut down the facility altogether with the purpose of limiting total output of Iran’s enrichment facilities to its current capability. That would prevent it from cutting breakout times with the flip of a switch if it chooses to renege on the deal. The next few months will be nothing less than a supreme test of our skill and our resolve and give the Obama administration the opportunity to manage a fundamental change that improperly handled would threaten American allies and the United States itself.
But the story since then is maddening and ominous. One of the parties to the treaty was Iran, and Iran has been in almost continuous noncompliance with the treaty it agreed to.
Flash forward to the Obama administration. Now the president is no longer trying to stop Iran from going nuclear. “Never” has been slimmed down to 13 years – at best! The Iranians have secured enough nuclear fuel to make the first generation bomb small enough to be dropped from a transport plane. The former International Atomic Energy Agency inspector, Olli Heinonen, reckons the proposed agreement from the Lausanne talks leaves Iran “a threshold breakout nuclear state for the next 10 years.” But we may have only the mirage of an agreement since Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his associates are producing tons of ambiguity about what was agreed – and on our side, where unity is essential in dealing with a very slippy adversary, there are troubling discrepancies between the French and U.S. understandings.
Just look at the wriggles and evasions since Lausanne. President Barack Obama said the sanctions would be lifted only after Iran has delivered on its commitments. Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani draw new red lines. They insist on the immediate removal of sanctions on agreement; they reject monitoring of Iran’s military sites and have the nerve to say its subversion – assistance to “resistance” groups – will continue.
Yet the sanctions that took years to put in place are being removed almost immediately, unlinked to a change in Iran’s behavior. The symmetry is grim: The Iranians walk away from long-standing commitments and the Americans compromise on long-standing demands.
Obama had previously stated that “the deal we’ll accept” with Iran “is that they end their nuclear program” and abide by the U.N. resolutions that have been in place. Yet more enrichment will continue with 5,000 centrifuges per decade and all restraints will end in 15 years.
That is the key. By making a breakout time the central measure by which to judge the effectiveness, the administration has made verification the most important part of the agreement. We must be in a position to show that we can detect what the Iranians are doing and when they are doing it. The IAEA inspectors must have access to declared and undeclared sites. The artificial deadline the administration imposed has had the perverse effect of pressuring Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, and not the Iranian government, to make concessions. On almost every key issue, the Iranians won the day as the Obama administration folded. The entire infrastructure of the Iranian nuclear weapons program remains intact.
Why is Kerry, not Iran, making concessions in nuclear deal negotiations?
Obama deliberately wrote off the inconvenient view of the country that is most endangered, Israel. He accommodated radical Islamist theocrats when he should have insisted on the opposite, that the survival of Israel is non-negotiable. In effect, he betrayed the trust of the Jewish state. And it is not just Israel that opposes Obama’s deal. The Arab leaders, especially our closest friends, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, have made clear they share Israel’s view.
Linda Chavez asks whether any of our allies even trust our word any
longer? Why should they when the president failed to live up to
promises, for example, to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine, or to keep
the murderous Assad regime from killing Syrian civilians. The Iranian
deal is more capitulation to those who threaten U.S. national security.
Iran will even get an immediate economic boost when we lift sanctions,
which will strengthen a regime that is already ascendant as a regional
power.
Obama has regularly tried to oversell Americans on this issue. When he became president, Iran had “thousands of centrifuges” which now would be cut down to around 6,000. In fact, according to the New York Post, in 2008 Iran only had 800 centrifuges. It was on Obama’s watch, and because of his perceived weakness, that Iran accelerated its nuclear program. Then, the president asserted that all of Iran’s “paths” to developing a nuclear arsenal would be blocked. Yet, he still acknowledged what is now the common perception that Iran might still be able to build a bomb in just a year.
The president offers false choices between something like this deal and U.S. involvement in another ground war in the Middle East. Why does he not acknowledge the third choice is to force Iran to behave: wider sanctions, diplomatic action and proximity pressures to force Iran to abide by six U.N. resolutions?
In fact, to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons capability, the U.S. must impose the most stringent possible limits on Iran’s ability to produce fissile material. It means permitting Iran only a civilian nuclear power program without enrichment facilities or capabilities. This must be joined with a strict and comprehensive inspection regime underpinned by credible and concrete promises to punish noncompliance. Such a deal must extend as long as the U.S. and its partners believe Iran retains its nuclear weapons ambition, which will threaten its neighbors, and remains the unsettling force in the Middle East.
But none of Iran’s nuclear facilities, including the Fordow center will be closed, as The Washington Post noted. Not one of the country’s 19,000 centrifuges will be dismantled. Tehran’s existing pile of enriched uranium will be “reduced” but not necessarily shipped out of the country. In effect, then, Iran’s nuclear infrastructure will remain intact even though some of it will be mothballed for 10 years. But when the accord lapses the Islamic Republic will instantly become a threshold nuclear state.
Most upsetting is that even with much greater restriction the deal would not be permanent but instead one or more sunset clauses whereby all limits would ultimately be lifted.
Congress fears it has no substantive input, which means a deal would be implemented without its consent. The vote and voice of Congress is vital to the credibility and durability of a final deal that would be acceptable to the U.S. and not just to this administration.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee understands that breakout time is crucially related to the size of Iran’s stockpile of fissile material. How much of its existing stockpile would Iran be required to ship out of the country? It has reneged on one deal and will try to do it on another if it is allowed to continue its efforts to increase the efficiency of its operating centrifuges. We need prohibitions on such activity, which would also include bans on any and all work on centrifuges other than those currently installed or operated, as well as clear restrictions on when, where, why and how Iran could replace the installed centrifuges.
Limits on when, where, why and how Iran would replace centrifuges during a breakout time would be crucial to preventing Iran from developing more efficient centrifuges for use immediately after an agreement expires. Iran believes it can continue to use the Fordow underground uranium enrichment plant for developing centrifuges, while the U.S. says no enrichment could take place there for 15 years.
The United States should stand by its original demands to shut down the facility altogether with the purpose of limiting total output of Iran’s enrichment facilities to its current capability. That would prevent it from cutting breakout times with the flip of a switch if it chooses to renege on the deal. The next few months will be nothing less than a supreme test of our skill and our resolve and give the Obama administration the opportunity to manage a fundamental change that improperly handled would threaten American allies and the United States itself.
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